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Going public is one of the most important decisions in the life of a company. It provides the 
possibility to raise new financial resources, immediately available to finance firms’ growth 
plans and to rebalance their capital structure. It offers the existing shareholders the opportunity 
to monetize part of their investments in the firm by exploiting the public offering as an exit 
strategy. It also enhances the reputation of the listing company both in the business and in the 
financial communities. Nevertheless, the process of going public is not costless. The transition 
from private to publicly traded entity generally implies several changes in the organizational 
structure of a firm, as the loss of management control, the increase in the disclosure 
requirements and the pressure from regulatory oversights. However, the most suffered costs by 
issuing companies are usually those directly related to the process of listing, paid in the form 
of fees. On the contrary, the major indirect cost of going public, shares underpricing, is 
frequently neglected.  
A broad empirical literature evidences indeed that when firms undertake initial public offerings, 
the price of the offered shares tend to jump substantially during the first day of trading. This 
systematic price increase on the stock exchange, with respect to the price at which shares are 
initially offered to investors, is therefore referred to as “underpricing”. Underpricing represents 
an opportunity cost for firms going public since, issuers selling shares at an offer price lower 
than their potential market value, are “leaving money on the table” and are diluting even more 
pre-issue shareholders’ ownership. In practice, it appears as a wealth transfer from the pocket 
of issuing firm and pre-issue shareholders to initial investors. The firsts to analyse this robust 
phenomenon were Reilly (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). Over the subsequent years, numerous 
researchers have tried to understand and explain its causes, thus developing a wide set of 
theories around the issue. The most relevant theories are based on asymmetric information, 
asserting that underpricing is caused by information frictions among the three main parties 
involved in the listing process: the issuer, the underwriter and the investors. Other groups of 
theories are then institutional theories, claiming that underpricing is used by issuing firm in 
order to insure against legal liability and reputation damage, and ownership and control 
theories, arguing that issuing firm’s managers voluntary underprice offered shares in order to 
obtain certain advantages in terms of ownership and control. The most recent theories are finally 
those which identify underpricing causes in the behavioural biases of the agents involved in the 
listing process, hence called behavioural theories. Additionally, other studies have focused on 
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specific factors affecting the level of underpricing, such as issue’s, firm’s and economy’s 
variables.   
In order to mitigate part of the direct and indirect costs associated with the listing process, in 
the last years, two important technology companies have decided to go public on the major 
stock exchanges through a very atypical mechanism: the direct public offering, alternatively 
known as direct listing. Direct public offerings present two fundamental differences with 
respect to traditional initial public offerings: they only provide for the listing of existing shares 
and they do not involve investment banks in the role of underwriters. Direct public offerings 
are indeed widely discussed because they downsize investment banks importance in the overall 
process of going public, therefore cutting fees paid by listing companies. The first company 
that chose to go public using a direct listing, in alternative to a traditional initial public offering, 
was Spotify Technology. The Swedish global leader of the music streaming listed part of its 
existing shares on the New York Stock Exchange on April 3, 2018, after having received the 
approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission. One year later, on June 20, 2019, also 
Slack Technologies, an American software firm, decided to go public on the NYSE via direct 
listing.  
The aim of this dissertation is not to merely illustrate the direct public offerings in order to 
appraise their advisability over the traditional listing procedure. The primary research objective 
is, instead, to understand if underpricing is a consistent phenomenon also in offerings 
characterized by no underwriting agreement and by a limited engagement of investment banks 
in the pricing and allocation phase. For timing reasons, the empirical analysis will be focused 
on the case of Spotify. In order to answer the question, it will be first necessary to acquire a 
deep understanding of the company’s business model, financial results and competitive 
framework; only afterwards it will be possible to detail Spotify’s direct public offering so to 
carefully evaluate each party’s contribution to the structuring of the process and to assess if a 
sort of shares underpricing could be observed as well. If this first part of the analysis leads 
indeed to some affirmative outcomes in terms of underpricing, then it will be worth to examine 
company’s valuation at the time of listing and to measure the extent of Spotify’s mispricing in 
comparison to similar traditional offerings, so to clarify the role actually played by investment 
banks in determining the degree of underpricing.  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 offers an overview of IPOs and DPOs, describing 
for each of them the main steps, the different pricing mechanisms and the services provided by 
underwriters; it also summarizes the advantages of going public and all the costs that issuing 
firms must incur for both the listing methodologies.  
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Chapter 2 introduces a literature review of the underpricing phenomenon and reports which are, 
according to past empirical researches, the variables that mostly affect the level of IPO 
underpricing.  
Chapter 3 reports the most relevant empirical findings about the relation between underpricing 
and underwriters, by analysing and comparing various offerings undertaken through different 
pricing mechanisms, underwriting and allocation procedures; it represents a basis to then 
contextualize the case study, also providing evidence about underpricing for technology and 
Internet-related companies.   
Chapter 4 presents the case of Spotify DPO: after an analysis of the company’s business model, 
economic and market performance, future risks and opportunities, and after a detailed 
description of its listing process, the supposed level of underpricing is compared to the findings 
deriving from an empirical research conducted on contemporary IPOs; in the final part of the 
chapter, following a valuation analysis on the company’s fundamental value using DCF and 





CHAPTER 1 - THE LISTING PROCESS 
 
An initial public offering is the first sale of a privately held company’s shares to the public and 
the listing of these shares on a stock exchange. For firms that choose to go public, the transition 
to the equity market represents a milestone in their everyday life, bearing enriching but also 
complex and time-consuming changes. As Draho (2004, p.1) highlights “few events in the life 
of a company are as great in magnitude and consequence as initial public offering (IPO)”. 
Indeed, the decision to go public not only must involve a thorough analysis of the initial benefits 
and costs – like the burden of the disclosure and compliance requirements – but it must consider 
also all difficulties that could arise after the effective listing. An IPO entails in fact substantial 
changes in the organizational structure of a firm: different legal and economic structure, loss of 
management’s control, increase in information disclosure requirements and stricter regulatory 
oversight.  
The success of an IPO strictly depends on an accurate pre-evaluation of all the possible 
scenarios which could realize along the process: before starting such an experience is 
fundamental for a firm to be fully aware about the available planning alternatives, about the 
subjects and entities involved in each phase, about their roles, responsibilities and implications 
in the overall process, so to minimize any possible risks and to maximize the final outcome.  
This chapter will try to deeply analyse all these aspects from the listing company’s point of 
view. The aforementioned issues will be divided into the two listing processes that will be 
compared along the whole elaboration, in order to have a full understanding of how they work 
before going to discuss them in terms of underpricing in the next chapters: the traditional initial 
public offering, the IPO, and the direct public offering, the DPO.  
 
1.1 - THE CHOICE OF GOING PUBLIC 
Disregarding the type of process chosen to go public, when starting to think about a possible 
listing, a private firm has always to ask which the benefits of going public could be. There are 
various and several answers to this question.  
First of all, as stated by Iannotta (2010), the most important reason to go public is probably 
cash. From the firm’s perspective, the new capital infusion obtained through the stock market 
offers a good alternative way to support the expansion of the company’s operations, to enhance 
the research and development, to finance new projects, or simply, to improve the company’s 
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financial structure. Through IPOs in fact, companies are able to raise new equity necessary to 
fund their growth without creating any further debt. From shareholders’ perspective too, 
liquidity is a key factor in the going public decision. For instance, the IPO of a firm could be a 
valuable strategy to deal with the succession of the first entrepreneurial generation, if a second 
is not available or willing to manage the firm (Iannotta, 2010). More in general, it can be 
affirmed that the shares listing is a liquidity event that permits founders and pre-IPO investors 
to monetize part of their investment or to completely cash out their position using the IPO as 
an exit strategy, especially in the case of private equity funds. This is further supported by 
Zingales (1995, p.425), who states that “IPO is also an important channel through which an 
entrepreneur or venture capitalist gets rewarded for his initial effort.” In going public indeed, 
entrepreneurs try to optimize the structure of their ownership in the company so to maximize 
the total proceeds from an eventual sale, and to use the IPO to facilitate the acquisition of the 
company for higher values than what they would get by bargaining in a trade sale.  
Besides that, there are other meaningful non-cash benefits from an IPO, especially for the firm 
itself. First, when companies are pursuing strategies of external growth through mergers and 
acquisitions, IPOs allow them to enhance payment alternatives: once a company is public, it 
can in fact acquire other businesses by paying with its own listed stocks rather than using only 
cash; in this case indeed, a public valuation is available, and, most importantly, the shares can 
be liquidated in any moment (Iannotta, 2010). Publicly tradable shares are clearly more 
attractive for target shareholders than illiquid private company stock. 
Second, a firm can obtain several advantages from the better image and reputation associated 
to the stock exchange listing. Thanks to the transparency in terms of financial and economic 
situation required by the listing parameters, public companies have easier access to debt market 
compared to private firms; furthermore, the continue information disclosure guarantees listed 
companies much more visibility towards stakeholders; as sustained by Geddes (2003) then, 
public companies are able to attract and to hire more qualified managers and employees because 
of the relevance and prestige tied to them. Finally, thanks to the better consideration in terms 
of strength and stability, listed firms can gain easier relationships with customers and suppliers.  
Third, IPOs also provide some enhanced benefits for current employees. Stock options and 
other similar performance-based compensation incentives align employees’ interests with those 
of the company: by allowing them to benefit alongside the company’s financial success, these 
programs increase productivity and loyalty to the firm. Management compensation solutions in 
particular – which are only possible if a company is listed – give management the right incentive 
and motivation to run the firm in the best way. 
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1.2 - THE TRADITIONAL UNDERWRITTEN IPO PROCESS 
The process of planning and executing a traditional IPO is highly articulated and time-
consuming: while it typically takes 14 to 16 weeks to close, the exact time taken can widely 
vary, depending on market conditions, complexity of the transaction, company’s readiness prior 
to the IPO process and many other factors. In this timeframe a company must choose the stock 
exchange in which to list its shares, decide how to offer them, perform various due diligence 
activities in order to provide the regulatory authority with the proper information and 
documentation requested, undertake some marketing actions and manage the relationship with 
prospective investors. Therefore, the complexity of the IPO process usually requires the support 
of a large team of professionals, including the company itself, the legal counsel, auditors and 
investment bank, among others. The latest, in particular, retains a primary importance in the 
overall IPO process, and it normally plays the role of underwriter: offering its underwriting 
services to the future listed company, the investment bank actually purchases securities – in the 
case of an IPO, stocks – from the issuer and then resales them to the market (Iannotta, 2010). It 
structures the transaction by verifying business and financial data, performs the due diligence 
and most importantly, prices the securities offered; as it will be further explained in the 
following paragraphs, the centrality of the investment bank in the IPO process derives indeed 
from its deep influence in the price-setting mechanism, being the price a crucial variable of any 
offering. Its functions can be briefly summarized as follows: 
− information, as it determines the market’s interest in the offering;  
− certification, as it certifies the quality of the deal and of the securities been issued, since the 
reputation of an investment bank is damaged if involved in mispriced (not good) IPOs;  
− research, as it provides aftermarket analyst coverage, increasing trading activities and 
liquidity;  
− market making, as it guarantees the ongoing trading of the issued securities.  
The presence of the investment bank in the IPO process is therefore strictly related to a matter 
of information asymmetry between issuing firm and investors. As Iannotta (2010, p.6) indeed 
argues “if a firm were able to credibly approach the financial markets and market its own […] 
stocks without any third party “certifying” the quality of its securities, investment banks would 
not exist”. A detail review of the common IPO phases will be provided in the following 
paragraphs, trying to stress – giving its cruciality – how they result traditionally driven by the 






The selection of the underwriter  
As anticipated, an IPO process is highly complex in terms of relationships and documentation 
to be provided; for this reason, it requires the management of a company to have a detailed 
knowledge about the stock exchange and the mechanisms behind it. Since, in general, a firm’s 
management has never dealt with an IPO process before, an investment bank can therefore offer 
the possibility to exploit its competences in the stock market and its network of contacts among 
different investors, so to speed up the overall process and to increase the firm’s visibility. 
Investment banks usually manage a lot of aspects of an initial public offering: performing a due 
diligence about financial soundness and satisfaction of capital requirements, they assist the 
company in shaping its investment thesis to be then used during the marketing phase; while 
preparing the registration statement and the prospectus, they guide the company in the 
presentation to investors; they underwrite the stocks, assuming part of the risk associated with 
the issue; they develop strong price recommendations and allocate shares to investors, selling 
in this way company’s stocks to the public.  
Given the importance of the services and advice provided throughout the process as well as the 
messages its involvement in an IPO signal to other advisors and to the market, a company 
should carefully consider the qualifications and the skills of the investment bank it hires. The 
selection of the underwriter is made among several investment banks that are ranked using some 
quantifiable criteria as the total IPO proceeds and their market share. According to Dealogic 
global IPOs bookrunner ranking1, the most important investment banks for 2019 in terms of 
value and number of followed IPOs are Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley and JPMorgan. Having in mind this ranking, firms then start the selection of the 
investment bank with a beauty contest (also known as “bake-off”), in which each participating 
bank makes a formal presentation to the board of directors, trying to emphasize their expertise 
in the IPO process, showing their recent relevant IPOs, the post-IPO price performance of the 
companies they have taken public and their preliminary views on the market value of the 
company (Bagley and Dauchy, 2012). However, as underlined by Fernando, Gatchev and 
Spindt (2005) in their paper about the way in which firms and underwriters choose each other, 
is worth to point out that “issuers and underwriters associate by mutual choice”: during the 
“bake-off” meetings in fact, as issuers look to the abilities of prospective underwriters to certify, 
promote, and allocate their shares, similarly underwriters look to the issuer’s characteristics 
relative to other possible issuers; factors like the issue size, the likelihood that the offer will be 
 
1 Available at https://www.dealogic.com/platform/investment-banking-capital-markets/ [access date: 10/08/2019]. 
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completed, or even the probability that the issuer will remain in the business and issue further 
shares in the future, will indeed affect underwriters’ short-term and long-term profits. So, 
“underwriting contracts are executed between those issuers and underwriters who mutually 
agree that their interests coincide” (Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt, 2005, p.2438). It follows 
that, in general, higher quality firms tend to associate with underwriters characterized by a 
higher ability, while lower quality firms associate with lower ability underwriters. Having 
clarified that, from the issuer firm’s perspective, the evaluation of the candidates is made 
combining different criteria: cost minimization (as underpricing and compensation), reputation 
of the bank’s analysts, level of information that the bank has collected about the firm and about 
the potential investors’ interest, and additional services provided besides the underwriting one 
are all aspects taken into consideration. The choice of a specific underwriter is then externalized 
by the firm by sending a letter of intent to the chosen bank.  
Although the whole IPO is primarily managed by a single investment bank, more banks are 
usually involved in the process, so to form a syndicate. The issuing firm normally selects a lead 
bookrunner, that plays the critical role of advising the company on all aspects of the IPO 
process, assists the company in marketing the transaction and guides the firm in its dealings 
with investors. Being responsible for the due-diligence, roadshow, bookbuilding and allocation 
of the shares, it also gets the largest portion of fees. In consultation with the firm, the lead 
bookrunner then forms a syndicate of banks that assists in the pricing, underwriting and 
distribution of the offering.  Inside the syndicate it is possible to distinguish three main parts. 
The first part is the managing group, composed by the lead bookrunner and the joint 
bookrunners, that are chosen based on their relationship with the company, industry expertise, 
research analyst capabilities and market-making ability. They work closely in order to draft the 
registration statement, craft the marketing materials, create the roadshow schedule, and support 
the stock in the aftermarket. The second group of the syndicate also comprehends non-
managing underwriters (called “managers”), that are less involved in the day-to-day advisory 
for which the bookrunners are responsible for, but that have the role of underwriting an 
additional portion of shares following bookrunners’ suggestion. Finally, there are some selling 
banks (known as “co-managers”), that mainly guarantee the allocation of the shares, providing 
additional research coverage and assisting the market making once the stock is public (Iannotta, 
2010). The company’s choice of the lead bookrunner becomes therefore of fundamental 
importance, if considered its consequence in determining the other investment banks 
participating in the IPO process.  
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Once concluded the selection of the main underwriter and of the whole syndicate of banks – if 
any – the contract between the issuer and the investment bank is formalized through an 
underwriting agreement, which can be shaped in three different ways:  
1. The first form of this contract is the “firm commitment”, in which the underwriter 
guarantees to purchase all the shares issued at the agreed price and to absorb eventual loss 
in case of unsold shares; for the issuer, it is the safest but the most expensive type of 
contract. 
2. The second form is the so called “best effort” contract, in which the underwriter tries to sell 
as many shares as possible but does not guarantee the proceeds to the issuer; of course an 
underwriter who considers the issue quite risky may prefer this type of agreement to shift 
the risk to the company. 
3. The third form is the “all-or-non” contract, that can be considered a modification of the 
best-effort alternative: in this case, if the entire offering is not sold, the underwriter agrees 
to cancel the issue.  
 
The due diligence phase 
In a traditional underwritten initial public offering, once decided for the investment bank that 
will lead the whole process, the first week is characterized by several organizational meetings 
among the management of the firm and all the key members of the IPO working group, usually 
held at the company’s headquarters, in order to clearly define timing, key tasks and 
responsibilities for the IPO and to understand as much as possible about the issuer’s relevant 
aspects.  
From this information-gathering phase onwards, the bank chosen as lead bookrunner, together 
with other banks of the managing group of the syndicate – if any – starts the so called due 
diligence phase, which can be broadly referred to as “the process of verifying that the 
information in the prospectus and the registration statement is materially complete and 
accurate” (NYSE, 2013, p.38). As it is therefore possible to infer from this definition, the due 
diligence activity is strictly connected to the drafting of the registration statement and, in 
particular, of the prospectus, whose contents and aims will be later presented in this paragraph. 
So, in addition to ensure the accuracy, completeness and truthfulness of the company’s 
registration statement, which is fundamental for the issuer in order to build confidence among 
potential investors, due diligence has actually the purpose of limiting the risk of liabilities: in 
case of material misstatements or omissions in the offering disclosures, it provides underwriters 
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and directors of the company with due diligence defence2. Both parties indeed have important 
reputational interests in the soundness of the company’s business plan and associated risks 
presented in the disclosure documents. In this sense, due diligence also helps identifying 
business issues that need to be addressed before the listing becomes effective.  
Due diligence investigation performed by the managing group of banks basically consists in a 
collaborative and iterative process with the firm, which takes the form of company’s 
inspections, meetings, interviews, questions and answers sessions with directors and managers 
of the firm. The inspected aspects of the firm during this phase are numerous and 
interconnected, but for organizational purposes, two kinds of due diligence can be identified. 
First, banks conduct business and financial due diligence, focusing primarily on the company’s 
operations, procedures, historical and prospective financials, firm’s capital structure, 
competitive position and business strategy, as well as on management team and key board 
members in order to assess their qualification and experience in running the firm. As part of 
this procedure, managing underwriters also review any agreement the company signed with 
customers, suppliers and creditors, and – if necessary – undertake interviews and discussions 
with these parties. Second, legal and accounting due diligence is performed: this type of 
investigation verifies company’s legal records, the accounts ledgers and material contracts, and 
wants to analyse any litigation and compliance with laws and regulations. Of course, in 
conducting all these activities, investments banks are supported by lawyers, accountants and 
any other helpful external consultants.  
As anticipated before, the outcome of the whole due diligence activity is the preparation of the 
prospectus. “The prospectus is, legally, the only publication that investors should use in order 
to make an investment decision to buy shares […] in an IPO” (Espinasse, 2014, p.102). In other 
words, it is the central document used to market an initial public offering to potential investors. 
All the information gathered during the due diligence phase is used to draft a preliminary 
prospectus, that in the U.S. is called “red herring”, since it has a legal disclaimer printed in red 
in its front page, stating that the securities are not yet offered. In fact, the content of this initial 
document is usually not complete and subject to further changes. The prospectus must include 
information about the firm’s business (like products and services, distribution channels, or 
intellectual property); audited financial statements and even unaudited interim financial 
statements; firm’s strengths, strategy and competitive environment; potential risk factors that 
 
2 In many jurisdictions, other liable parties in case of material misstatements and/or omissions in the prospectus 
and in the registration statement are the officers who sign the registration statement, the company’s auditors, and 
any selling shareholders.  
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may affect future performance of the company; quality and experience of the management; use 
of the proceeds from the IPO (for growth, debt reduction, or acquisition of other businesses for 
instance); information about the main shareholders and even about the investment bank chosen 
as underwriter. As stated by Iannotta (2010, p.53) “the prospectus provides full disclosure of a 
firm’s business and it is a key marketing and protection tool for retail investors”. A simplified 
version of the document, called “offering circular” is instead addressed to institutional 
investors. The final prospectus then includes additional detailed information about the issue, as 
the number of shares offered and the final offering price, the dilution resulting from the offering, 
underwriting agreements and any selling shareholders.  
This final document must also be ultimately approved by the market authority (i.e. by the SEC, 
“Securities and Exchange Commission”, in the U.S.). In the U.S. indeed, the final prospectus 
constitutes the Part I of the registration statement, a document in the company’s responsibility 
which is filed with the SEC for the registration of the initial public offering. The amount and 
the type of information there included must be conformed to SEC rules. Generally, domestic 
companies submit the registration statement on Form S-1 (or Form F-1 if foreign private 
issuers) which is composed, besides the prospectus, by Part II: in this section several data and 
documents are required, such as employment arrangements, a list of subsidiaries, joint ventures 
and license agreements, acquisitions or contracts with customers and suppliers. For this reason, 
smaller issuers can use other registration forms that require less specific information and a less 
complex procedure to register their offerings. Once received the registration statement, the SEC 
must verify its conformance to disclosure requirements: the SEC takes approximately 30 days 
to complete its initial review of the first version of the registration statement and usually 
requires at least three amendments of the document before the approval; anyway, it can always 
refuse to make the registration statement effective if some documents are incomplete or are 
missing. After the approval of the prospectus and all the other documents, the registration 
statement becomes effective, allowing the company to sell its shares from this moment on.  
 
The marketing phase 
While waiting comments from the SEC on the draft registration statement, pre-marketing 
activities of the IPO start to be prepared. Analysts of the managing investment banks work at 
the so-called pre-IPO research report, which is used to educate institutional investors on the 
firm’s investment case. Before this report is released, the prospective IPO is undisclosed to the 
public. The importance of the research report relies therefore in the possibility of collecting 
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investors’ feedbacks and their interest in participating in the IPO, helping therefore the 
underwriters to determine a price range for the issue. After the release of this document, a black-
out period usually follows3: the lead investment bank does not release any another report about 
the issue, in order to avoid analysts’ recommendations that could increase market demand or 
offering price. Sometimes, however, investment banks undertake confidential talks with some 
key institutional investors as well, in order to get their feelings about the issue (this pre-
marketing practice is usually referred to as “pilot fishing”). Having collected the feelings from 
prospective institutional investors, a price range is set: the width of the range is quite variable, 
being from 10% to 20% or even more from the mid-price.  
Once the pre-marketing step is over, the last weeks prior to the listing are dedicated to the 
roadshow in which the company, accompanied by the representatives of the bookrunners, 
conducts a series of presentations to an audience of potential investors and a series of one-to-
one meetings with the most important ones (which is the most quoted way by investors, since 
it allows to avoid free riding on the information they get). In this way investors are able to 
quickly absorb the “equity story” and to evaluate their investment decision. Just targeting 
investors – those who are most likely interested in the issue – are invited to the roadshow: 
investment banks in fact usually consider only institutional investors and exclude retail ones, 
both because of the non-feasibility to manage a large number of small investors and because of 
the better knowledge about the value of the company by professional investors. These meetings 
usually take just a couple of weeks or even less, depending on the size of the IPO. They can 
take place in different financial centres, including also the city in which the stocks will be listed. 
The presentation made is usually 20 to 30 slides in length: it details the offering, the company’s 
products and services, key selling points, industry trends and growth opportunities, competitive 
positioning and financial performance. In this sense, roadshow presentations do not add new 
information about the firm but “merely reiterate fairly general information already contained in 
the prospectus. Perhaps surprisingly, road shows may instead be a way for the investment 
banker to gather information from investors, about their views of the company and its valuation. 
[…] The marketing phase thus generates a lot of additional information regarding the reaction 
of the potential investors to the offer, which can be fed into the next stage of the process when 
the final price is set” (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, pp.14-15). In this phase, investors are 
also solicited to make non-binding bids, from which a book of orders, useful to define the final 
offering price of the issue, is determined4.  
 
3 The black-out period is a proper rule in the U.S., while it is more a common practice in other countries.  
4 See the next paragraph “Pricing and allocation phase”.  
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Besides the roadshow, issuing firm and investment banks have also other possible and 
additional alternatives of marketing an IPO, like press briefing and advertising. Marketing 
campaign is critical and, as stated by Kuhn (1990, p.269), it “will determine the success or 
failure of the IPO. The key is to stimulate investor demand for the stock so that, as in basic 
economics, the demand will exceed the supply.”  
 
Pricing and allocation phase 
The final steps of the IPO process are dedicated to the most critical phase: the pricing of the 
offering and the allocation of the shares among investors. As sustained by Espinasse (2014, 
p.193): “pricing and allocating an IPO is really more of an art than a science. It needs to take 
into account the priorities of the issuer, of the selling shareholders (if any) and of the investors 
so as to encourage aftermarket buying and a steady increase in the share price”.  
Pricing an IPO is a really difficult task, since it is not possible to observe a market price prior 
to the offering; the offering price should in fact reflect the fundamental value of the issuing firm 
and should be aligned with the valuation of comparable companies. At the same time, it must 
also take into consideration issuer’s and underwriter’s different interests and needs. As stated 
by Sindelar, Ritter and Ibbotson (1994, p.66) “if the price is set too low, the issuer does not get 
the full advantage of its ability to raise capital. If it is priced too high, then the investor would 
get an inferior return and consequently might reject the offering”. This high uncertainty 
surrounding the setting of the price makes the role of the investment bank even more crucial in 
the overall IPO process and very strictly related to the price setting mechanism chosen. There 
are three main mechanisms to price and distribute shares:  
1. fixed price offerings, in which the offering price is set prior to requests of shares being 
submitted; 
2. auctions, in which a market clearing price is set after bids are submitted; 
3. open price offerings, better known as bookbuilding, in which the investment bank 
canvasses potential investors and then sets an offering price. 
Nowadays, the most common approach is bookbuilding. Despite the criticism it attracts for its 
lack of transparency, from 1990s, thanks to the penetration of American investment banks in 
the European market, this mechanism has become the most used worldwide. Draho (2004, 
p.219) sustained indeed that “issuers, underwriters and institutional investors appear to 
universally favour bookbuilding when given the choice”, but he then added that “issuers do not 
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get to choose their IPO mechanism. Either regulatory constraints limit the choice or market 
forces dictate that certain types of issuers must use a particular method”.  
In fixed-price mechanism, the issue’s final price is fixed with respect to the market demand and 
is already specified in the preliminary prospectus. It is not influenced by investors’ orders and 
cannot be adjusted in response to excess supply and demand. Despite the presence of several 
allocation approaches reflecting the different market’s regulations, in fixed-price mechanism 
share allocation is usually performed on a pro rata basis when the issue is oversubscribed (“fair 
allocation system”).  
Auctions are the least common type of price-setting mechanisms and currently, excluding some 
exceptions, is normally used only in four countries (France, Isreael, Taiwan and the U.S.). In 
an auction, investors are invited to bid for shares, and once the offering is covered, shares are 
allocated among investors following some precise and transparent rules. Two kinds of auctions 
are used. One is discriminatory (or pay-what-you-bid) auction, in which winning bidders pay 
the price they bid. The other is uniform-price (or single price), where all winning bidders pay 
the same price, that is the market clearing price; it represents the highest price for which 
sufficient bids at decreasing prices cover the shares being offered. Investors specify the limit 
price of their offer and the number of shares they are willing to buy. The aggregate demand 
curve is formed by all individual orders and the final price is determined by matching demand 
and fixed supply. In case of excess demand each investors whose bid is above the clearing price 
would receive the whole amount of shares demanded, while the bids at the clearing price would 
receive a pro-rata allocation of shares. In general, there is no pricing and allocation discretion 
in an auction mechanism; once decided the type of auction, the underwriter has a passive role. 
As confirmed by Draho (2004, p.218) “the bids are effectively anonymous, as shares are 
allocated in a non-discriminatory basis to institutional and retail investors”.  
The bookbuilding mechanism is instead typically characterized by a greater level of discretion 
allowed to underwriters in phase of pricing and allocation of shares. As already anticipated, 
after having distributed the preliminary prospectus with a first indication of offering price range 
and while the company’s management is presenting the issue at the roadshow, book-runners 
collect non-binding bids from institutional investors. According to its interest and strategy about 
the issue, each investor can submit different kinds of orders, in different points of time, revising 
some precedent bids or even withdrawing them. Bids can be mainly shaped in two different 
forms: strike bid (also called market order), in which the investor accepts to buy a given amount 
of shares regardless of the final price, and limit bid, in which the investor specifies the 
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maximum price he is willing to pay for the shares he wants to buy. As argued in NYSE IPO 
Guide (2013, p.41) “the goal of the bookrunner is to get as many market orders as possible in 
order to maximize price for the company, while still balancing appropriate value for investors 
and ideally achieving a Day 1 trading “pop” of approximately 15%5”. The overall bookbuilding 
process is therefore highly dynamic and, if it results that the demand is very strong or too weak, 
bookrunners can revise the range of the offering price and investors can submit new bids. For 
many IPOs, the majority of orders comes in the last two or three days of the roadshow. In this 
time bookrunners do not simply rely on investors’ demand curve but try to scrub the demand 
in order to identify which orders are real and intended to be held, and which instead have only 
been placed to “flip” the shares the very next day6. This provides the justification generally 
used by investment banks when trying to explain their discriminatory approach in allocating 
shares among institutional investors. Nevertheless, some recent studies have identified other 
relevant factors influencing the allocation decision by investment banks: Cornelli and Goldreich 
(2001) have empirically proved that investment bankers favour price contingent bids – those 
that are price limited, revised or early submitted in the bookbuilding period – since they would 
provide information which can then be used by bookrunners to set the offering price; Jenkinson 
and Jones (2004) however, which analysed a slightly different sample of IPOs, found little 
support to this view, even though they also specified that “we caution against interpreting our 
results as evidence against the general class of information revelation theories7”. Anyway, 
additional factors – common to both studies – that positively affect a preferential allocation of 
shares by investment banks are: size of bids (larger bids gets systematically better pro-rata 
allocation); high-frequency bidders (regular investors who participate in many issues are 
favoured); bidders of the same country of the issuer; bids submitted directly to the bookrunner 
(since the bookrunner decides the allocations, it tends to favour bids submitted directly to its 
own sales force, thus increasing its own fees, rather than to other members of the syndicate).  
The last step of the bookbuilding process implies the review of the order book by the 
bookrunners – that takes into account many factors as the general market conditions and the 
performance of the company’s competitors during the roadshow – and the communication of 
the price per share recommendation to the issuer. This price meeting “is a crucial phase: the 
issuer wants to maximize the proceeds (and in part leave a “good taste” to the market), the 
investors want to make a good deal and the investment bank is in between” (Iannotta, 2010, 
 
5 See Chapter 2 “IPO underpricing: a literature review”.  
6 “Investors who receive an IPO allocation are said to flip their shares if they sell them immediately in the 
aftermarket. Flipping could be motivated by the desire to lock in quick profits or to dump shares before price 
stabilization ends” (Draho, 2004, p.263).  
7 See Chapter 2 “IPO underpricing: a literature review”.  
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p.55). Once the company has then formally agreed on an IPO offering price with the 
bookrunners, the underwriting agreement is executed, and the underwriters literally purchase 
IPO shares and resell them to selected investors at the IPO offering price. In the period between 
the closing and the allocation of the shares, investment banks are exposed to a very little 
underwriting risk, since, although having submitted non-binding bids, institutional investors 
rarely renege on bid, given the repeated nature of their relationships with underwriters. 
Discriminatory pricing and allocation practices by the investment banks should guarantee a 
high-quality, long-term and focused shareholder base to the company. 
 
Effective listing and trading phase 
Once the IPO pricing and allocation have been performed, secondary market trading starts 
shortly after. On the first trading day the Designated Market Maker (DMM) – the agent 
designated on the exchange to facilitate trading by quoting a market in the stock – officially 
opens the newly public stock on the chosen stock exchange. Generally, the first days are 
characterized by strong volatility and extraordinary high trading volumes, especially when the 
stock is traded between short-term buyers and sellers, thus generating the possibility of 
immediate instability in the aftermarket. This could in turn affect the share price, which may 
temporarily fall below the offer price. It is therefore common in an IPO to appoint a stabilizing 
agent – generally chosen within the global coordinators and bookrunners – to go into the market 
and buy (or offer to buy) the securities to stabilize or maintain their price during the initial 
period after listing (Espinasse, 2014, p.209). As defined by the SEC, stabilization is indeed “the 
buying of a security for the limited purpose of preventing or retarding a decline in its open 
market price in order to facilitate its distribution to the public”. The possibility to perform 
stabilization activity must be disclosed in the IPO final prospectus and is generally covered by 
detailed market rules that set the manner, the timing, record keeping requirements and the price 
limitations associated with those activities, whose final aim is to avoid market manipulation.  
In most markets, stabilization can be conducted through the use of an overallotment option, 
commonly known as “Green Shoe”, from the name of the first issuer which this technic was 
used for. Green Shoe consists in over-allotting the shares, that is in selling to investors more 
shares than are being offered (and underwritten by the investment bank), usually a 15% more 
of the base offer size8. The stabilizing agent overallots shares via short selling (that is selling 
 
8 “Any more would send the signal to the market that the bookrunners expect a particular volatile start of trading. 
Much less than 10% probably would not reassure investors that the stabilizing agent has enough shares at its 
disposal to ensure orderly trading in the first weeks after the IPO” (Espinasse, 2014, p.210).  
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shares that it does not own). The issuer covers this short position in the sense that he grants the 
stabilizing agent an option to purchase shares from the issuer himself or from the selling 
shareholders in the following 30 days, giving therefore the investment bank the possibility to 
give back to him the shares borrowed. This option is however shaped as a call option (whose 
holder is indeed the stabilizing agent) on the overallotted shares with strike price equal to the 
IPO price. Furthermore, being part of the service provided by the investment bank, it is granted 
for free. Two scenarios are possible. In the worst case, the price of the newly listed shares could 
drop, spreading a bad taste within the market about the issue and damaging investment bank’s 
reputation. In this situation, the stabilizing agent simply buys the shares on the market, hoping 
to slow or reverse the fall; buying shares at a price lower than the IPO price produces three 
main results: it contrasts the price decline; which was the purpose of the stabilization activity; 
it leaves less shares in the market; and it generates profits for the investment bank (because it 
buys the shares back at a price lower than the one at which it has sold the shares). The Green 
Shoe option is in this case not exercised. In a better scenario, the price of the newly listed shares 
could rise: having to give back the borrowed shares to the issuing company independently on 
the price movements, the stabilizing agent buys back shares from the market by exercising the 
granted call option, thus avoiding to pay a price higher than the current IPO price; proceeds 
from the overallotted shares are returned to the issuer as well. Since the issuer pays to the 
investment bank a fee on the total proceeds, the bank earns some additional money also in this 
case.  
Overallotment stabilization practice implies however some controversial issues. First of all, as 
already explained above, stabilizing an offering that has started to trade down usually generates 
additional revenue for the stabilizing agent; in recent years issuers and selling shareholders have 
therefore sought to share these stabilization profits, if any, with the investment bank, without 
reaching significant results. As argued by Espinasse (2014, p.213) indeed “since Greenshoes 
are not really technically underwritten by investment banks, but allocated to investors usually 
on the basis of a borrowing agreement, itself generally at no cost to the banks, the practice of 
paying management and underwriting commissions on over-allotment options has sometimes 
been criticized […]. Market practice, however, continues to dictate that full fees be paid on 
Greenshoes”. Secondly, Green Shoe mechanism is not always effective in stabilizing the market 
price. As demonstrated by Iannotta (2010, p.67) indeed, if the market price is only slightly 
below the issue IPO price, the trading profits from buying back the shares on the market at a 
price below the one they have been sold, might not be high enough to offset the opportunity 
cost of forgoing fees. So, whenever the level of overpricing (which verifies when the first day 
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price is below the issue price) is lower than the fees on total proceeds to the issuer, the 
investment bank exercises the option as well, even though the market price is lower than the 
issue price9. This theory is supported by Aggarwal (2000) study on aftermarket stabilization 
activities performed on 137 IPOs between May and July 1997, which shows that “underwriters 
manage the stabilization process and limit their losses by using a combination of short covering 
in the aftermarket, penalty bids, and exercise of the overallotment option. These activities are 
relatively inexpensive because the underwriter can manage the process”. Last, in some cases, 
the Green Shoe option does not work, because of an extreme selling pressure on the newly listed 
shares, which forces the stabilizing agent to wait the offer finding a natural price level, before 
going to buy back shares in the market.  
Another very common post-closing stabilization activity used in IPOs is the so called “lock up” 
provision. It is a contractual agreement between issuing company and investment bank, that 
constraints the supply of shares, thus helping stabilization: issuer’s pre-IPO shareholders are 
asked not to sell their shares and the issuing company itself not to issue new shares for a certain 
period of time following the IPO. This wants to give the signal that company’s insiders will not 
cash out immediately. Restrictions vary depending on the regulator or stock exchange on which 
the shares are listed, as well as what has been negotiated with the bookrunners. In general, 
however, the company is prevented from raising new equity and pre-IPO shareholders from 
selling all or part of their holdings for a period of six months to a year after the publication of 
the final prospectus. 
Finally, once the effective listing of the IPO shares starts, some restrictions apply also to banks’ 
syndicate in order to prevent them from influencing, through their deep information about the 
company, the price and the size of the traded shares. For instance, a research blackout or “quiet” 
period remains in force for those investment banks that have participated in the IPO. This 
generally lasts for a period of 40 days from the date of listing. At the end of this period, banks 
are free to formally initiate coverage, with reports including both share price targets and 
recommendations on whether to buy, hold or sell the shares. Another restriction regards the 
penalization (in form of taking away selling concession) imposed by underwriters to members 
of the selling group whose customers quickly "flip" shares in the aftermarket.  
 
 
9 A partial solution to this problem would be the use by investment banks of a naked short position, which, 
however, is very rare. For a further analysis of the issue see “A guide to underwriting and advisory services” 
(Iannotta, 2010, p.73).  
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Costs and benefits of a traditional IPO 
Until know, this elaboration has tried to accurately explain the main phases characterizing a 
traditional underwritten initial public offering, highlighting all the major services provided by 
investment banks in this process. From the due diligence analysis to the marketing, pricing, 
allocation and aftermarket stabilization activities, investment banks’ intermediary role seems 
to be a fundamental point of contact between investors and issuing firm. On one hand, thanks 
to their long experience in corporate finance operations, investment banks support issuing 
company in all the aforementioned activities, speeding up the overall process and guaranteeing 
– especially in case of firm commitment contract – the full allocation of shares among investors, 
also trying to stabilize prices and volumes during the first weeks of trading; on the other hand, 
from investors’ perspective, investment banks certify, through their reputation, the quality of 
the offering, and reduce information asymmetry in the stock market, since they produce and 
deliver information that otherwise would be more expensive and risky to acquire by investors 
themselves.  
While the benefits of hiring such an intermediary are supposed to be clear, the costs are not. All 
the key decisions made by the issuer during the IPO preparation affect the direct and indirect 
costs of going public: the choice of the underwriter, the portion of equity sold to new investors, 
the proceeds to raise through the IPO, the pricing and allocation mechanism are all factors 
determining the final price of going public. Of course, the cost is also affected by other 
elements, not directly controlled by the issuer, like the firm size or the market volatility at the 
time of the IPO.  
The most relevant cost of a traditional underwritten IPO is the underwriter’s or syndicate’s 
compensation, represented by a fee, or gross spread, which can be defined as the net difference 
between the proceeds from the public sale of the issue and the amount the issuer receives. 
Generally expressed as a percentage of total IPO proceeds, it may vary across countries and 
depend on issuer characteristics; it is also affected by the type of IPO chosen: in a best effort 
offering for instance, because of the associated lower risk, gross spread earned by investment 
banks is lower with respect to the firm commitment formula; a bookbuilding process then costs 
much more than a fixed price offering (Iannotta, 2010).  However, in the U.S. from 1990, gross 
spread has tended toward 7% (Ritter, 2018). Gross spread can be divided into three components 
associated to three syndicate’s groups: management fee (which, as a standard market practice, 
takes the 20% of the gross spread) compensates the bookrunner and the joint bookrunners for 
structuring the offering, conducting the due diligence, drafting the prospectus, dealing with 
regulators, managing the roadshow, pricing and allocating the securities; the underwriting fee 
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(20% of the gross spread) compensates the underwriting group for the underwriting risk (which, 
however, is minimal in bookbuilding IPOs), which then shares among members according to 
the number of shares underwritten; the selling concession (usually equal to 60%) is then divided 
among syndicate members based on the number of shares each one has sold. However, as 
previously explained, the lead bookrunner has significant discretion on the allocation of shares 
and, as a consequence, on the allocation of selling concession among syndicate members. This 
is the reason why the lead bookrunner is usually credited with much more sales (about 40% 
more) than the corresponding underwritten shares, while the other underwriters are credited 
with selling concession of about 10% relative to the underwritten shares (Corwin and Schultz, 
2005).  
Other direct costs may be related to fixed expenses: the issuing company is indeed required to 
cover investment banks’ outflows, such as those sustained during market campaign and road 
show organization or those for the printing and mailing of the prospectus. Other fixed expenses 
are the fees paid to lawyers, accountants and consultants, that, accordingly to Heim (2002, p.28) 
“can easily add up to $400,000 to $500,000 for a typical IPO”; other fees are those due for the 
filing of the registration statement with authorities (as highlighted in the NYSE IPO Guide, for 
the SEC’s 2013 fiscal year, they stood at $136.40 per million dollars, so for a $100 million IPO 
they would amount at $13,640).  
Regarding the ongoing costs of being public, the company has to incur expenses linked with 
the maintaining of a public company structure, like quarterly and annual reporting requirements, 
mandatory stockholder meetings or investor relations disclosures. Being public entails also 
incremental staff and board costs, professional fees for accounting advice, audit, legal and 
annual listing fees. These are all substantial and ongoing expenses that a company must 
consider before undertaking an initial public offering. 
Finally, another relevant indirect cost of IPOs is in general underpricing. Defined as the 
percentage difference between the offer price and the first day closing price, it is an opportunity 
cost, since issuers, selling shares at a price below their potential market value, are “leaving 
money on the table”10. 
 
 
10 Underpricing phenomenon will be described and analysed in detail in Chapter 2.  
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1.3 - AN UNORTHODOX WAY TO LIST: THE DPO PROCESS  
Traditionally, a company decides to go public by hiring one or more investment banks in the 
role of underwriters, through which selling its shares to the general public. However, as 
previously anticipated, also underwriters have the faculty to choose which companies to assist 
in the listing process, mainly depending on their revenues and on their ability to reach successful 
performance shortly after the IPO. For this reason, from 1990s, taking advantage of the coming 
disruptive innovation of that time – the Internet – some small-medium companies which could 
not find any supporting investment banks, went public through an alternative process: the direct 
public offering (DPO), alternatively referred to as “direct listing”. Internet gave indeed these 
companies the possibility to market their stocks directly to the public by posting their offering 
documents on the Web, making them accessible to hundreds of millions of potential investors. 
DPOs are generally considered to be “disintermediated”, since there are no underwriters 
carrying them on11.  
Spring Street Brewing Company, a New York beer microbrewer, is regarded to be the first 
company to complete an Internet DPO. It was a small company, thus needed funds for 
expansion but was unable to attract an underwriter and unwilling to accept the terms offered by 
a venture capitalist. The microbrewer decided so to raise funds by offering its shares directly to 
the public over the Internet, posting its offering documents on its Website. Spring Street 
completed the offering in March 1996 raising roughly $1.6 million by selling approximately 
900,000 shares to 3,500 investors at $1.85 per share (Fisch, 1998).  
The following paragraphs will first explain in which measure DPOs differ from IPOs, will 
describe the main phases an issuing company has to face in conducting a DPO, and finally will 
try to analyse which could be the advantages of following such a listing process rather than a 
traditional one.  
 
Main differences with a traditional IPO 
A direct public offering basically consists in listing the shares of a company for trading on a 
stock exchange without conducting an underwritten IPO. As a result of this process, the shares 
of a privately held company are publicly traded and the company becomes subject to the 
periodic reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).  
 
11 Nevertheless, as it will be explained in Chapter 4, in recent DPOs investment banks mange part of the listing 
process as well, but not playing the role of underwriters.  
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The first relevant difference of a DPO relative to an IPO can therefore be identified in the 
absence of investment banks in the role of underwriters: there is no investment banker deciding 
upon which institutional investors will participate at the roadshow; there is no bookrunner 
soliciting orders to investors to get their feelings about the issue and adjusting the offer price 
according to their targets; there is no underwriter actually purchasing shares from issuing 
company and then re-allocating them on a discretional basis among favoured investors. 
Nevertheless, while first DPOs were completely disintermediated, with the management of the 
company handling with the whole listing process, or, if anything, with the support of external 
consultants like lawyers or accountants, in recent DPOs investment banks are still involved in 
the listing process, albeit playing a more marginal role than the underwriting one12.   
Another important difference is the fact that, unlike in a traditional IPO, no new capital is raised 
by the company though a DPO: the company indeed does not issue new shares and only limits 
to offer existing ones. From a technical point of view indeed, in a direct listing the company is 
not registering the offer of securities neither because the company issues new shares (primary 
offering) nor because its selling shareholders want to sell (secondary offering). The application 
and registration with the market authority has in fact the purpose of making the outstanding 
shares eligible for trading on an exchange, and not, intentionally, to distribute or sell securities 
that would need to be registered.  
Finally, another substantive difference between a DPO and an IPO relies in the lack of lock-up 
period: in a traditional IPO, as it has been described in the previous section, existing company 
shareholders agree to a period, typically ranging from 180 days to one year from the date of the 
effective listing, where they are restricted from selling or issuing their shares. While they are 
not mandated to do so by the SEC, investment banks usually ask for this because it allows the 
company’s shares to trade and establish a track record for a certain period of time. On the 
contrary, one of the purposes of a DPO is right that of providing a liquidity event to the 
company’s existing shareholders who purchased their shares in the private capital markets.  
At this point it would be easy to understand why companies that nowadays want to undertake 
a direct listing are those that may not have the resources to pay underwriters, may not want to 
dilute existing shares by creating new ones or may want to avoid lockup agreements. In the 
following three paragraphs DPO listing process will be illustrated in detail, trying to highlight 
some other secondary differences with respect to IPO process as well.  
 
12 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as “reintermediation” of DPOs (Sjostrom, 2001), “Direct IPOs” 
(Sjostrom, 2001) or even “hybrid DPOs” (Anand, 2003). See next paragraphs.   
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Complying with registration requirements  
The preparation process for a direct listing is very similar to that for an IPO. First of all, as for 
a traditional IPO, after having decided for the market in which to list, the company has to 
comply with registration requirements imposed by the market authority. In the U.S. therefore, 
every offering of securities must be either registered with the SEC or qualify for an exemption 
from registration. Thus, the first step for a company that is undertaking a DPO is to determine 
how it will comply with this rule. The Securities Act of 1933 establishes only two exemptions 
that allow companies to solicit an unlimited number of investors in multiple states through the 
use of general advertisement and which can be therefore applicable to DPOs: Rule 504 of 
Regulation D and Regulation A.  
The SEC promulgated Rule 504 exemption in 1982 in an effort to aid small businesses raising 
seed capital. It exempts from registration the offer and sale of up to $5 million of securities in 
a 12-month period. The only filing required to be made with the SEC within 15 days after the 
first sale of securities in the offering is the Form D, containing some basic information about 
the company.  
Regulation A is often referred to as a “short form registration”, since it provides for a filing 
with the SEC of an offering statement, having similar requirements to those for a registration 
statement. Regulation A has two offering tiers: Tier 1, for offerings of up to $20 million in a 
12-month period, for which audited financial statements are not required to be included in the 
offering statement; and Tier 2, for offerings of up to $50 million in a 12-month period.  
If the company does not qualify for any of these exemptions, it must register its DPO with the 
SEC as usual. There is no registration statement’s form specifically designed for DPOs: the 
company must prepare the registration statement – often called “shelf” registration statement in 
the case of DPOs – in compliance with the same regulations that dictate the content and the 
form of a registration statement for a traditional underwritten IPO (Form S-1 for domestic 
issuers and Form F-1 for foreign private issuers). However, unlike for a traditional IPO, there 
is no industry practice for preparing a DPO registration statement (Sjostrom, 2001). Companies 
undertaking a DPO could for instance draft the registration statement by modifying publicly 
available registration statements of competitors, or by having a company counsel preparing it 
from scratch. Once done, the filing of the draft registration statement, the reviewing and the 
revision procedure by the SEC, are the same for a traditional IPO.  
Nevertheless, in the U.S., any offering or selling of securities should also comply with the 
securities laws of the states in which the company is making the offer, unless the offering falls 
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within an exemption. Fortunately, Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 eliminates state 
securities registration requirements for IPOs of securities that will be traded on one of the major 
markets (NYSE or NASDAQ). However, since many DPOs are conducted by small-medium 
companies which do not meet the initial listing requirements of these major exchange markets, 
state registration could be a huge issue for those direct listings which intend to market in 
multiple states. In addition, even though a DPO qualifies for exemption from federal 
registration under Rule 504 or under Tier 1 of Regulation A, it must comply with state securities 
laws and regulations as well13. Complying with state regulations is a very costly and time-
consuming process, since each of the fifty states has its own law in terms of registration 
requirements and exemptions. During years the North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) has sought to promote uniformity in regulation, simplify state 
registration of securities offerings and reduce associated costs: the SCOR of 1989 (Small 
Corporate Offering Registration) available for Rule 504 and Regulation A, the CER of 1997 
(Coordinated Equity Review) available for offerings registered with the SEC, and the Regional 
Coordinated Review Programs represent the main efforts. Nevertheless, complete uniformity 
among states has not yet been reached (Sjostrom, 2001).  
 
Marketing a DPO 
“The success or failure of a DPO is determined by how many shares the company sells, which 
is directly related to how well the offering is marketed to the public” (Sjostrom, 2001, p.553). 
Before describing the main alternatives a company can choose to market its DPO, it is worth to 
underline that federal and state securities laws also define when and how marketing activities 
can be conducted. In particular, until the filing of the registration statement with the SEC, no 
soliciting of offers is possible: in this period a company should in fact just maintain 
communications with the public limited to the ordinary business and financial information 
disclosure. During the waiting period then, that lasts until the SEC declares the offering 
effective, a company is allowed to orally solicit orders, distribute its preliminary prospectus and 
make a strong advertisement with respect to its offering, but not yet to accept any offers. Once 
the SEC declares a registration statement effective, the company can finally accept offers and 
solicit further ones through the use of the final prospectus; from this moment onward, and so 
even before the stocks start materially trading, it is also allowed to provide prospective investors 
 
13 Issuers in Tier 2 offerings of Regulation A instead are not required to register or qualify their offerings with 
state securities regulators. 
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with some forward-looking financial guidance, whereas in a traditional IPO it is not possible 
until the overall process has been completed.  
Marketing techniques for a DPO are really heterogeneous, and strictly depend on the firms’ 
pre-listing characteristics, on which the company retains to be the most effective ways to 
communicate with prospective investors, and, of course, on the amount of economic resources 
a company is willing to invest in this kind of activities. As explained by Sjostrom (2001), a 
company could use web marketing, posting the offering document on its website and placing 
advertisements in other websites, or could employ traditional marketing activities like 
advertisement in newspapers, telephoning most promising prospective investors or directly 
meeting them.  
Of course, all the investor education and the relationship building efforts characterizing a 
typical marketing process for a traditional IPO, represent crucial aspects also for a DPO. Being 
perfectly aware about this, some medium-large companies undertaking a direct listing and 
having enough resources to dedicate to more sophisticated marketing activities14, have recently 
organized the so-called “Investor Day”, which can be compared to the roadshow arranged in a 
traditional IPO. During this meeting, that usually takes place four or five weeks before the first 
day of trading, the company publicly talks with prospective investors and presents main 
historical financial results to all of them, also using instantaneous Internet communication via 
webcast. In this way, direct public offerings can be considered more democratic because every 
potential investor has access to the same information in the same time (McGurk, 2019). As in 
a typical roadshow, the listing firm also organizes one-to-one presentations with the largest and 
most influential investors in order to build demand, relation and trust in the management of the 
firm. During these one-to-one meetings, the firm is however accompanied by its “capital market 
advisors”. Capital market advisors are the same investment banks which play the role of 
bookrunners and underwriters in a traditional IPO, but which, in this context, assume a more 
marginal position limited to marketing services. Despite the similar players and activities, 
though, the investor meetings under direct listing process are much more limited in scope 





14 See last direct listing cases of Spotify (2018) and Slack Technologies (2019).  
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Pricing a DPO 
In general, pricing mechanism underlying a direct public offering is deemed to lead to a “fairer” 
market price than bookbuilding process underlying a traditional IPO actually does (McGurk, 
2019). This is mostly due to the absence of investment banks in the role of underwriters and to 
the fact that no solicitation of orders from investors is performed: even though a company 
decides to primarily market its offering arranging an investor day, a DPO never provides for 
the building of a book. However, also in a direct public offering, an offering price must be set 
before the effective listing of the stocks.  
Companies undertaking a DPO that do not meet listing requirements of the major exchanges, 
price their offering and effectively list their selling shareholders’ stock through a rather quick 
process. On the same webpage where the company’s offering document is posted, a 
subscription agreement for investors, with indication of price and number of shares they desire 
to purchase, is also available. Investors have then to print out the subscription agreement, sign 
it and mail it along with a check for the shares to an escrow agent hired by the company. Once 
the escrow agent has received and deposited shares checks aggregating the amount of demand 
with the amount of the offering, the closing of the process starts: funds are therefore released 
to the selling shareholders of the company and sale confirmations and stock certificates are sent 
to investors (Sjostrom, 2001).    
Companies undertaking a DPO which instead effectively meet listing requirements and that 
will therefore list on one of the major exchanges, follow a more articulated pricing mechanism. 
In this final phase, existing shareholders of the company must determine at what price they 
would be willing to sell their stock. To do so, the day before trading begins, the stock exchange 
usually publishes a reference price for the offering. On the NYSE for instance, this pre-opening 
reference price is represented by the most recent transaction price in the market, if the company 
has recently sustained trading in a private placement market; otherwise the reference price is 
defined by the stock exchange itself in consultation with the company’s financial advisor 
(which is always represented by one or more investment banks). By this time of course, the 
company must have already turned off any trading of company shares in other secondary 
markets. In the early morning of the first day of trading then, the designated market maker (the 
person designed on the exchange) starts to collect size of demand and then tries to define at 
what price supply and demand could match. In the meanwhile, buyers and sellers adjust their 
orders for several hours until an equilibrium price is reached. In this way, an opening price is 
set and effective listing on the stock exchange market begins. These initial trading dynamics do 
not differ too much from those undertaken in a traditional IPO, except for the lack of the lock-
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up provision: for this reason, DPOs are generally considered to open the listing on the market 
with a more “natural” volume of traded shares. This volume is in general crucial in finding the 
“true” market price with a direct listing. 
 
Risks and benefits of a DPO 
Why, until now, have just few companies decided to go public through a direct public offering? 
The answer simply relies on the conspicuous risks and downsides this alternative listing process 
implies both on listing firm and prospective investors.  
The first concern about direct listing process is absolutely liquidity. A stock is considered liquid 
if it has an active public trading market allowing easy buying and selling with minimum price 
influence. As already described, the primary underwriters of a traditional IPO, in an effort to 
guarantee liquidity following the listing of the shares, provide post-offering market support, 
which usually includes acting as a market maker for the stock, purchasing shares for its own 
account and issuing analyst reports and recommendations to develop investor interest. 
Conversely, in a DPO, since the company has no relationship with an investment bank with a 
vested interest in establishing an active secondary market, it is likely that the stock will be 
illiquid (Sjostrom, 2001). Moreover, this possible illiquidity is exacerbated by the lack of 
institutional investors, who instead provide a great deal of demand in a traditional underwritten 
IPO. Electronic matching systems used in closing a direct public offering only matches sellers 
and buyers, but do not create, by themselves, demand. Audience limitation in a DPO may be a 
key factor in deciding not to undertake it (Giddings, 1998).  
Secondly, as previously explained, one of the reasons for a company to go public is that of 
gaining reputation from an increased shareholders base and attention from analysts and business 
press. In addition, other stakeholders, like customers or suppliers, may be more readily to work 
with the company because its financials and other data have been reviewed by investors and 
regulators and are publicly available. “The lack of a well-known and reputable underwriter 
lessens the overall credibility of the issuer” (Giddings, 1998, p.809), so that the aforementioned 
advantages of going public for a DPO strictly depend on the extent of attention from analysts 
and the business press, if any.  
Beyond credibility, it is well known that the role of investment banks in the IPO process 
becomes crucial also in certifying the quality of the information provided by the listing 
company, and in particular the quality and truthfulness of the registration statement through an 
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accurate due diligence investigation. In this sense, liability exposure should be minimized since, 
investment banks’ team is supposed to have the right accounting, finance and securities analysis 
skills to properly evaluate the information disclosed by the company and an extensive 
experience in drafting registration statements. In the case of a company undertaking a registered 
DPO with the market authority instead, the risk of liability becomes much more stressed. Firm’s 
directors may have every intention to include complete and accurate disclosure in the 
company’s registration statement; however, they may accidentally misstate or exclude 
information that would have been analysed by an underwriter's due diligence investigation. 
“Having securities counsel carefully reviewed a registration statement prior to filing can 
provide some comfort. However, unless securities counsel has intimate knowledge of the 
company's operations, he will only be able to verify that the registration statement appears to 
meet SEC requirements […] but will not be able to detect misstatements or omissions” 
(Sjostrom, 2001, p.578).  
Another important concern both from the listing company’s and from the investors’ point of 
view, is securities cybercrime. Especially for small and not well-known companies, a DPO 
brings the dangerous possibility to match uninformed and anonymous investors with unproven 
entrepreneur (Barmann, see Giddings, 1998). The perception about the risk of having a DPO 
listing company which arranges or that is subject to fraudulent schemes is quite high. 
Unsuspecting investors for instance, trying to create their own venture capital fund over the 
Internet or buying securities in a company they like, could be victim of these schemes.  
On the other side, one could rightly ask: why have some companies decided to go public 
through direct listing, given all the aforementioned risks? A first explanation to this question 
could be provided by stating that, in general, DPOs do not only allow listing companies to 
broaden their group of affiliated investors, as more people come into contact with their products 
via the Web, but also allow to strengthen it. According to Drew Field, a San Francisco securities 
lawyer (see Giddings, 1998, p.794), DPOs “are not for start-ups” and “work best for successful 
companies with devoted customers, or affinity groups”. Investors who are attracted by a DPO 
tend in fact to be loyal purchasers of the issuer’s product who are investing for or tend to have 
a strong association with the company’s brand. As these investors do not demand immediate 
profits, their approach to the investment is different from that of other investors (Hannon, 1996, 
p.74). “It's more like buying into a business than buying a stock” affirms Drew Field (Giddings, 
1998). Moreover, DPOs’ investors are in general ready to perform a deeper analysis of the 
company they are investing in: while in a traditional underwritten IPO investors simply rely on 
the capability of investment banks to complete a diligent review of the company, in a DPO 
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investors have first to evaluate the credibility of the proposed business plan and, second, the 
experience and reputation of the issuer's management. However, as stated by Sjostrom (2001, 
p.582) “members of the affinity group are already familiar with and may be emotionally 
attached to the company, and thus are willing to invest without fully verifying the accuracy of 
the offering document or relying on a certification intermediary”.  
The basic argument for undertaking a DPO rather than a traditional IPO is however related to 
cost savings. Hannon (1996, p.74) affirms that these “cost savings are tremendous because 
cutting out the underwriter, accountants, printing, and roadshows allows companies to go public 
at a cost of 6% of the total value of the issue, as opposed to a 13% average for a traditionally 
underwritten offering”. Also Sjostrom (2001) highlights that, disintermediating the listing 
process allows to save underwriter’s fee, printing fees because of the distribution of the offering 
documents directly on the Web, and legal fees, in the case the management of the company, 
and not the counsel, directly drafts the registration statement. Nevertheless, Sjostrom (2001, 
p.576) also points out that “against these dollar cost savings, as compared to a traditional IPO, 
will likely be increased filing and legal fees for registering the offering in various states […] 
and marketing and advertisement fees”. This argument is supported also by Anand (2003, 
p.442-443) who affirms that “in the DPO context, issuers will have higher costs (for lawyers 
and advisers) because of the need to discern the precise rules applicable to the transaction. If 
the DPO is being carried out on the Internet, issuers will need to expend resources to ensure 
that the website works as intended and that they are complying with any regulatory policies 
related to electronic communications. Lawyers of the DPO issuer will need to negotiate with 
regulators to determine how the transaction should proceed. […] Thus, DPO issuers may face 
costs arising from uncertain law, heightened regulatory surveillance, or conservative 
application of the regulatory regime”. In addition to no or decreased investment bankers’ fees, 
DPOs could lead to lower ongoing costs if compared with a traditional IPO, because, especially 
for direct listings with no reporting requirements to the market authority, there is no need to 
hire additional personnel to deal with securities analysts or shareholders, and all the needed 
documentation is available on the company’s website.  
Another relevant argument in sustaining the advisability of DPOs relies, as already anticipated, 
to this mechanism’s ability to generate a truer market price. Avoiding the intermediation of 
underwriters which directly purchase securities from listing firm and then discretionally resell 
them to institutional investors, trying to maximize, at the same time, their clients’ proceeds 
(both company’s and investors’ interests) and their own revenues by manipulating somehow 
the initial offer price of the IPO, DPOs should reveal a market price which is more coherent 
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with company’s equity value. In other words, since true offer and demand immediately match, 
DPOs should imply a lower level of underpricing. However, because the aim of this work is 
indeed that of demonstrating if the level of underpricing is lower when associated with a DPO 




CHAPTER 2 – IPO UNDERPRICING: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The analysis of the underpricing phenomenon related to initial public offerings is supported by 
a broad literature background. Several studies and researches have been carried out since the 
early ‘70s. Pazarzi (2014, p.281) reported that “for the 40-year period between 1969 and 2010 
there have been conducted more than 150 empirical studies regarding the underpricing of the 
IPOs”. Stoll and Curley (1970), Reilly (1973), Logue (1973), and Ibbotson (1975) were the first 
who documented and tried to explain the existence of the underpricing phenomenon: since then, 
their findings have been explored and developed by various authors, who elaborated different 
theories and models trying to detect the reasons and factors that cause IPO underpricing.  
IPO underpricing, often referred to as “positive first-day return”, occurs whenever company’s 
shares are offered to investors at prices that are below the prices at which shares trade on the 
stock exchange the first day of listing; in other words, whenever newly issued shares close the 
first day of trading at a price above the set offer price, these shares have been underpriced. As 
already anticipated in the previous chapter, underpricing usually represents one of the most 
relevant indirect costs for a listing company. In particular, underpricing is generally considered 
an opportunity cost for firms going public since issuers selling shares at an offer price lower 
than their real market value are said to “leave money on the table”: “if the shares had been sold 
at the closing market price rather than the offer price, the proceeds of the offering would have 
been higher by an amount equal to the money left on the table” (Loughran and Ritter 2002, 
p.413). The amount of money that an issuer loses can be computed as the number of shares 
issued times the first-day capital gain15. Loughran and Ritter (2002, p.413) also proved that 
“during 1990-1998, companies going public in the United States left more than $27 billion on 
the table […]. The $27 billion left on the table is twice as large as the $13 billion in investment 
banker fees paid by the issuing companies that we studied. These same companies generated 
profits of approximately $8 billion in the year before going public, so the amount of money left 
on the table represents more than three years of aggregate profits”. In addition, in primary issues 
underpricing produces a negative effect on pre-issue shareholders since it increases 
shareholders’ dilution (target proceeds of an IPO being equal, an underpriced IPO implies the 
issue of a larger number of shares than a non-underpriced IPO). In conclusion, positive first-
day returns of IPOs come at the expenses of the issuing firm and its pre-issue shareholders.      
 
15 For an accurate analysis of the underpricing calculation see Chapter 3 – IPO underpricing: an empirical review.  
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Despite differences during time, from sector to sector and from country to country, a constant 
presence of average underpricing in IPOs has been confirmed by numerous scientific papers 
and empirical researches (though some exceptions of no underpricing or overpricing effectively 
exist). Ritter and Welch (2002) showed that U.S. IPOs conducting in the period from 1980 to 
2001 had an average first day return of 18.8%. Loughran and Ritter (2004) then demonstrated 
that the level of underpricing is cyclical: they found an average first day return of 7% in the 
1980s, of 15% in the period from 1990 to 1998, of 65% during the so-called “dot-com bubble” 
(1999-2000) and finally of 12% in the years 2001-2013. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 
instead concluded that IPO underpricing is approximately 15% in industrialized countries and 
around 60% in emerging ones.  
Consequently, this remarkable empirical regularity has inspired a large theoretical literature 
that tried to rationalize IPO underpricing in any country and in any different institutional, legal 
and regulatory framework. In this chapter the most relevant theories and studies illustrating the 
reasons and factors behind IPO underpricing will be presented, being aware that it is not 
possible to identify an exhaustive model able to uniquely explain this ongoing phenomenon. 
 
2.1 - ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION THEORIES 
As broadly discussed in Chapter 1, the key parties in an IPO transaction are the issuing firm, 
the investment bank traditionally assuming the role of underwriter, and the prospect investors. 
Asymmetric information theories basically assume that one of these parties knows more than 
the others. They represent the first and the most relevant group of theories explaining 
underpricing phenomenon: there are models based on information revelation; others built on 
signalling of the firm’s quality; others then, focused on the existence of information asymmetry 
between various classes of investors or between the issuer and the underwriter. In this section 
the most quoted asymmetric information theories will be presented and discussed.  
 
The winner’s curse 
Among the different asymmetric information theories, the best-known model is represented by 
Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse, which is an application of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem. As 
in Akerlof’s theory, where uninformed buyers have an informational disadvantage and are not 
able to distinguish between good quality and bad quality products, also Rock’s model bases on 
the assumption that is possible to categorize investors into “informed” and “uninformed”: some 
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investors are better informed than others about the real value of the shares on offer. Winner’s 
curse theory also assumes that neither the investment bank nor the issuing firm are not 
completely informed about the real value of the offered shares, so that they are in informational 
disadvantage, since, on one hand they must reveal to the market all the information included in 
the prospectus, but on the other hand, they are not able to obtain all the information possessed 
by informed investors (usually institutional investors). Informed investors, taking advantage of 
their additional information, bid only for attractively priced IPOs (i.e. for underpriced shares), 
while uninformed investors apply indiscriminately, because they are not able to distinguish 
between underpriced and overpriced shares. This imposes a winner’s curse on uninformed 
investors: in unattractive offerings (i.e. in case of overpriced shares) they receive all the shares 
they have bid for because there is no competing demand; whereas, in attractive offerings, they 
get only a small fraction of underpriced issues due to the high demand from informed investors. 
In the extreme case, uninformed investors receive nothing in underpriced IPOs and get the full 
allocation in overpriced IPOs, resulting in average returns that are negative. Consequently, 
knowing the winner’s curse phenomenon, uninformed investors abstain from participating at 
the offering, so that the IPO market is populated only with (equally) informed investors. 
Information asymmetry causes adverse selection and would lead to market failure. Thus, Rock 
assumes that the primary market is dependent on the continued participation of uninformed 
investors, in the sense that informed demand is not sufficient to absorb all the shares offered 
even in attractive offerings. According to Rock’s theory therefore, underpricing is needed to 
attract and to make uninformed investors participating in the IPO, because it ensures them, at 
least, a non-negative return. Of course, this does not remove the allocation bias against the 
uninformed investors, but thanks to systematic underpricing of shares, they no longer expect to 
make losses on average. It is worth to point out that Rock’s theory can be used to explain 
underpricing only in fixed-price offerings, whereas winner’s curse is not an issue in 
bookbuilding process, because the investment bank solicits investors’ feedbacks and 
information prior to the final pricing.  
A key empirical implication of Rock’s winner’s course model is that the degree of underpricing 
should increase in the ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the firm. Beatty and Ritter (1986, 
p.215) provided the following intuition: “[…] the degree of underpricing, is directly related to 
the ex ante uncertainty about the value of an issue. This is because, as the ex ante uncertainty 
increases, the winner’s curse problem intensifies. Roughly speaking, there is more to lose as ex 
ante uncertainty increases. Consequently, in order to be willing to submit a purchase order for 
shares in an offering with greater ex ante uncertainty, a representative investor will demand that 
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more money be ‘left on the table’, in an expected value sense, via underpricing”. Alternatively, 
an investor can be seen as implicitly investing in a call option on the IPO, which will be 
exercised if the ‘true’ price exceeds the strike price, that is, the offering price. The value of this 
option increases in the extent of valuation uncertainty. Thus, the greater the valuation 
uncertainty, the greater the portion of informed investors. This raises the required underpricing, 
since an increase in the number of informed investors aggravates the winner’s curse problem.  
 Being one of the first theories developed about underpricing, Rock’s model assumptions and 
findings have been largely discussed in the literature. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) questioned 
the assumption that abstaining from participating in overpriced issues is costless for informed 
investors. They showed that this choice can cost an investor the opportunity to take part in 
future (underpriced) offerings and, consequently, also informed investors decide to participate 
in less attractive issues. 
Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), instead, found evidence against the fact that informed investors 
impose a winner’s curse on uninformed ones by applying only for underpriced offerings. 
Studying a sample of 38 IPOs managed by a single underwriter, they found that approximately 
70% of shares of underpriced issues are allocated to institutional investors but also that 
“institutional investors take similar large position in overpriced offering” and that “institutional 
investors are allocated large proportion of issues for which pre-offer interest is weak and also 
of issues for which it is strong” (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995, p.240).  
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) then discussed the assumption that issuing firms must sustain 
underpricing cost in order to have uninformed investors participating in the offering. In fact, if 
informed investors are not enough to absorb all the offered shares, the uninformed ones could 
invest through institutional-informed investors (for example using investment funds) in order 
to exploit their superior information – in exchange for a fee – and not subscribe overpriced 
shares. 
 
Information revelation theories 
According to information revelation theories, as assumed by Rock (1986) some institutional 
investors are better informed than the issuer and the investment bank about the firm’s 
competitors, the industry and the economy as a whole. However, in the absence of inducements, 
investors are not incentivized to reveal positive information about their own demand for the 
shares to underwriters: doing so, would probably lead to an increase in the final offer price (in 
37 
 
informationally efficient market indeed, prices should reveal all available information), and 
thus to lower profits for the informed investors. In most cases even, there is a strong incentive 
to actively misrepresent positive information – that is, to understate effective interest in an 
offering by potential investors – in order to induce underwriters to depress the price at which 
they will then purchase shares. Therefore, since the disclosure of information is essential to 
avoid mispricing, underwriters must find a mechanism that induces investors to truthfully reveal 
their private information. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), who first introduced the “information gathering theory”, pointed 
out that bookbuilding could be an appropriate mechanism, under certain conditions, to induce 
investors to reveal information about the demand for shares in the pre-selling phase. As 
described in Chapter 1, during the road show and before the final price has been set, investors 
are asked to communicate their interest and to submit their bids specifying the price and the 
number of shares they are willing to buy. After collecting investors’ indications of interest, 
investment banks allocate no, or only a few, shares to any investors who bid conservatively, 
while they reward with disproportionately large allocations of shares those investors who bid 
aggressively revealing favourable information. In this way, bookbuilding process allows 
underwriters to reduce the incentive to mispresent positive information. However, the more 
aggressive are investors’ bids, the more the offer price is raised. Thus, investors who truthfully 
reveal their private (positive) information and their expectations about the value of the listing 
company must be rewarded with underwriters’ discretionary allocation of underpriced shares. 
By doing so, bookbuilding mechanism reduces uncertainty and information asymmetry 
between investors and investment banks. Leaving some money on the table is necessary 
because, in the absence of underpricing, investors would not have interest in revealing their 
positive information. 
A contribution to information revelation theories has been supplied by Benveniste and Wilhelm 
(1990). They stated that the optimal mechanism to acquire information from informed investors 
is price discrimination and that underwriters need to use a combination of price and allocation 
discrimination to maximize proceeds. If investment banks could offer underpriced shares only 
to well-informed investors, their incentive to truthfully reveal positive information would be 
stronger and issuers would leave less money on the table. However, regulatory constraints 
generally forbid price discrimination among investors; in addition, especially in Europe and 
Asia, the common practice requires a certain fraction of the shares to be allocated to retail 
investors, thus reducing underwriters’ ability to target allocations at the most informed 
investors. Therefore, according to Benveniste and Wilhelm theory, imposing such constraints 
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on the underwriter’s allocation discretion only interferes with the efficiency of the bookbuilding 
mechanism, forcing investment banks to underprice the issue to all IPO subscribers, without 
rewarding only informed ones. 
In addition, Benveniste and Wilhelm also studied the interaction between Rock’s winner’s curse 
and information revelation. They demonstrated that, when underwriters are able to extract 
information from well-informed investors using bookbuilding mechanism, both the information 
asymmetries among investors and between investors and underwriters are reduced. This, in 
turn, reduces the winner’s curse and thus the level of underpricing required to ensure 
uninformed investors break even.  
Another support to Benveniste and Spindt theory is provided by Hanley “partial adjustment” 
phenomenon (1993). She showed that the new positive information collected during 
bookbuilding process is only partially incorporated in the final offer price. Using Iannotta 
(2010, p.93) words, “when investors inform the investment bank that the price should be revised 
positively, the book-runner only partially adjust the price”. Hanley (1993, p.249) demonstrated 
also that “underpricing is positively related to revisions in the offer price from the filing of the 
preliminary prospectus to the offer date. […] Issues that have positive revisions in the offer 
price and good information revealed are significantly more underpriced than other IPOs”.  
A limitation in the assumptions of Benveniste and Spindt framework relies in investors 
possibility to become informed without incurring any costs. In general, however, information 
production is costly: underwriters need it to decide how much information production to induce. 
Sherman and Titman (2002) explored this issue in a setting where more information increases 
the accuracy of price discovery, resulting in a trade-off between the (issuer-specific) benefit of 
greater pricing accuracy and the cost of more information production. The idea is further 
investigated by Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) and Benveniste and others (2003), 
who recurred to underwriter’s capacity to ‘bundle’ IPOs over time. The central intuition is that 
valuation uncertainty is composed of a firm-specific and an industry component. Obtaining 
information about the industry component allows investors to evaluate other offerings in that 
industry more cheaply. Nevertheless, such economies of scale could result in too few firms 
going public, because the first firms to do so must compensate investors for their whole 
valuation effort, while later firms can ‘free-ride’ on the information production. Underwriters 
could be able to reduce this negative externality by establishing networks of regular investors 
with whom to undertake a sequence of offerings. If underwriters and institutional investors deal 




“Bookbuilding theories” stress the fundamental role of investment banks in extracting 
information that is then valuable in price-setting, and the benefit of giving them discretion over 
allocation decisions. Some authors – in particular Loughran and Ritter (2004) – point out the 
“dark side” of these institutional arrangements, by highlighting the potential for agency 
problems between the investment bank and the issuing firm. The theoretical literature linking 
agency conflicts and IPO underpricing goes back more than 20 years to Baron and Holmström 
(1980). Baron (1982) in particular assumed that investment banks have superior information 
about the demand level for the shares offered and capital markets. According to Baron, issuing 
firms rationally allow underwriters to underprice in order to compensate them for the use of 
their superior information. To induce optimal use of the underwriter’s superior information 
about investors’ demand, the issuer delegates the pricing decision to the investment bank. Given 
its information, the underwriter self-selects a combination of IPO prices and underwriting 
spreads. Since underwriting fees are typically proportional to IPO proceeds and, as a 
consequence, inversely related to underpricing, when investors’ demand is low the bank selects 
a high spread and a low price, and vice versa when demand is high. This mechanism optimizes 
the underwriter’s unobservable selling effort by making it dependent on market demand. 
Therefore, the more uncertain is the value of the firm, the greater the asymmetry of information 
between issuer and underwriter, and thus the more valuable is the investment bank’s service, 
resulting in greater underpricing.  
However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), testing Baron’s model, found that the 
information asymmetry existing between the issuing company and the underwriter firm is not 
appropriate to explain the underpricing phenomenon. In their empirical analysis, they used a 
small sample of 38 IPOs of investment banks going public without referring to other 
intermediaries. In nutshell, they selected a sample of “self-marketed” or “self-underwritten” 
IPOs, in which investment banks participated in the distributions of their own shares. In this 
way, the issuer and the underwriter coincide in a single entity and, therefore, there is no 
information asymmetry and there are no principal-agent problems. Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
showed that, in contrast to Baron’s findings, “self-marketed” IPOs are statistically subject to 
significant underpricing as well and that these IPOs present a level of underpricing not lower 






In contrast to the other asymmetric information theories analysed so far, signalling theories 
assume that issuing companies are the well-informed party – rather than investors or investment 
banks – and so have superior information about their own true value and about the risk of their 
future performance. In this context, underpricing is a way to signal firm’s high quality: even if 
costly, is used by high-quality firms to reveal to prospective investors their true equity value 
and to raise capital, in subsequent equity stages following IPO, at more advantageous terms.   
Ibbotson (1975) was the first to introduce signalling theory as IPO underpricing explanation. 
He stated that issuing companies intentionally underprice in order to “leave a good taste in 
investors’ mouths so that future underwritings from the same issuers could be sold at attractive 
prices” (Ibbotson, 1975, p.264). Signalling their quality and positive commitment by 
underpricing thus, allows issuers to later sell additional shares in the market at more favourable 
conditions. Ibbotson theory was further developed by other authors, among them Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989).  
In their model, Allen and Faulhaber (1989) supposed that there are only two types of firms: 
good quality and bad quality firms16. They also assumed that firms are better informed by their 
“prospects than anybody else” (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, p.307) and so only issuers precisely 
know the category of firm which they belong to. In this model investment banks play no active 
role in certifying the quality of the issuing company. In addition, issuers are risk-neutral: they 
want to maximize expected proceeds that are the sum of issuing proceeds from initial public 
offerings and subsequent seasoned offerings. Allen and Faulhaber theory states that good firms 
signal their quality through the initial offering price: the level of underpricing is therefore 
positively related to the quality of the firm. Allen and Faulhaber (1989, p.304) affirmed that 
“underpricing the firm’s initial offerings (which is an immediate loss to the initial owners) is a 
credible signal that the firm is good to investors, because only good firms can be expected to 
recoup this loss after their performance is realized. Good firms find it worthwhile to underprice 
their IPOs, because by doing so they condition investors to more favorably interpret subsequent 
dividend results. The owners of bad firms know their expected performance and subsequent 
market valuation. They know they cannot recoup the initial loss from underpricing, and so 
cannot afford to signal”.  
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) developed a similar model to the one proposed by Allen and 
Faulhaber. In particular, they assumed that company’s managers are well-informed about firm’s 
 
16 In the model, the quality of the firms is defined by the expected dividend stream.  
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future cash flow, while investors have little knowledge about project cash flow and their 
variance. In this model issuing firms use two different tools to signal their quality: the degree 
of underpricing and fractional holding (retained shares). They showed that the decision to retain 
part of the shares issued, is a signal of managers’ optimism about firm’ future prospects. They 
observed positive relationship between the retention rate and initial returns, and also between 
the level of underpricing and the value of the firm. 
Finally, Welch (1989) built a model in which he assumed that firms are rational actors with 
superior information operating in a perfectly competitive capital market. The basic intuition of 
the model is that low quality firms must incur very high imitation costs to appear to be high 
quality firms. Investors probably may be able to find out the firm’s true quality after the IPO 
and before other seasoned offerings; this exposes low quality issuers to the risk that their true 
value could be detected before they can recover the benefit from imitating the high quality 
issuers’ signal. The cost of underpricing can therefore induce low quality firms to voluntary 
refrain from imitating the high quality ones, so that high quality firms can influence investors’ 
opinions about their value by deliberately leaving money on the table at the IPO, and then 
recoup this money in seasoned equity offerings. In this way, Welch demonstrated that the cost 
of signalling is lower for high quality firms and that the degree of underpricing is positively 
correlated with the firm quality. “The model strongly suggests that IPO firms pursue a multiple 
issue strategy when they choose both the price and the proportion of the firm they offer at their 
IPO. The reason why IPO underpricing results in a higher SO [seasoned offering] price is an 
information asymmetry between firm owners and investors. High-quality firm owners can 
signal their superior information to investors because their marginal cost of underpricing is 
lower than the marginal cost of underpricing for low-quality firm owners” (Welch, 1989, 
p.445). 
Though providing an important alternative point of view among the various asymmetric 
information theories, signalling theories have often been challenged by authors who argued that 
firms may choose a wide range of signals, other than underpricing, to advise about their real 
quality. Just to mention some of them, Booth and Smith (1986) highlight the possibility to hire 
particularly reputable underwriters, Titman and Trueman (1986) quote auditors while 






Efficiency of direct public offerings 
Within the numerous works summarizing the wide literature around IPO underpricing, Anand 
theory about the efficiency of direct public offerings (2003) is not usually presented among the 
traditionally corroborated asymmetric information theories analysed so far. Neither it is 
disclosed as an extension of these theories, as it does not provide supplemental explanation to 
the underpricing phenomenon in traditional IPOs. However, this thesis wants to study Anand 
intuition in this precise point of the elaboration, first because it illustrates the degree of 
information asymmetry in DPOs, also suggesting some solutions to overcome it, and then 
because it tries to explain the reasons behind the existence of underpricing also in DPOs, 
clarifying under which circumstances this unorthodox listing mechanism may contribute to the 
efficiency of capital markets.  
In Chapter 1, it was highlighted that one of the most relevant risks of undertaking a DPO relies 
in the lack of certification of the offering usually provided by investment banks. In this section, 
both Rock’s model and information revelation theories have shown how in traditional IPOs the 
information asymmetry between (institutional) investors – who have superior information – and 
issuing firm is greatly reduced by mean of intermediaries (i.e. underwriters). In the absence of 
such intermediaries, the cost deriving from information asymmetry could be even larger: in this 
case, even investors suffer an information disadvantage, since no entity is guaranteeing the 
quality of information disclosed by the firm. As argued by Black (1998) an adverse selection 
problem exists also in disintermediated listings, precisely because investors are not able to 
distinguish which issuers are truthful and which are not. This, in turn, leads uninformed 
investors to discount the prices that they will offer for all DPOs securities. According to Black 
(1998), in this context DPO issuers are victims of a sort of “death spiral”: high quality issuers 
exit the market because they cannot obtain a fair price for their shares; low quality issuers resist 
inside the market and “as a result, investors discount still more the prices they will pay. This in 
turn only drives more honest issuers away from the market and exacerbates the adverse 
selection problem” (Black, 1998, p.92). However, in her theory about DPOs efficiency, Anand 
(2003) tries to offer some strategies which may help DPO issuers to avoid this death spiral and 
to reduce information asymmetry with respect to prospect investors, by signalling them their 
true quality. Anand’s first intuition relies in the possibility for management and principal 
security holders to establish a voluntary lock-up agreement, equivalent to those typically 
demanded by investment banks. “The lock-up agreement would signal credibility, value, and 
management's commitment to the long-term success of the DPO issuer” (Anand, 2003, p.456). 
Another way to convince sceptical investors about the credibility of the issue is that of 
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purchasing, by insiders and founders, additional shares during a DPO, so to send a strong signal 
about the value of the offered shares. A third possibility deals with performance-compensation 
schemes: “management would be rewarded well for the company's success but would suffer 
with shareholders in periods of poor financial performance. Statements regarding these types 
of performance-based compensation strategies could be placed in the prospectus or even the 
articles of incorporation” (Anand, 2003, p.456). Moreover, DPO issuers could use earnings 
forecasts, disclosures about the previous performance of the company or valuation of the 
company’s stocks in order to signal their value. Finally, founders of a DPO firm could commit 
to sign the offering prospectus, thus assuming liability risk and guaranteeing that information 
contained therein is accurate. “By signing the prospectus, founding security holders would also 
reduce the need for individual verification of the disclosure contained therein. […] However, 
the signatures of founding security holders would serve as an "insurance contract" for outside 
investors” (Anand, 2003, p.457). Despite being costly, implementing some of these signalling 
strategies may help DPO firms to largely reduce the adverse selection problem and therefore to 
obtain a more favourable price from investors (i.e. less underpriced).  
Anand reasoning of DPO underpricing originates from Rock’s model assumptions. As known, 
Rock individuated two types of information asymmetry: the one between firms and investors 
and the one among investors. As just discussed, the first type of information asymmetry, which 
originally would be greater under DPOs rather than IPOs, can be largely reduced if a DPO 
issuer undertakes some of the aforementioned signalling strategies. In addition, Anand also 
points out that in a DPO “when all outside investors possess the same information about the 
firm, there should not be any underpricing” (Anand, 2003, p.459). The second type of 
information asymmetry – that across all investors – is also minimized in a DPO since, as 
illustrated in Chapter 1, marketing DPO techniques usually allow all prospective investors to 
access the same information in the same time. Thus, underpricing would seem to have no 
rationale in direct public offerings. However, Anand identifies DPOs underpricing explanation 
in capital markets’ competition. She states indeed that “in an offering with no underwriter, the 
issuer must underprice its securities to be comparable to similar offerings in which an 
underwriter is engaged. […] In addition, DPO issuers may have to discount their securities 
further to offset the higher information costs that investors must now bear individually. 
Investors will invest only if the DPO is priced to compensate them for their increased level of 
risk in the absence of an underwriter” (Anand, 2003, p.459). Therefore, a certain degree of 
underpricing is required also in direct offerings, first to be able to compete with traditional 
underpriced IPOs, and second to compensate investors for the additional risk and greater 
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information extraction effort they bear in the absence of an underwriter. Consequently, Anand 
shows that, if this required level of underpricing plus any additional costs incurred to complete 
a DPO – including costs of signalling – do not exceed the commission fees the issuer would 
have paid to an underwriter, undertaking a direct listing could be convenient and could lead to 
obtain higher net proceeds from the offering. Using her own words, “[DPO] issuers may also 
receive higher net proceeds for the securities offered. If they are able to do so, provided the 
costs of signalling do not reduce the net proceeds received by the DPO issuer to a level at or 
below that received by an issuer in an underwritten offering, capital market efficiency should 
increase” (Anand, 2003, p.460).  
 
2.2 – OWNERSHIP DISPERSION THEORIES 
A different group of theories explaining underpricing focuses on the ownership structure’s 
changes, and in particular on the ownership dispersion, originated from an IPO. In fact, in most 
of the cases, the going public decision entails the separation of ownership and control. IPO 
ownership dispersion is relevant because it can have strong and direct effects on management’s 
incentives and control to make optimal operating and investment decisions. In particular, 
agency problems between managing shareholders and dispersed shareholders could arise when 
the firsts, rather than maximizing expected shareholder value, maximize their expected private 
utility at the expense of outside shareholders.  
Zingales (1995) and Booth and Chua (1996) were the first authors who deeply investigated the 
relation between the going public decision, the ownership’s structure changes and IPO 
underpricing. Zingales claims that companies undertake initial public offerings also to optimize 
their ownership structure and he showed that a more diffuse ownership allows controlling 
shareholders to obtain a higher price when selling their controlling stake. So, company owners 
intentionally try to create diffuse ownership using IPOs and maintain a controlling stake to 
extract more surplus from a future potential buyer. 
Booth and Chua instead (1996) demonstrated that issuers effort to create broad ownership 
dispersion generates an incentive to underprice shares. “Secondary market liquidity increases 
with the level of oversubscription and ownership dispersion, which in turn increases total 
information costs and underpricing” (Booth and Chua, 1996, p.307). Underpricing and 
oversubscription therefore increase initial ownership dispersion, resulting in a more liquid 
secondary market.  
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However, the most known models rationalizing underpricing within the context of ownership 
dispersion are those of Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner’s (1998).  
 
Underpricing as a mean to retain control 
Analysing a sample of 69 IPOs issued in the UK between 1986 and 1989, Brennan and Franks 
(1997) showed that underpricing is a mean to retain managerial control by avoiding monitoring 
by a new large outside shareholder. According to Brennan and Franks, underpricing typically 
produces oversubscription and it is therefore followed by rationing in the share allocation. 
Thanks to underpricing, companies’ managers have the opportunity to strategically allocate the 
shares when going public, and therefore, to protect their private benefits. The role of 
underpricing in this model is that of generating excess demand, which in turn enables managers 
to ration investors so that they end up holding smaller stakes in the business. Indeed, when 
owners wish to maintain the control of the firm also after the IPO, they deliberately underprice 
the issue so to ensure oversubscription: this reduces the possibility of a hostile takeover because 
it allows the owners to discriminate between potential subscribers. Shares are then rationed to 
investors in order to reduce the block size of new shareholders: “the discrimination is usually 
against large applicants and in favour of smaller applicants” (Brennan and Franks, 1997, p.412). 
A largely dispersed ownership in this sense should guarantee to the incumbent managers to 
avoid constant monitoring by a new large shareholder.  
Some authors argued that underpricing-induced ownership dispersion is not the only way to 
protect private benefits of control. Available alternatives could be to put in place takeover 
defences before going public or simply to issue non-voting stocks. Field and Karpoff (2002) 
showed that a majority of U.S. firms undertakes at least one takeover defence, especially when 
private benefits of control appear large and internal monitoring mechanisms are weak. Other 
authors then claimed that underpricing and the resulting excess demand protects managers from 
outside monitoring only when outside investors do not assemble large blocks once trading has 
begun. Brennan and Franks (1997) however replied that when a large investor is expected to 
put together a large stake and to change the ownership structure of the firm, the share price will 






Underpricing as a mean to reduce agency costs 
In contrast to Brennan and Franks (1997), who view underpricing as a mean to retain control 
by avoiding monitoring by a large outside investors, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) developed 
a model in which underpricing may be used to minimize agency costs by encouraging 
monitoring. Ownership structure can affect corporate governance efficiency and, as a 
consequence, firms’ value. Agency costs are ultimately borne by the owners of a company, in 
the form of lower IPO proceeds and a lower subsequent market value for their shares. Since, in 
most of the cases, managers are also in part owners of the company, they bear some of the costs 
deriving from their own opportunistic behaviour. If their stakes in the company are large enough 
so that the agency costs they bear outweigh the private benefits they enjoy, it will be in their 
interest to reduce their own discretion. Therefore, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) observed that 
it may be value-enhancing to allocate shares to a large outside investor since, in general, this 
type of investors is better incentivized to monitor managerial actions, exactly because of the 
large stake they own. Therefore, in this model the rationing in the share allocation is used to 
favour larger rather than smaller investors, so to reduce agency problems and enhance 
monitoring on management. However, if this large allocation is not optimal from the investor’s 
point of view (for instance because it is not easily diversified), this investor can be further 
incentivized through the allocation of underpriced shares.   
 
2.3 – INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES 
Another group of underpricing theories adopts institutional explanation to rationalize the robust 
phenomenon of underpricing. The most quoted argument belonging to this group is absolutely 
lawsuit avoidance; however, this explanation is in a certain sense U.S.-centric, because, as it 
will described later, liability rules are particularly strict in the U.S., while they are not in many 
other countries where underpricing is widespread as well. A second institutional approach 
instead, deals with underwriters’ price “manipulation” and stabilization services in the after-
market. A third institutional insight then comes from tax arguments.    
 
Legal liability 
Lawsuit avoidance as explanation of underpricing goes back to Logue (1973) and Ibbotson 
(1975): their basic idea of their insights is that underpricing is deliberately used by companies 
as an insurance tool to reduce the likelihood of possible litigation and future lawsuits from 
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shareholders. Disclosure and liability rules are indeed quite stringent in the U.S. and expose 
underwriters and issuers to considerable risk of litigation by investors:  Lowry and Shu (2002), 
for instance, estimated that nearly the 6 percent of companies listed in the U.S. between 1988 
and 1995 were subsequently sued for violations relating to the IPO. Lawsuits are obviously 
very costly for the issuing firms, not only in terms of direct costs – such as legal fees or 
opportunity costs of management time – but also in terms of the reputational damage, which 
could lead issuers to face a higher cost of capital in case of future offerings. Therefore, issuing 
companies try to insure against these costs by voluntarily underprice the offered shares: this 
should reduce the probability to be sued for misstatements or omissions in the IPO prospectus 
or for poor post-IPO performance of the shares.  
However, the main contribution to lawsuit avoidance theory was provided by Tinic (1988) and 
by Hughes and Thakor (1992). Tinic started from Logue and Ibbotson intuition that 
underpricing is used by companies to insurance against legal liability and reputational damage. 
Tinic hypothesis is the following: the higher is the risk of future litigation, the higher should be 
the underpricing applied by the issuing firm. In order to prove his hypothesis, he assumed as 
determining factor the Security Act of 1933, the first relevant legislation regarding the offer 
and sale of securities that increased firms’ disclosure and liability requirements, and in turn also 
the risk of future litigation with shareholders. Analysing two samples of IPOs – one including 
IPOs performed before the Security Act of 1933, from 1923 to 1930, and the other including 
IPOs performed after the Security Act of 1933, from 1966 to 1971 – he confirmed that 
underpricing was significantly lower for IPOs performed before 1933, when the lawsuit 
avoidance was not a real problem, and was higher once the Security Act became effective. 
Hughes and Thakor (1992) developed a more articulated model, suggesting that companies 
usually face a trade-off: on one side, they want to minimize the probability of litigation, and 
hence the potential associated costs; on the other side, they also aim at maximizing the gross 
proceeds from the IPO (and consequently the underwriter’s commission). According to this, 
they assume that the probability of litigation is a positive function of the offer price: the more 
overpriced is an issue, the more likely is a future lawsuit. Nevertheless, they also point out that, 
even if a relation between litigation risk and underpricing exists and can be empirically tested 
in most IPOs, litigation risk is not a unique and exhaustive cause of underpricing phenomenon 
since “underpricing occurs even in countries where litigation risk is not a factor” (Hughes and 
Thakor, 1992, p.737). 
Finally, Lowry and Shu (2002) found a reciprocal correlation between underpricing and lawsuit 
probability. They started from Hughes and Thakor theory and noted that firms can lower the 
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probability of being sued by performing an accurate due diligence before the IPO and by 
decreasing the potential damages for IPO investors using underpricing. They wanted to 
simultaneously analyse “whether litigation risk affects IPO issuers’ incentives to underprice 
their issues and whether underpricing lowers the expected litigation costs by reducing lawsuit 
probabilities” (Lowry and Shu, 2002, p.311). In their analysis, Lowry and Shu found evidence 
and support for both effects and in particular they demonstrated that “firms with higher 
litigation risk underprice their IPOs by significantly greater amount” and that “firms that engage 
in more underpricing significantly lower their litigation risks” (Lowry and Shu, 2002, p.333). 
 
Price stabilization 
As already described in Chapter 1, price stabilization is one of the main services the underwriter 
provides after the effective listing of a company’s shares, intended to reduce or avoid price 
drops in the aftermarket for few weeks. Some authors argued that underpricing is an intentional 
consequence of such a stabilization performed by investment banks. First of all, Ruud (1993) 
sustained that IPOs are not deliberately underpriced. He observed that IPOs initial returns, 
rather than forming a symmetric distribution around some positive mean, typically peak sharply 
at zero and rarely fall below zero. The left tail of the distribution (i.e. negative returns) would 
be eliminated by stabilization of those offerings whose prices threaten to fall below the offer 
price, so to put in evidence only positive average price jumps. Therefore, observed data could 
not reveal the unconditional expectation of true initial returns, but the mean conditional upon 
underwriter intervention in the aftermarket. Estimating the unobserved unconditional mean of 
IPOs initial returns through the use of a particular model, Ruud was able to demonstrate that 
average first-day returns are indeed close to zero.  
Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996) model then formalizes the idea that “a commitment 
to price stabilization effectively bonds the underwriter against overstatement of pre-offer 
interest and subsequent overpricing of the issue” (Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm, 1996, 
p.225).   Since underwriters’ fees increase in gross proceeds, these are incentivized to raise the 
offer price. During the bookbuilding process, they could therefore overstate investors’ interest 
and price the IPO aggressively. However, rational IPO investors would recognize this adverse 
incentive and may choose not to cooperate in the building of the book. Instead, by implicitly 
committing to price support – which costs more, the more the offer price exceeds “true” share 
value – underwriters may convince investors that the issue will not be intentionally overpriced. 
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According to Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996), the main beneficiaries of price support 
should be therefore institutional investors who participate in bookbuilding.  
 
Tax arguments  
Another side of institutional explanations relies on tax advantages deriving from IPO 
underpricing. Rydqvist (1997) analyses this possibility in the context of Swedish IPOs. Before 
1990, employment income was taxed much more heavily than what were capital gains. This 
had created an incentive to pay employees also in the form of appreciating assets. Therefore, in 
the event of an IPO, underpriced shares were allocated preferentially to the firm’s own 
employees. In 1990, the Swedish tax authorities made underpricing-related gains subject to 
income tax, removing the incentive to allocate underpriced stock to employees. From this 
moment underpricing fell from an average of 41% in 1980-1989 to 8% in 1990-1994.  
A similar argument is provided by Taranto (2003) who, studying U.S. taxation, found out that 
some tax laws can increase senior managers’ incentive to underprice their company’s IPO. In 
the U.S., holders of managerial or employee stock options are required to pay taxes in two steps. 
First, when they exercise the option, they pay income tax on the difference between the strike 
price and “fair market value”. Second, when they eventually sell the underlying stock they 
acquired at exercise, they must pay capital gains tax on the difference between “fair market 
value” and the sale price. Since the capital gains tax liability is deferred, and since capital gains 
tax rates are typically lower than income tax rates, managers prefer this “fair market value” to 
be as low as possible. In U.S. tax law “fair market value” for options exercised in conjunction 
with an IPO indicates precisely the offer price, rather than the price that will prevail in the after-
market. This in turn generates an incentive to underprice. Taranto’s (2003) empirical results 
seem to be generally consistent with this argument, as they show that companies tend to more 
underprice, the more they rely on managerial and employee stock options.  
 
2.4 – BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES 
The last group of theories about IPO underpricing presented in this chapter deals with 
behavioural explanations. Before illustrating them one by one, it is fair to clarify that these 
models are still at a development and testing stage, even though seem promising. They born 
soon after the observation of the extraordinary underpricing level registered during the dot-com 
bubble, which, on average, reached the 65%: this extraordinary first-day initial return led some 
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researches to deem that there should have been some behavioural factors, besides theories 
analysed so far, explaining IPO underpricing. Behavioural theories indeed assume that 
underpricing is the result of investors’ behavioural biases, due either to the presence of irrational 
investors or to issuers subject to behavioural biases. The most prominent behavioural insights 
are provided by informational cascades of Welch (1992), “investor sentiment” of Ljungqvist, 
Nanda, and Singh (2006), and prospect theory of Loughran and Ritter (2002).  
 
Informational cascades 
Welch (1992) found an IPO underpricing rationale in the idea of an “informational cascade” 
effect, by which investors assume their investment decisions sequentially. Later investors tend 
to ignore their own private information and simply act like previous investors: they condition 
their bids on the information inferred from the previous sales and on the purchasing decisions 
of earlier investors, thus creating an information cascade by following sequential sales. “As a 
consequence, if a few early investors believe that the offering is overpriced, they can swamp 
the information held by all other investors and doom the offering to fail. Or, if a few early 
investors believe that the offering is a bargain, they can create almost unlimited demand for this 
issue” (Welch, 1992, p.696). Therefore, subsequent investors interpret successful initial sales 
as an evidence of positive information owned by earlier investors, so that they are encouraged 
to invest as well, regardless of their private information. Since, following this mechanism, 
market power is completely demanded to earlier investors, being aware of the subsequent effect 
of their own decisions, they do not hesitate to ask a higher level of underpricing in return for 
committing to the IPO thus creating a positive cascade. Issuing firms need to underprice in 
order to create high demand from initial investors. In fact, Welch demonstrated that only 
underpriced offerings are successful, while overpriced ones use to fail: this fact would lead 
companies to apply a substantial level of underpricing when undertaking a public offering.  
It is worth to underline that informational cascades theory is usually developed in fixed-priced 
offerings and not in bookbuilding contexts because, in this case, the underwriter has usually the 
possibility not to reveal the building of the demand of the book and moreover, the issuer can 
increase the offer size if demand becomes particularly high. Finally, Welch (1992) proved that, 
even though investors could freely communicate, investors are better off with cascades than 
with free communication: free communication aggregates all available information, therefore 
maximizing issuer’s information disadvantage compared to investors. In addition, avoiding free 
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communication reduces the possibilities that a single investor’s private information becomes 
widely known, thus decreasing the likelihood of IPOs failure.  
 
Investor sentiment 
Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) developed a model based upon the “irrational” or 
“sentiment” side of investors and on the positive response of issuing companies to such a 
behaviour. They observed that a large part of investors holds optimistic view about the future 
performance of IPO companies, mainly because these firms are usually quite young, have not 
yet reached a mature phase and are therefore hard to be valued. In this case, the issuer tries to 
maximize the sentiment investors’ excess valuation over the fundamental value of the stock. 
However, launching a huge number of shares in the market will depress the price; thus, the 
optimal strategy for the issuer would be that of keeping the stocks in “inventory”, so to avoid a 
price falling towards their true fundamental value. Nevertheless, regulatory constraints on price 
discrimination and inventory holding do not allow the issuer to implement such a strategy 
directly. Therefore, the commonly followed approach consists instead in allocating offered 
shares to regular institutional investors, who in turn resale them to sentiment investors, at prices 
that aim at restricting the offering. On the other hand, since offerings producing a strong initial 
demand are in general risky, regular institutional investors require the shares to be underpriced, 
even in the absence of asymmetric information. Anyway, since the offer price exceeds the 
fundamental value of the stocks because institutional investors must gain as well from trading 
with sentiment investors, the issuing company takes advantage from this underpriced allocation.  
 
Prospect theory 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) elaborated an IPO underpricing theory which focuses on 
behavioural biases among decision-makers of issuing company rather than among investors. 
They state in fact that issuers do not “get upset” about leaving money on the table in the form 
of underpricing because they tend to sum the wealth loss due to large first-day return with the 
wealth gain deriving from the price net increase on retained shares in the aftermarket. “Prospect 
theory assumes that issuers care about the change in their wealth rather than the level of wealth. 
Prospect theory predicts that, in most situations occurring in the IPO market, issuers will sum 
the wealth loss from leaving money on the table with the larger wealth gain on the retained 
shares from a price jump, producing a net increase in wealth for preissue shareholders” 
52 
 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002, p.414). In particular, Loughran and Ritter assume that decision-
maker’s initial valuation is reflected in the mean of the indicative price range reported in the 
issuing firm’s preliminary prospectus. However, the IPO offer price is systematically different 
from this price range, either because of information revealed by institutional investors during 
the marketing phase or because of investment bank’s influence on issuers’ expectations. 
Nevertheless, as known from Hanley (1993) theory, the offer price is only partially adjusted to 
reflect upward revisions: therefore, large positive revisions from the offer price are associated 
with large initial price increase during the first day of trading. Consequently, assuming IPO 
issuers retain some shares of the company also after the IPO, they perceive positive revisions 
from the offer price as a wealth gain. At the same time however, they also perceive a positive 
initial return as a wealth loss when considering that shares could have been allocated at higher 
trading prices. But, if the perceived gain exceeds the perceived loss from underpricing, firm’s 
decision-makers allow underwriter to leave a great amount of money on the table. Loughran 
and Ritter empirically demonstrated that the largest portion of IPO underpricing is in fact 
provided by those companies whose offer price is revised upward from what had been drafted 
in the preliminary prospectus in the extent that this “benefit” more than compensates the 
underpricing loss.  
According to Loughran and Ritter also underwriters are better off when issuers behave as 
described above. They argue in fact that, even though underpricing seems to be costly to 
underwriters, since raising the offer price would raise also their revenues as gross spread is 
linked to IPO proceeds, they benefit in two ways from leaving money on the table. “First, it 
makes it easier to find buyers for IPOs, reducing their marketing costs […]. Second investors 
will engage in rent-seeking behavior to improve their priority for being allocated shares in hot 
IPOs. Among the other things, they do this by trading with the brokerage arm of the 
underwriters and overpaying for commissions. This rent-seeking behavior on the part of 
potential IPO investors increases the revenues of the underwriter beyond that measured when 
focusing exclusively on the gross spread” (Loughran and Ritter, 2002, p.416). Therefore, 
Loughran and Ritter prospect theory concludes that, when demand becomes particularly and 
unexpectedly strong in the pre-selling phase, issuing firms weight the opportunity cost of 
underpricing as less relevant than direct fees paid in the form of gross spread, so that 





2.5 - FACTORS AFFECTING THE LEVEL OF UNDERPRICING 
In addition to the different theoretical explanations trying to rationalize IPO underpricing 
presented in the previous paragraphs, other studies regarding the main factors and variables 
affecting the degree of positive initial return have been developed during time. Among them, 
the most important ones can be categorized in endogenous to the IPO firm, as the issue specific 
mechanism or firm’s specific features, and exogenous economic factors, as market cycle or 
country specific regulatory constraints. Nevertheless, also in this case, empirical evidence 
shows that there is no unique model able to provide an exhaustive clarification to the 
phenomenon. 
 
Issue specific factors 
In the previous paragraphs it has been explained how the information disclosed in the 
prospectus and during the whole marketing phase is incorporated in the final offer price. 
However, some authors have noted that price perception of prospect investors results highly 
influenced also by some issue specific attributes, as the price mechanism chosen or the 
underwriter reputation. 
Biais and Faugeron (2002) developed a model in which they showed that the bookbuilding 
process is successful in reducing the level of underpricing compared to fixed price and auction 
mechanism. As sustained by Benveniste and Spindt (1989), bookbuilding is able indeed to 
reduce the magnitude of the information asymmetry among investors and above all between the 
most informed investors and underwriters, by allowing flexible bids. According to Biais and 
Faugeron, this process enables the issuing company to actively contribute in the building of the 
final offer price by considering the whole collected information, and therefore ensures the final 
offer price to be really close to the intrinsic value of the firm as perceived by investors, thus 
reducing the level of underpricing. Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) then, supported 
this view by adding that the positive effect that bookbuilding has in reducing the degree of 
underpricing outweighs the costs paid to underwriter in terms of fees and marketing 
compensation. Differently from Biais and Faugeron and many other theoretical studies 
sustaining that auction price mechanism, in contrast to bookbuilding, induces higher level of 
underpricing, greater volatility, and increased failure in attracting long-term investors, Iannotta 
(2010), assumes an opposite point of view. Exploiting Derrien and Womack (2003) findings, 
which showed that, in a sample of 264 French equity offerings conducted between 1992 and 
1998, auctions exhibited less underpricing than bookbuildings, he states that auction 
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mechanism is able to minimizing the degree of positive initial return, since it guarantees the 
most recent market information to be included in the final offer price. Trying to explain why 
bookbuilding is the most popular process, in spite of its supposed inefficiency, he also adds that 
“if the issuers were to decide which mechanism adopt, they would probably choose to minimize 
underpricing, thus opting for auction […]. However, underpricing is beneficial to investment 
banks and to their investor clients, who, differently from issuers, are repeated customers. As 
long as investment banks control the access to institutional investors, they will decide what 
mechanism to use and it will be bookbuilding, which allow[s] them discretion in allocation” 
(Iannotta, 2010, p.92).  
Besides price mechanism adopted for IPO issuance, also the choice of the underwriter seems to 
have significant influence on the level of underpricing. As highlighted so far, issuers need to 
underprice in order to stimulate investors’ demand because of information asymmetry 
problems. However, some authors reported that information asymmetry can be reduced by 
hiring highly reputable and prestigious investment banks as underwriters: it has been found 
indeed that most reputable investment banks are able to price the issue more accurately and to 
better attract long term investors. Logue (1973) for instance, examining a sample of 250 IPOs, 
found significant differences in the average initial return between the IPOs performed by 
prestigious and non-prestigious investment banks: according to him, underwriter’s reputation 
is taken as a signal by potential investors that enables them to evaluate the risk associated with 
the IPO and the quality of the issuing firm. Consistent with this hypothesis, Carter and Manaster 
(1990) demonstrated that offerings followed by well reputed underwriters are associated with 
less risk and that therefore underwriter reputation is inversely related to positive initial returns. 
If an IPO issue is led by well reputed and prestigious underwriters in fact, investors will be 
confident about investing in that issue. The certification of the issue and the fairness of the offer 
price provided by well reputed investment banks have been confirmed also by Titman and 
Trueman (1986), who showed that first time issuers having favourable information about firm’s 
value tend to select prestigious underwriters and auditors: “when a firm sells shares for the first 
time its true value is imperfectly known by investors and the quality of the auditor and 
investment banker chosen by the firm’s owner provides information to the market about that 
value” (Titman and Trueman, 1986, p.159). Finally, Dunbar (2000) explained that most 
reputable underwriters tend to price the issue more accurately because fair underpricing of IPO 





Firm specific factors 
Another group of endogenous factors affecting the degree of underpricing deals with issuing 
firm’s specific characteristics such as age, size, ownership structure, competitive advantage or 
economic sector.  
First of all, Ritter (1991) showed that the smaller is the offering, the higher is the initial return, 
and also demonstrated that there is a negative relation between firm’s age, at the time of going 
public, and the level of underpricing. Indeed, the younger is the firm, the higher is the risk 
associated to the issue and therefore, the higher is the degree of underpricing. James and Wier 
(1990) then found that the existence of a borrowing relationship reduces the uncertainty about 
the value of the issuing firm’s equity; the presence of consolidated credit relations indeed 
decreases the uncertainty and therefore the level of underpricing. Consistent with this view, An 
and Chan (2008) states that IPOs preceded by credit rating before going public, exhibit lower 
level of underpricing compared to firms without credit ratings.  
Other studies focus instead on the effect of business group affiliation over IPO underpricing. 
Ghosh (2005), and later Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010), studying IPOs of Indian business 
group affiliated firms, empirically proved that IPOs belonging to business group affiliated firms 
show higher level of underpricing than standalone companies: according to them in fact, 
business group affiliated firms intentionally underprice their issues in order to be favoured by 
investors in subsequent equity issues. In contrast, Beckman and others (2001) observed that 
business group affiliated firms of Japan present lower degree of underpricing, both because they 
are expected to produce more stable earnings in the future and because they have stricter 
relations with main financial institutions, therefore reducing the extent of information 
asymmetry.  
In addition to the aforementioned firm’s specific factors, also the ownership stake of managers 
and other institutional investors is an important variable in explaining IPO underpricing. 
Similarly to Zingales (1995), Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) developed a model in 
which managers induce a certain level of underpricing in order to maximize their own wealth: 
an increased first day return indeed shifts the demand curve upwards, so that managers can 
strategically diversify the funds invested in the company at a higher price after the expiration 
of the lock-up period. Therefore, the degree of underpricing results positively influenced by the 
ownership stake held by managers. Other authors instead, studied the effect on IPO 
underpricing of the involvement of venture capital investors in pre-IPO ownership structure. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991), comparing equal numbers of venture capital backed IPOs to non-
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venture capital backed IPOs conducted between 1983 and 1987, found that venture capital 
backed IPOs were less underpriced: venture capital firms’ ability to assess company’s value 
more accurately would indeed be associated with a certification effect. On the contrary, Lee 
and Wahal (2004) observed that venture capital firms are characterized by higher level of 
underpricing, supporting their so called “grandstanding hypothesis”, according to which 
obtaining liquidity from invested funds by venture capital firms has a positive influence on their 
reputation and allows them to easily raise funds in the future. Therefore, IPOs underpricing 
would be strategically induced by venture capital investors in order to successfully exit their 
investment.  
Finally, other studies investigated whether underpricing varies across different economic 
sectors. In particular, probably due to the extraordinary level of underpricing registered during 
the dot-com bubble (1999-2000), many of them focus on new technology companies 
underpricing. Lowry and Schwert (2002) showed that high-tech companies (such as biotech, 
computer equipment, electronics, and communications) exhibit higher level of underpricing 
than low-tech companies and also that non-technology firms are less underpriced. This evidence 
has then been confirmed by Loughran and Ritter (2004), who, after having studied a sample of 
6,391 IPOs conducted in the period from 1980 to 2003, proved that tech and Internet related 
companies are associated to higher initial returns than non-technology firms. In addition, they 
showed that not only during the dot-com bubble the average level of underpricing for 
technological companies was much higher than for other firms (more than 80% and 
approximately 23% respectively), but also in the years before and after the bubble, tech and 
Internet related firms were characterized by higher level of initial returns. Finally, Gregoriou 
(2006, p.227) asserts that “IPOs of the new economy account not only for the most excessive 
underpricing, but also for the highest negative first-day return”. All these findings can be 
justified by the fact that high tech industry is still relatively young and that, consequently, 
technological companies are perceived to be riskier. Indeed, this type of firms is difficult to be 
evaluated due to their large proportion of intangible assets and to their uncertain growth 
prospects; the risky nature of high-tech companies is also worsen by considering that they are 
frequently exposed to technology innovation and that their product cycles are usually of short 
duration. All these elements intensify information asymmetries between firms’ owners and 
potential investors, consequently forcing issuers of high-tech companies to strongly underprice 






In addition to issue specific and firm specific factors, there are some external environmental 
factors affecting the level of IPO underpricing, such as the market timing chosen, the number 
of IPOs belonging to the same industry, the IPO volume or the volatility of the market. In 
particular, when examining which could be the proper moment to undertake an initial public 
offering, an issuer must take into consideration the existence of market cycles. Cycles exist in 
both the volume and the average initial return of IPOs. Observing Figure 1, it is possible to infer 
that the number of IPOs is not randomly distributed over time: high-volume periods are almost 
always followed by further high-volume periods. 
 
Figure 1:  Number of IPOs and average initial return by month from 1960 to 2018 (source: own re-elaboration of 
Ritter’s (2019) data available at http://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/) 
The same trend happens also for average initial returns: like IPO volume, also the degree of 
underpricing is cyclical and periods of high initial returns generally last for several months or 
even years. Therefore, market timing of IPOs is differentiated into “hot” and “cold” market 
periods. In hot market periods an unusually large number of firms undertake IPOs and average 
initial returns are particularly high (as can be noted from Figure 1, an “hot issue” market was 
the one of the late 1990s in the U.S.). Conversely, cold markets are characterised by low degree 
of underpricing, low issuing volume and few instances of oversubscription. Even though 
observing such market cycles is quite immediate, explaining the rationale behind the existence 
of “hot issue” market is still now quite complicated. Ritter (1984) introduced the “changing risk 
composition” hypothesis, which provides that riskier IPOs tend to be underpriced more than 














































































































































































































































periods, the period with riskier firms will be characterised by higher level of underpricing. 
Another possible explanation is linked to Ritter’s (1991) idea that market goes through 
temporary “windows of opportunity”: that is, periods in which IPOs can be sold at relatively 
high valuation multiple due to the over-optimistic investor behaviour. Of course, issuers try to 
successfully time their IPOs to take advantage of these “windows of opportunity” and exploit 
favourable market sentiment. Schultz (2003) then elaborated a pseudo market timing theory, 
according to which issuers decide to go public when they anticipate high probability of 
obtaining greater IPO price, so to maximize the issue proceeds. Therefore, based on their 
anticipation, IPOs should be launched when companies’ valuation reaches the peak. However, 
most of the times issuers are not able to precisely identify this peak, and therefore offer prices 
of other IPO issues keep increasing until the market reaches its peak.  
In conclusion, since the flow of IPOs is not constant neither in volume nor in average initial 
returns, issuing firms need to carefully choose the timing for their IPOs. As can be observed 
from evidence, private companies tend to go public during periods of high stock market 
valuations, while, in case of market downturn, they usually delay the issuance until favourable 
market conditions. In addition, issuing firms should consider that not only stock market 
valuations and market sentiments vary over time, but also stock exchange regulations, listing 
requirements, commissions paid to investment banks and other factors can change and influence 
the IPO timing decision. 
 
Underpricing in different countries 
The analysis conducted so far shows that underpricing is a robust phenomenon in the IPO 
market during time. Although most studies have analysed U.S. stock market and have focused 
on U.S. IPOs, empirical studies provide evidence about the presence of underpricing also in 
every other studied market. From Figure 2, that reports the level of IPO underpricing by country 
of listing, is possible to note that there are important differences in the average initial 
underpricing across countries. In non-European countries it is higher in Asian market than in 
more developed countries. China (157% in the period 1990-2017), India (85.2% in the period 
1990-2017), Malaysia (51% in the period 1980-2018) and above all United Arab Emirates 
(270% in the period 2003-2010) and Saudi Arabia (approximately 240% in the period 2003-
2011) have the highest average underpricing. In the U.S. average underpricing is much lower, 
about 17% (registered in the period 1960-2018), while it is even lower in Canada (6.4% in the 
period 1971-2017) and in Argentina (only 5.7% in the period 1991-2018). In European 
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countries, the average underpricing is very high in Greece (approximately 50% in the period 
1976-2013) and Sweden (more than 26% in the period 1980-2015), while it is more limited in 
Italy (15% in the period 1985-2013), France (below 10% in the period 1983-2017) and Spain 
(9.2% in the period 1986-2018). These relevant cross-country differences are, above all, due to 
institutional differences that arise from binding regulations and contractual mechanisms. 
Regulatory environment indeed significantly differs across countries in terms of discretionary 
power allowed to underwriters, listing norms on IPO for the first day of trading, disclosure rules 
linked to the utilization of IPO proceeds or tax structure on capital gains: all these variables, 
added to factors illustrated along the description of the various theories, have a precise different 
effect on the level of IPO underpricing.  
 
Figure 2:  Average initial return by country in the period 1960-2018 (source: own elaboration of 2019 Ritter’s 




















































































































































CHAPTER 3 – IPO UNDERPRICING: AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
  
While in the previous chapter all the main studies about IPO underpricing phenomenon have 
been briefly discussed from a theoretical point of view, this chapter will present only those 
empirical evidences which are deemed to be essential in order to better evaluate underpricing 
related to direct public offerings. Unfortunately indeed, no empirical study about the topic has 
produced relevant and statistically significant results precisely related to direct listings, 
probably because the shortage of companies adopting such a listing mechanism has not allowed 
to construct a dataset large enough; up to date, only two big technology companies have decided 
to go public through a DPO: Spotify Technology, whose offering performed on NYSE the April 
3, 2018, and Slack Technology, which listed in NYSE as well the last June 20, 2019. For this 
reason, other evidences conducted on traditional IPOs, which could however reflect direct 
public offerings peculiarities, will be discussed. In particular, since, as already seen also in 
Chapter 1, DPOs seem to be a phenomenon directly linked with the coming of the Internet, the 
first section of this chapter will present the main findings around IPOs initial returns of 
technology and Internet-related firms; the majority of them focuses on analysing the Internet 
bubble period, but even those which examine wider period of times do highlight a higher level 
of underpricing associated to technology issuing firms. Then, because DPOs do not provide for 
the investment bankers assuming the role of underwriters, thus reducing or even deleting the 
information asymmetry between issuing firms and investment banks, the second section of the 
chapter will report some studies about self-marketed IPOs by investment banks: two studies out 
of three evidence that investment banks, when underwriting their own shares, use a lower level 
of underpricing. Third, as traditional initial public offerings are usually conducted through the 
mechanism of bookbuilding, which implies investment banks to discretionally deciding which 
institutional investors will be allocated offered shares, the most relevant empirical studies 
related to the efficacy of such a mechanism will be discussed: some of them show that not 
always IPO underpricing is used to extract valuable information from investors, but is 
sometimes used to compensate underwriters’ recurring clients. Finally, since pricing setting 
seems to be a key variable in explaining IPO initial return, the last section will deal with some 
evidences about auction mechanism, which implies the offered shares to be underwritten from 
the investment bank as well, but at the same time no influence from underwriter on the offering 
price: being the form of offering that mostly reflect direct listings, it results to save a great 




3.1 – UNDERPRICING MEASUREMENT 
Before presenting empirical results related to the issues illustrate above, it would be appropriate 
to deepen the knowledge about how IPO underpricing is usually computed. Even though the 
majority of empirical studies takes for grant the measurement method of such a phenomenon – 
normally referring to the most basic one – this section will provide a concise review about the 
possible alternative ways in measuring IPO underpricing, in light of the effects such a choice 
could have in determining the extent of “money left on the table”. Hence, the following 
paragraphs will discuss the Raw Initial Return formula, the Market Adjusted Initial Return 
variation and the Opportunity Cost of Issuance alternative.  
 
Raw Initial Return formula 
In quantitative terms, IPO underpricing is generally defined as the percentage change from the 
offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading17. Hence, in most of the empirical 
researches about IPO underpricing, the initial performance on the first day of trading is 
computed using the conventional measurement of the Raw Initial Return (RIR) formula, 





where 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the raw initial return on the first day of trading; 𝑃𝑖,1 is the first day of trading 
closing price available on the stock exchange website of the company’s listing market; and 𝑃𝑖,0 
is the final offer price or issue price of the company i, disclosed in the formal registration 
statement of the offering.  
The reason why this formula uses the closing first day price in order to measure IPO 
underpricing is that closing price should reflect the price equilibrium determined by the demand 
and supply forces on the market at the end of the first day of trading, i.e. after the initial trading 
has stabilized. Of course, Raw Initial Return formula provides with an underpricing estimate in 
percentage terms; however, IPO underpricing is normally computed in monetary terms simply 
multiplying the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price by the number 
of shares offered in the IPO, so to have a measure of the real amount of money left on the table.  
 
17 Usually, offer price is in general compared to the closing price in the first day of trading. However, different 
references have been taken into consideration during time: mainly, Uhlir (1989) and Carter and Manaster (1990) 
used respectively the official market clearing price and the closing bid price two weeks after the offering.   
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Market Adjusted Initial Return formula 
Raw Initial Return formula could be appropriate in computing IPO underpricing only if certain 
specific conditions are satisfied: in particular, it generates trustworthy results in cases of perfect 
market conditions, when there is no opportunity cost and no time lag between the closing date 
of the registration period of the offering and the first day of effective trading. However, under 
imperfect market conditions, the Raw Initial Return formula is adjusted in order to take into 
account the general performance of the stock market in such a time lag. Hence, under Market 








where 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the market adjusted initial return at the first day of IPO effective listing; 𝑀𝐼𝑖,1 
is the market index at the end of the first day of effective listing of the company i; and 𝑀𝐼𝑖,0 is 
the market index at the end of the shares subscription period of the company i.  
Empirical evidence about IPO underpricing shows that Market Initial Adjusted Return formula 
is in general more accurate than Raw Initial Return formula in measuring IPO underpricing, 
even in cases when effective listing begins immediately after the closing of the registration 
period: the first day closing price indeed may be particularly high with respect to the offer price 
just because the whole stock market performance has risen after the closing of the pre-issue 
activities; in these cases, adjusting for the market overall return allows to obtain more reliable 
results. Moreover, the Market Initial Adjusted Return formula could be also interpreted in a 
different way when considering the market initial return component as one of the alternative 
investment opportunities an investor could have undertaken instead of choosing for company i: 
doing so, he may be able to precisely assess the extent of underpricing compared to an 
alternative generic investment. Of course, also this formula measures IPO underpricing under 
percentage terms: in order to assess the whole amount of “lost” money, the difference between 
the numerators of the Market Initial Adjusted Return formula must be multiplied by number of 
shares issued in the offering.  
 
Opportunity Cost of Issuance formula  
Opportunity Cost of Issuance (OCI) formula is an alternative method to calculate monetary IPO 
underpricing, particularly useful in determining company’s owner cost of issuance beyond 
direct fees. First developed by Dolvin and Jordan in 2008, and then further improved by Dolvin 
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in 2012, the calculation was basically built on the assumption that commonly used 
measurements of IPO underpricing, as those illustrated above, are not appropriate in measuring 
the magnitude of this opportunity cost suffered by pre-existing shareholders, since they fail to 
take into account the share structure of the offering. Dolvin argues indeed that, while 
underpricing is normally computed using the total number of offered shares, without specifying 
which nature these offered shares are, a more accurate estimate of IPO underpricing from the 
company’s owner perspective could be obtained by distinguishing between primary and 
secondary shares. Underpriced primary shares, i.e. newly created shares used to raise fresh 
capital, will dilute company value at the expense of pre-issue shareholders; underpriced 
secondary shares, i.e. shares previously owned by pre-issue shareholders and sold to the market 
in order to exit the company, will instead lower the sale gain realized by the selling 
shareholders. The general approach threat both types indifferently. However, Dolvin claims 
that, normally, company’s owners do not sell the total amount of their own shares in an IPO: 
they typically retain the largest part of them and limit to offer a smaller quantity. Hence, taking 
into consideration IPOs share structures, he came to elaborate the following formula:   
𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑃𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑖,0) ∗ (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑)
[𝑃𝑖,1 ∗ (𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠) +  (𝑃𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑖,0) ∗ (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠)]
 
where 𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the opportunity cost of issuance of company i in the first day of trading; 𝑃𝑖,1 and 
𝑃𝑖,0 are defined as above; shares offered are the total amount of shares offered in the IPO; 
existing shares is the number of shares prior to the offering; and primary shares is the amount 
of newly created shares offered in the IPO. In particular, 𝑃𝑖,1 ∗ (𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠) represents 
the pre-listing value of the company at the first day of trading closing price, already net of the 
dilution effect coming from the issuance of newly created shares; (𝑃𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑖,0) ∗
(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠) instead is the amount of the dilution. Therefore, appealing to Opportunity 
Cost of Issuance formula, IPO underpricing results still positive but much more reduced. Dolvin 
justifies this results by explaining that the company’s entrepreneur, in general, still owns some 
shares also after the offering, which he could sell at the current market price once the lockup 
period expires; for this reason he is willing to sustain the opportunity cost of issuance “to create 






3.2 – UNDERPRICING AND INTERNET-RELATED FIRMS 
As already anticipated in previous chapters, the new millennium has been characterized by the 
so-called “Internet” bubble period, during which a large number of high-technology and 
Internet-related firms went public, registering a record in the history of IPO initial returns. From 
this point onward many studies have focused their attention on figuring out factors behind this 
excess underpricing, trying to understand if, indeed, the listing companies belonging to the 
“new economy” play a role in explaining it. The majority of their results have highlighted a 
strong positive relation between this type of IPOs and first-day initial return. Hence, since it is 
fundamental to take into account this anomaly when analysing Internet-related IPOs, the 
following paragraphs will report the empirical findings around the issue, referring to authors 
like Loughran and Ritter (2004), DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik (2001), Arosio, Giudici and 
Paleari (2000).   
 
Loughran and Ritter 
In their famous paper entitled “Why has IPO underpricing changed over time?”, Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) try to explain the reasons behind observed high-frequency movements 
characterizing IPO underpricing: from 15% in the period 1990-1998, to the extraordinary level 
of 65% during the Internet bubble years 1999-2000, reverting back to 12% during 2001-2003. 
To do so, they study a large sample of 6,391 U.S. IPOs undertaken between 1980 and 2003, 
mainly analysing it into four sub-periods: 1980-1989, 1990-1998, 1999-2000 corresponding to 
the Internet bubble, and 2001-2003, reflecting the post-bubble years. They then compute the 
effect of various firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics on the average initial return, 
among which firm’s proceeds, assets, sales, age or underwriter prestige; nevertheless, for the 
aim of this elaboration, only results regarding industry segmentation are reported; in particular, 
Loughran and Ritter distinguish analysed firms into two basic “industries”: technology and 
Internet-related, and non-technology. As shown in Table 1, the collected data highlight a 
systematically higher average initial return for the technology and Internet-related firms: being 
only 4 percentage points higher than that of non-technology firms during 1980s (10.2% versus 
6.2%), tech and Internet-related firms’ underpricing doubles in the 1990s (22.2% against 
11.3%), is almost four times greater during the Internet bubble (80.6% compared to 23.1%), 
reverting to a more acceptable level in the years following the bubble (16.4% versus 9.8%). 
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IPOs sample 6,391 U.S. IPOs 
Analysed period 1980 - 2003 
Underpricing calculation RIR 
Main results   N Return 
1980-1989 
tech and internet-related 576 10.2% 
non-technology 1,406 6.2% 
1990-1998 
tech and internet-related 1,081 22.2% 
non-technology 2,315 11.3% 
1999-2000 
tech and internet-related 585 80.6% 
non-technology 218 23.1% 
2001-2003 
tech and internet-related 60 16.4% 
non-technology 150 9.8% 
Table 1: Tech and non-technology IPOs initial returns during 1980-2003 by sub-periods (source: own re-
elaboration of Loughran and Ritter data, 2004) 
As displayed in Table 2, Loughran and Ritter regression further underlines additional effects of 
young technology and Internet related firms on IPO average initial return: first of all, 
technology-related companies maintain across sub-periods positive and significant effects on 
IPO underpricing, particularly high during the bubble (16.98%); Internet-related firms instead 
present a strong positive relation on average initial return only in the 1990s (31.29% and 
25.02%), corresponding to the proliferation of companies offering Internet services, while they 
show an even negative relation in in the 1980s and in the first years of new millennium (-4.06% 
and -3.25%, respectively); issuing company’s age has finally a constant negative effect on first-
day initial return (averaging 1 percentage point).  
Effects on first-day 
initial return 
Tech Internet Age 
1980-1989 2.44 -4.06 -0.89 
1990-1998 5.46 31.29 -1.31 
1999-2000 16.98 25.02 -0.97 
2001-2003 5.26 -3.25 -1.35 
Table 2: Effects of “tech”, “Internet” and “age” variable on IPO initial return by sub-periods during 1980-2003 
(source: own re-elaboration of some empirical results by Loughran and Ritter, 2004) 
Although not being the main objective of their empirical analysis, Loughran and Ritter 
contribute to put into evidence the general positive relation between young technology and 
Internet-related issuing companies and the degree of IPO underpricing resulting from their 
equity issues. As anticipated in the theoretical section, the risky nature of this type of firms, 
often being established for a very few time, having a large percentage of intangibles and 
offering short-duration products, complicates underwriters’ and investors’ equity valuation, 
forcing issuing companies to strongly underprice their offerings in order to be competitive and 
signal their quality. Therefore, the change in the risk composition of companies going public, 
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due to more or less Internet and technology related firms undertaking IPOs, represents a partial 
but significant explanation of IPO underpricing variation during time.  
 
DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik 
DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik (2001) focus instead their entire analysis on directly examining 
the reasons behind Internet firms’ IPO underpricing. They identify 342 Internet companies 
going public in the U.S. stock market between 1988 and 1999; in order to obtain consistent 
results, they further select a comparable sample of 249 “matched” non-Internet IPOs, whose 
offer date had to fall within a 30 day range around the Internet IPO and whose total proceeds 
had to fall within a lower bound of 50% and an upper bound of 150% of the registered proceeds 
of the Internet IPO. Table 3 confirms that the mean initial return for Internet IPOs is 
substantially higher than that of other firms: although showing similar offering parameters in 
terms of mean number of offered shares and average offer price, Internet IPOs underpricing 
reaches the extraordinary level of 74.9% compared to the more modest 31.4% of non-Internet 
IPOs18. Furthermore, even though the mean total proceeds registered by Internet IPOs ($70.9 
million) is not much larger than proceeds collected by non-Internet IPOs ($64.5 million), 
Internet IPOs left on the table more than $62 million per issuing firm, while non-Internet IPOs 
mean money left on the table is just $22 million. In total, Internet issuing firms seem thus to 
have sustained an indirect cost of issuance four times greater than that of comparable non-
Internet IPOs ($21.3 billion compared to $5.5 billion, respectively).   
IPOs sample 342 Internet IPOs vs 249 non-internet IPOs 
Analysed period 1988 - 1999 
Underpricing calculation RIR 
Dataset   Internet IPOs 
non-Internet 
IPOs 
  initial return 74.9% 31.4% 
  shares offered (ml) 4.683 4.624 
  offer price ($) 14.186 12.916 
  first day closing price ($) 27.026 17.683 
  money left of the table ($ ml) 62.193 22.062 
  tot money left on the table ($ ml) 21,270 5,494 
Table 3:Descriptive statistic of DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik analysis (source: own re-elaboration of 
DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik data, 2001) 
 
 
18 The average underpricing of non-Internet IPOs exceeds the historical average underpricing of 15-20% (Ritter 
1991) partly because the matched non-Internet sample includes a number of telecommunication firms which could 
arguably be considered Internet-based firms also. 
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The second part of DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik analysis aims at individuating the factors 
influencing Internet IPOs initial returns. Some of the outcoming results are quite 
counterintuitive and opposite with respect to the explanations provided by theoretical literature. 
First, they find that the need to return to the capital market to undertake a seasoned equity 
offering is positively associated with first initial return of Internet-related firms, but not of non-
Internet IPOs (the coefficients in the regression are equal to 31.1% and 6.5%, respectively); 
Internet-related firms could strategically decide to underprice their IPO: by doing so, they could 
indeed gain enough market share to later induce investors in participating in subsequent 
financing rounds. Second, empirical evidence shows that underwriter’s high quality does 
increase first-day return of Internet-related firms, but not of non-Internet IPOs (the coefficients 
in the regression are equal to 43.5% and 6.0%, respectively): the involvement of reputable 
investment banks in Internet IPOs seems to have a positive effect on the level of underpricing; 
authors rationalize the astonish result by referring to Loughran and Ritter (2002) recent insights: 
taking advantage of Internet firms inexperience and uncertainty, underwriters may underprice 
Internet stocks so to lower marketing costs to place shares in the market or to increase investors’ 
commissions in exchange of guaranteeing them quick and elevated profits in hot IPOs. Finally, 
DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik demonstrate that media exposure pre-IPO is positively 
associated with underpricing of Internet IPOs (+0.7%): the result suggests that media exposure 
maybe captures information about pre-IPO demand that is not incorporated by underwriters 
during the roadshow process. 
 
Arosio, Giudici and Paleari 
Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000) totally dedicate their efforts in analysing Internet stocks 
underpricing as well, but, differently from DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik, they concentrate 
on Internet bubble period. They study a sample of 86 Internet IPOs19 listed between January 
1999 and May 2000 on two European secondary stock exchanges: the EASDAQ, whose rules 
are very similar to those of NASDAQ, a Belgian stock market founded in the 1996 by U.S. and 
European financial intermediaries aiming at attracting international oriented fast growing high-
tech companies; and Euro-NM, a network of regulated national markets dedicated to growth 
companies, constituted by German Neuer Markt, by French Nouveau Marché, by Belgian Euro-
 
19 They identify an “Internet-related” firm as the one that would not exist without the Internet; they therefore 
exclude form the sample companies simply selling their products on the Web; most of the firms included in the 
sample sell Internet software and services, some of them provide Internet business consulting while just a few 




NM Belgium, and by the Italian Nuovo Mercato, each one having its own country requirements. 
This choice is dictated by the fact that, compared to the official market standards, the rules of 
the secondary EU markets are less restrict, so to facilitate Internet start-up firms20. Markets’ 
data regarding mean initial return and money left on the table are summarized in Table 4: the 
whole sample shows a relevant initial return equal to 76.43%, extraordinary high (160%) in the 
Euro-NM Amsterdam because of the presence of a single IPO, and decisively lower in the Euro-
NM Belgium (30.54%). Furthermore, more than 4,6 billion Euro were left on the table by 
European Internet IPOs between 1999 and 2000.   




left on the table 
(ml €) 
Neuer Markt 60 +77.11% 3,308.396 
Nouveau Marchè 14 +84.20% 388.227 
Nuovo Mercato 5 +50.16% 830.526 
Euro-NM Belgium 2 +30.54% 7.571 
Euro-NM Amsterdam 1 +160% 60.000 
EASDAQ 4 +73.94% 77.779 
Whole sample 86 +76.43% 4,672.499 
Table 4: Descriptive statistic of Arosio, Giudici and Paleari analysis (source: own re-elaboration of Arosio, 
Giudici and Paleari data, 2000) 
In this context, Arosio, Giudici and Paleari try therefore to investigate the correlation between 
Internet IPOs initial returns and firm specific factors. According to authors in fact, Internet 
stocks are subject, on one side, to investors’ euphoria due to the possibility of diversifying their 
portfolios and maintaining an option on future growth opportunities; on the other side, 
uncertainty surrounding Internet companies value affects IPO valuation: intermediaries and 
investment banks may fail to correctly price Internet shares, because they continue to apply 
evaluation techniques appropriate only for “old economy” companies, and not for young 
Internet-related companies whose short-term profitability is usually scarce and whose assets are 
essentially intangibles not included in the balance sheet figures. Dividing determinants of 
money left on the table into three categories (proxies of the market and investor sentiment, firm-
specific accounting data and IPO-specific data), authors find the most interesting results in the 
accounting variables. In particular, as shown in Table 5, while assets composition seems to be 
irrelevant21, sales amount is negatively related to Internet IPOs underpricing (-10.8%), while 
 
20 For instance, offered shares must represent a fraction of the equity capital which is lower than required by 
primary markets, and the minimum offering size is smaller, too; in most of these secondary markets then only one 
set of published financial statements is required before the offering.  
21 The coefficient of 0.5175 is not statistically different from zero at any level. 
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net profits show a small but positive effect on Internet IPOs initial returns (+0.09%). This 
evidence suggests that the market is not concerned about the capital assets of the IPO firm, 
since Internet investments are considered as strategic options on future growths; however, sales 
are considered as a cash source, in order to finance R&D, marketing and skill costs and reduce 
uncertainty about the firm's success in competing on the Internet business; hence, when sales 
are satisfying, the requested underpricing may be lower. On the contrary, Internet companies’ 
profits may enhance underpricing because, increasing the probability of the firm's survival, they 
increase the duration and value of the entry option in the Internet business. Since the traditional 
valuation methods of IPOs rarely take into account these strategic elements, underpricing is 
forced to be higher. 
Variables 
Effects on Internet 
IPOs initial return 
market performance 1.0762 
market volatility 0.0053 
N of IPOs in the market -0.0577 
assets' value -0.0185 
intangibles/tot assets 0.5175 
total revenues -0.1081 
net profit 0.0009 
leverage 0.0002 
offer price -0.3535 
Table 5: Effects of different variables on Internet IPO initial return (source: own re-elaboration of Arosio, 
Giudici and Paleari empirical result, 2000). 
In conclusion, according to Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000, p.21) “public information, i.e. 
accounting data from the IPO prospectus, do have a role (although unclear) in investors' 
judgement. The assets size and typology and the debt ratio are not related to the initial 
underpricing, thus suggesting that information asymmetry is reduced by book building 
procedures. On the contrary data about sales and profits are found to be relevant in mispricing 
IPOs. Therefore, we posit that the market recognizes as value drivers for Internet stock some 









3.3 - UNDERPRICING ARISING FROM PRINCIPAL-AGENT ASYMMETRIES 
One of the fundamental question of this thesis is whether IPO underpricing is influenced or not 
by the presence of investment banks – in the role of underwriters – in the process of going 
public. For this reason, this section will present the main empirical tests on Baron model 
hypothesis. As illustrated in Chapter 2, Baron model assumes that, since investment banks are 
better informed than the firm itself about capital market conditions, IPO issuers deliberately 
delegate the offer price decision to the banks. However, because of the issuer’s inability to 
perfectly monitor the investment bank’s distribution effort, offer price is usually set lower than 
would have been in the absence of information asymmetry. Various authors tried to empirically 
test the validity of this assumption, mainly focusing on the comparison between self-marketed 
and not self-marketed IPOs of investment banks, even though without coming to a univocal 
result: the most significant ones are Muscarella and Vetsuypen (1989), Chen, Fok and Kang 
(2009), and Regalli (2013).  
 
Muscarella and Vetsuypen 
Muscarella and Vetsuypen (1989) are usually introduced in anthesis to Baron’s theory. Indeed, 
analysing a sample of 38 U.S. self-marketed investment banks IPOs between 1970 and 1987 – 
that is, initial public offerings of banks who participated in the distribution of their own shares 
– they find that the sample is characterized by a notable level of underpricing as well, as 
illustrated by empirical results in Table 6.  
IPOs sample 38 investment banks self-marketed IPOs 
Analysed period 1970-1987 






  all self-marketed IPOs 38 7.12% 
  of which lead manager 17 13.23% 
  of which not lead manager 21 2.17% 
Table 6: Descriptive statistic of Muscarella and Vetsuypen analysis (source: own re-elaboration Muscarella and 
Vetsuypen data, 1989) 
Among the 38 investment banks going public in the considered period, 17 of them acted as lead 
managers of their own IPO, while the remaining 21 played the role of co-managers, distributors 
or selected dealers. The results obtained, on average, suggest that IPO underpricing is a 
pervasive phenomenon also removing the information asymmetry factor between issuer and 
investment bank. Self-marketed IPOs of U.S. investment banks are indeed characterized by 
statistically significant shares underpricing of 7.12%, on average not lower than the level of 
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underpricing experienced by comparable IPOs. Furthermore, distinguishing among self-
marketed IPOs in which the issuing bank acts as lead manager of the offering, thus exercising 
a decisive influence on offer price, and those in which the issuing bank does not assume this 
crucial role, Muscarella and Vetsuypen find out that IPO initial return of the former is clearly 
higher than IPO initial return of the latter (respectively 13.23% versus 2.17%). This evidence 
may indicate that lead manager investment banks deliberately underprice initial public offerings 
also when they lead their own offerings.  
 
Chen, Fok and Kang  
Following Muscarella and Vetsuypen work, Chen, Fok and Kang (2009) recently re-examine 
the validity of Baron model. In order to test Baron’s hypothesis, they analyse IPO underpricing 
in a quite extended period of time, from 1980 to 2003, and they performed two different 
comparisons: the first test essentially represents an extension of Muscarella and Vetsuypen 
empirical evidence, involving 41 self-marketed and not self-marketed investment banks IPOs; 
the second test instead compares the same investment banks self-marketed IPOs of the first 
sample to 52 IPOs led by these banks in the same period.  
As summed up in Table 7, the first empirical evidence does not reject Baron’s theory. 14 self-
marketed IPOs show a mean initial return of 13.98%, even higher than the mean initial return 
registered by the remaining 27 not self-marketed banks IPOs (12.75%).  
 Test 1 
IPOs sample 41 investment banks IPOs 
Analysed period 1980-2003 






  all investment banks IPOs 41 13.17% 
  of which self-marketed 14 13.98% 
  of which not self-marketed 27 12.75% 
Table 7: Descriptive statistic of the first analysis by Chen, Fok and Kang (source: own re-elaboration of the main 
empirical results of Chen, Fok and Kang, 2009) 
The second test instead compares the 14 self-marketed IPOs to a sample of “traditional” IPOs 
led by themselves. Chen, Fok and Kang identify 52 comparable IPOs selecting those undertaken 
six months before and after the self-marketed IPO and those having similar offer size. As shown 
in Table 8, IPOs led by self-marketed underwriters show significant higher level of initial 
return: 17.6% compared to nearly 14%, suggesting that investment banks tend to mitigate IPO 
underpricing level when involved in their own shares offering.  
72 
 
  Test 2 
IPOs sample 
14 self-marketed investment banks IPOs vs 52 IPOs they 
led 
Analysed period 1980-2003 






  self-marketed IPOs 14 13.98% 
  
IPOs led by the self-
marketed underwriter 
52 17.61% 
Table 8: Descriptive statistic of the second analysis by Chen, Fok and Kang (source: own re-elaboration of the 
main empirical results of Chen, Fok and Kang, 2009) 
Despite the significant positive underpricing also characterizing self-marketed banks IPOs, 
Chen, Fok and Kang conclude that Baron’s model cannot be rejected: the results they obtained 
support indeed the hypothesis that, when investment banks are involved in their own IPO, the 
expected level of underpricing is lower because in this case the asymmetric information 
problem between the investment bank and the issuer is eliminated.  
 
Regalli  
Differently from previous studies, Regalli (2013) decided to test information asymmetry 
between issuer and investment bank analysing the Italian stock market, traditionally oriented 
towards financial intermediaries. Therefore, he took all the IPOs undertaken on the Italian 
market between 1985 and 200722: among them, approximately 57% of the firms belongs to the 
“industry”, 22% to the “services” and 21% to the “financial” sector.  
Underpricing of IPOs undertaken by banks of the sample is practically equal to zero (1.6%). 
However, as shown in Table 9, when distinguishing between self-placed, or self-marketed 
banks IPOs (amounting to 11 observations) and not self-placed banks IPOs (6 observations), 
mean initial returns are completely different: while not self-placed banks IPOs show an average 
underpricing of 13.6%, quite in line with the average initial return of other types of firms, self-
placed banks even register a mean overpricing of 5%. Thus, only those banks directly involved 
in their own offering show underpricing below the mean.  
 
 
22 He excluded listings without an initial public offering, listings following extraordinary operations (with 
previously listed companies), as well as simple transfers to the main market from other national or international 
markets; re-admissions of previously suspended shares, listings of shares other than ordinary shares, and operations 




IPOs sample 213 Italian banks and non-banks IPOs 
Analysed period 1985-2007 






  financial firms 45 10.4% 
  of which self-placed banks 11 -5.0% 
  of which not self-placed banks 6 13.6% 
  services firms 46 4.9% 
  industrial firms 122 11.3% 
Table 9: Descriptive statistic of Regally analysis (source: own re-elaboration of Regalli empirical results, 2013) 
Regalli strengthen this first demonstration of Baron’s theory further comparing self-placed 
banks IPOs with other firms IPOs that went public in the same years: in this way, possible 
distortions arising from market trends in the years in which self-marketed IPOs did not take 
place are avoided. Empirical evidence highlights that, while the 11 self-placed banks IPOs 
present an overpricing of 5%, the 77 IPOs which took place in the same years show an average 
initial return of 12.1%. Since Italian stock market is highly intermediary-oriented, Regalli 
concludes that Baron’s theory may be reasonably validated when considering the difference in 
the level of underpricing of Italian self-placed banks and other Italian IPOs.  
 
3.4 - UNDERPRICING RELATED TO SHARES ALLOCATION 
As described in Chapter 2, according to Benveniste and Spindt (1989) theory, bookbuilding 
pricing mechanism would allow investment banks to overcome information asymmetry issues 
with respect to informed investors: leveraging on their discretion in allocating shares indeed, 
underwriters would be able to extract valuable information from informed investors by 
compensating them through the allocation of larger fractions of underpriced shares. In this 
framework, table left on the table becomes fundamental in order to induce investors to reveal 
positive information about the issue. In recent years, more and more attention has been 
dedicated to criteria by which IPO shares are allocated among investors. Given the large amount 
of money left on the table in fact, public opinion has started to mistrust the fairness of 
underwriters’ allocation policies and has therefore begun to deepen the research around the 
topic. Even Ritter and Welch (2002, p.35), who have been studying IPOs and related 
underpricing for many years, in their paper entitled “A review of IPO activity, pricing and 
allocations” underline the interesting and promising results such a research could bring: “The 
allocation of shares by underwriters is perhaps the most active area of current IPO research. 
[…] To date, empirical research has been limited due to the lack of micro-level data on share 
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allocations in the U.S. As this data becomes available, we expect that it will be able to shed 
light on many questions”. Hence, this section will present some of the most relevant empirical 
results about the relation between IPO underpricing and shares allocation, as documented by 
authors like Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Jenkinson and Jones (2004), Aggarwal, Prabhala 
and Puri (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002). On average, they all conclude the preferential 
allocation granted to regulatory institutional investors, while they all do not completely agree 
on the superior information gathering through such a mechanism. 
 
Cornelli and Goldreich 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) examine the impact of several factors on the “normalized 
rationing measure”, which simply represents the ratio of percentage allocation to percentage 
bids. They analyse a sample of 39 international equity issues23 that took place between 1995 
and 1997, all having the same global bookrunner European investment bank; sample’s main 
features are summarised in Table 10.     
IPOs sample 
39 equity issues led by the same 
European investment bank 
Analysed period 1995-1997 
Issuers characteristics   Mean 
  Sales (ml $) 2,382 
  Earnings (ml $) 184 
  Age (years) 36 
  Offer Price ($) 37.1 
  Underpricing (%) 3.4 
Table 10: Descriptive statistic of Cornelli and Goldreich analysis (source: own re-elaboration from Cornelli and 
Goldreich data sample, 2001) 
Table 11 shows the main results of their research on 11,077 considered bids. First of all, they 
find that larger bids are favoured compared to small bidders: all else being equal, percentage 
allocation increases by 24% for bids in the largest size quarter, probably because they are better 
informed. Bids that find in the second largest quarter are also favoured, but just for a 5%; 
investors submitting large bids are interpreted as being less concerned about liquidity and 
control issues. Bookrunners then award more shares to investors who submit price limit bids 
than to investors that just indicate a limit quantity of shares through strike bids (+19% and +4% 
in the normalized rationing, respectively). Also bids revisions are favoured (+8%), since they 
are interpreted as providing additional information about the issue as it arises over time. Bids 
 
23 Of the 39 issues, 23 are initial public offerings (IPOs) and 16 are seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Moreover, 
14 of the 39 issues are privatizations (both IPOs and later tranches).  
75 
 
submitted early in the bookbuilding phase instead (among the first 25%) are penalized (-5%) 
because perceived as less informative: information about the issue changes along the 
bookbuilding period, thus later bids are probably better informed. Furthermore, high frequency 
bidders, those who usually participate in a large number of issues, receive favourable treatment 
from book-runners since they are regular investors (+20% of allocation ratio to bidders who 
participate in more than 10 issues and +9% for those who participate in more than 3 issues). 
Investors having the same nationality of the issuing company are also favoured compared to 
foreign institutions (+9%). Finally, the variable that most affects the normalized rationing is 
whether the bid is submitted to the bookrunner or to another investment bank of the syndicate: 
in the first case the percentage allocation rises to 34%; this could be quite intuitive considering 
that, in deciding allocations, the bookrunner would tend to maximize its own interest rather 
than the client’s, by favouring bids directly submitted to its sales force so to increase its own 
compensation in the form of higher brokerage fees. Cornelli and Goldreich analysis, therefore, 
would confirm Benveniste and Spindt theory suggesting discretionary allocation of shares as a 
mechanism to compensate informative investors.  
Results 
Largest size quartile  +24% 
Second largest size quartile  +5% 
Limit bid +19% 
Currency strike bid +4% 
Early bid (first 25%) -5% 
Revised bid +8% 
High frequency (more than 10 issues) +20% 
Medium frequency (between 3 and 9 issues) +9% 
Home investor +9% 
Bid submitted to the bookrunner +34% 
Adj. R-squared 13.6% 
Number of bids 11,077 
Table 11: Factors affecting IPO shares allocation (source: own re-elaboration of empirical results from Cornelli 
and Goldreich data, 2001) 
 
Jenkinson and Jones 
Following Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Jenkinson and Jones (2004) try to empirically analyse 
the factors affecting investors bids’ allocations; however, their conclusions are slightly 
different. They test a sample of 27 initial public offerings conducted between 1996 and 2001, 
whose issuing companies are all European and greatly heterogeneous in terms of industry. 
Institutional allocations represent, on average, the 84% of the market offering (the remaining 
being retail offerings), although in the majority of the cases the institutional allocation accounts 
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for the entire offerings. Considered bidders instead come from 44 countries, although most of 
them are clustered in a few countries. Other quantitative characteristics of the issuing companies 
as mean sales, assets and post-money capitalization are detailed in Table 12. 
IPOs sample 27 IPOs of European issuers 
Analysed period 1996-2001 
Issuers characteristics   Mean 
  Sales (ml $) 130 
  Total assets (ml $) 167 
  Gross IPO proceeds (ml $) 72 
  Post money market cap. (ml $) 230 
  Institutional offerings 84% 
Table 12: Descriptive statistic of Jenkinson and Jones analysis (source: own re-elaboration from Jenkinson and 
Jones data, 2004) 
Jenkinson and Jones analysis main results are reported in Table 13. Similar to Cornelli and 
Goldreich, they find that largest bids are in general favoured by bookrunners (+40% in the 
normalized rationing for top quartile size bids and +20% for second largest size quartile). 
Consistently with the precedent work, they also prove that regular investors of a particular 
investment bank are generally treated more favourably (+34% in the normalized rationing for 
high frequency investors and just +5% for medium frequency investors). Another common 
result to both analyses is the positive relation between bids submitted directly to bookrunner 
and allocation ratio: in Jenkinson and Jones, this factor increases normalized rationing by even 
55%. However, differently from Cornelli and Goldreich, they find little evidence that more 
informative bids receive preferential allocation: bids containing a price limitation increase 
normalized rationing by 15%, bids specifying a particular quantity by just 6%, and those which 
are revised in the price or in the quantity even decrease allocation ratio by 12%. Therefore, 
Jenkinson and Jones results suggest that bookrunners are more concerned on placing the issued 
shares to long-term investors – thus favouring regular and large size bids – than on gathering 
information about the issue during the bookbuilding period, even though, as specified by 
authors (Jenkinson and Jones, 2004, p.2337), “this does not preclude information production 









Largest size quartile  +40% 
Second largest size quartile  +20% 
Limit bid +15% 
Currency bid +6% 
Early bid (first 25%) -2% 
Revised bid -12% 
High frequency (more than 6 issues) +34% 
Medium frequency (between 3 and 5 issues) +5% 
Home investor -1% 
Bid submitted to the bookrunner +55% 
Adj. R-squared 7.4% 
Number of bids 5,510 
Table 13: Factors affecting IPO shares allocation (source: own re-elaboration of empirical results from 
Jenkinson and Jones, 2004) 
  
Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri 
Consistently with bookbuilding models of IPO underpricing, Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri 
(2002) enhance the empirical study previously performed by Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), by 
developing a clearer relation between institutional allocation of IPO shares and level of initial 
returns. Analysing 174 U.S IPOs undertaken between 1997 and 1998 and managed by 9 
different investment banks, they documented a positive relation between degree of institutional 
allocation and level of underpricing.  
As shown in the Table 14 summarizing the mean results both for the analysed sample and for 
the entire population of IPOs that took place in the considered period, the sample used consists 
of larger issues at higher prices compared to the population. This is because Aggarwal, Prabhala 
and Puri find that institutional allocations tend to concentrate more in better performing IPOs, 
whose pre-market demand and offer price are particularly high. As a consequence, as predicted 
by Benveniste and Spindt (1989), stronger pre-market IPOs result in more underpriced shares 
allocated to institutional investors (as displayed in Table 14, initial return for the sample having 
an institutional allocation rate of 72.77% is equal to 19.25%, while it is much lower for the 







IPOs sample 174 U.S. IPOs (managed by 9 underwriters) 
Analysed period May 1997 - June 1998 







  Proceeds ($ ml) $132.2 $75.55 
  Shares Offered  7.47 6.07 
  Offer Price $15.09 $12.37 
  Initial Return 19.25% 14.27% 
  Institutional Allocation 72.77% - 
Table 14:  Descriptive statistic of Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri analysis (source:  own re-elaboration of 
Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri data, 2002) 
After having tested the fact that institutional investors, thanks to greater allocation of 
underpriced shares in IPOs with strong premarket demand, indeed obtain superior profits than 
retail investors do, Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri demonstrate that this effect persists even when 
controlling for premarket demand. The related regression conducted on the sample shows for 
instance that an increase in the institutional allocation percentage from 64.95% to 81.44% 
increases expected IPO underpricing by 5.12%. This implies that institutional allocation and 
underpricing relation is beyond that predicted by premarket demand: in other words, 
institutional investors seem to have private information about first day returns not fully captured 
by premarket demand or publicly owned information. Such private information could reflect 
institutional investors superior information that allows them to participate only in better 
performing IPOs, or could alternatively be held by investment banks that use it in order to 
favour institutions. Whatever the explanation is, Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri proved that 
institutional allocations in underpriced IPOs is in excess of that required by bookbuilding 
process.  
 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
In their paper entitled “IPO allocations: discriminatory or discretionary?” Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2002) try to empirically shed light on the question whether discretionary allocations 
of shares by banks are beneficial to IPO participants or whether instead they just serve bankers’ 
interests at the expense of the other parties. To do so, they analyse a large sample of 1,689 
equity offerings conducted worldwide between 1990 and 2000, structured as shown in Table 
15. The dataset consists of three parts: IPOs conducted in 15 States of the European Union 
(EU15), IPOs that took place in Europe but in States not belonging to the EU and IPOs in the 




IPOs sample  1,689 IPOs of 37 countries all over the world 
Analysed period 1990 - 2000 
Underpricing calculation RIR 
Dataset country N 
mean institutional 
allocation 
  U.K. 843 92.9% 
  France  244 76.1% 
  Germany  144 57.7% 
  Other countries  273 66.4% 
  EU15 1,504 82.3% 
  Non EU15 34 73% 
  U.S. 32 66.3% 
  Rest of the world 119 62.8% 
Table 15: Descriptive statistic of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm analysis (source: own re-elaboration from Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm data, 2002) 
However, authors focus their analysis mainly on four countries characterized by particular 
shares allocation regulations: the U.S. and Germany, where bookbuilding is the common 
practice and where primary markets impose few rules on shares allocation; France and United 
Kingdom, where issuers can select among a range of mechanisms and investment banks are 
usually subject to quite sever rules undermining their discretion exercise. For each of these 
countries, mean gross proceeds, underpricing and institutional allocation ratio of IPOs for 
which allocation data are available are displayed in Table 16.  
France 
Number of Observations 237 
Gross Proceeds ($ ml) 146.5 
Underpricing (%) 17.4 
Institutional Allocations (%) 76.0 
Germany 
Number of Observations 141 
Gross Proceeds ($ ml) 241.5 
Underpricing (%) 49.4 
Institutional Allocations (%) 58.4 
U.K. 
Number of Observations 231 
Gross Proceeds ($ ml) 261.6 
Underpricing (%) 11.9 
Institutional Allocations (%) 86.3 
The U.S. 
Number of Observations 32 
Gross Proceeds ($ ml) 172.3 
Underpricing (%) 8.9 
Institutional Allocations (%) 66.3 
Table 16: IPOs gross proceeds, underpricing and institutional allocations by selected countries (source: own re-
elaboration from Ljungqvist and Wilhelm empirical results, 2002) 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm generalize three important implications.  First, constraints in allocation 
discretion result in smaller revisions relative to indicative price range: authors demonstrate that 
constraints on the allocation of shares reduce average revisions by 21%, while, controlling for 
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regularity constraints, they have positive and significant effect on price revisions (+4.7%). On 
one hand, this proves how allocation of shares to institutional investors creates a positive effect 
on price revisions, since they generally own more valuable information about the issue than 
retail investors. On the other, it makes clear that reducing bankers’ discretion on institutional 
allocation limit price revisions and therefore diminishes information production. Second, 
institutional investors are rewarded with above normal large allocations in order to compensate 
them for revealing valuable information: Ljungqvist and Wilhelm find indeed that IPO proceeds 
result negatively related to institutional allocations, proving that large size IPOs provide more 
“currency” to compensate informed investors and therefore reduces the net proceeds issuers 
expect. Third, constraints on banker discretion, that translates into smaller institutional 
allocations, rise the indirect costs of going public: surprisingly, large institutional allocations 
reduce IPOs initial return by 3.9%. Furthermore, they also find that employing underwriters 
with higher market experience allows issuers to lower underpricing, confirming again the 
certification effect provided by large and well reputed investment banks.  
Though Ljungqvist and Wilhelm results show that investment banks’ discretion on allocation 
of shares is on average beneficial to issuing companies since it allows to set more informative 
prices and to minimize the loss in going public, they also conclude that in some cases 
investment banks discretion could also be used for favouring repeated investors and satisfying 
banks’ own interests.   
 
3.5 - UNDERPRICING RELATED TO PRICE SETTING MECHANISM 
“The solution to the underpricing puzzle has to lie in focusing on the setting of the offer price, 
where the normal interplay of supply and demand is suppressed by the underwriter”: following 
Ritter and Welch (2002, p.11) statement, the last empirical evidence this elaboration wants to 
describe deals with the link between IPO initial returns and the price setting mechanism. 
Although bookbuilding represents the most broadly used approach to conduct an initial public 
offering, many researchers have questioned its ability to effectively reflect true issuing firm 
value in the IPO price, thus increasing underpricing level above the necessary level. On the 
contrary, auctions have been sometimes claimed as providing for more information production 
in the setting of the offering price, although being rarely chosen as issuing mechanism because 
of the key role investment banks have in accessing important institutional investors, when 
adopting the bookbuilding approach. This section will report some of the main empirical studies 
about the topic: Derrien and Womack (2003), Kaneko and Pettway (2003) and Lowry, Officer 
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and Schwert (2010), all registering a lower level of underpricing when dealing with IPO 
auctions.   
 
Derrien and Womack 
Trying to understand which of the available pricing mechanisms reveals to be the most effective 
in pricing an IPO offering, Derrien and Womack (2003) decided to analyse the French IPO 
stock market: France, indeed, offers a unique contribution to the topic, since all the three issuing 
mechanisms (fixed-price, auctions and bookbuilding) are generally used there. In particular, the 
French OPF corresponds to the fixed-price offerings, where the offer price, resulting from the 
negotiation between the issuing firm and the underwriter, is set approximately one week before 
the first trading day; the day before the IPO, potential investors place the orders specifying the 
exact number of share they are willing to buy at the fixed offering price; shares are then 
allocated by the market authority on a pro-rata basis. In the French OPM instead, equivalent to 
uniform price auctions, the underwriter and the issuer set a minimum acceptable offering price 
one week before the IPO date; the day before the effective trading, potential investors submit 
price/quantity bids, which are then collected and computed by the market authority; the issuer 
and its investment bank then negotiate with the market authority a maximum price: all bids 
greater than the maximum price are eliminated, so to avoid unrealistic bids and to guarantee 
that submitted investors’ bids reveal their true valuation about the IPO firm; shares are finally 
allocated on a pro rata basis. French PG, alternatively known as bookbuilding, provides instead 
for the usual building of the book. Derrien and Womack analyse 264 French IPOs conducted 
between 1992 and 199824; auctions and bookbuilding samples are quite consistent (99 and 135 
observations) while fixed-price offerings are just 24, due to the falling use of that mechanism 
during the last analysed years. Main empirical evidences are summarised in Table 17: 
dependent variables are the first-day return and squared variation of return, the latter 
representing the squared difference between the predicted and the observed underpricing; the 
independent variables are instead the market return, an index incorporating stock market 
conditions until 3 months before the date of pricing, and the market volatility, defined as the 
standard deviation of the returns of the market stock index; both are then multiplied by the 
procedure dummies (OPF, OPM and PG). One key finding is that market return has a 
significantly larger impact on underpricing in bookbuilt and fixed-priced IPOs (3.277% and 
1.873%, respectively) than in auctions (1.062%). The significantly positive coefficient of the 
 
24 The effective sample is slightly smaller because data about some IPOs were not available.  
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market volatility in the case of bookbuilding (19.315%) shows instead that bookbuilding 
procedure is much more sensitive to market volatility than IPOs conducted through auctions. 
Also looking at the squared variation of return, the variability of underpricing results more 
accentuated for bookbuilding offerings (6.640%) than for auctions (0.402%) and fixed-price 
offerings (1.640%).  
IPOs sample  264 French equity offerings 
Analysed period 1992 - 1998 
Underpricing calculation RIR 
Dataset 
24 fixed price offerings (OPF) 
99 uniform price auctions (OPM) 
135 bookbuilding offerings (PG) 






  market return*OPF 1.873 0.183 
  market return*OPM 1.062 0.184 
  market return*PG 3.277 1.059 
  market volatility*OPF 8.197 1.640 
  market volatility*OPM 2.677 0.402 
  market volatility*PG 19.315 6.640 
Table 17: Market return and volatility of French OPF, OPM and PG (source: own re-elaboration from Derrien 
and Womack empirical findings, 2003) 
Therefore, Derrien and Womack findings show that auction pricing mechanism is associated 
with less underpricing and lower variance of underpricing than other mechanisms, mainly 
because of the auctions’ ability to incorporate more recent information about the recent market 
conditions inside the IPO price. French auction market driven procedure is indeed subject to 
fewer frictions and reflects all investors’ valuations more completely in the offer price, thus 
reducing underpricing, while bookbuilding offerings, being led by underwriters, also reflect 
investment banks’ interests in satisfying repeated investors objectives.  
 
Kaneko and Pettway 
Kaneko and Pettway (2003) compare instead price-competitive auctions to bookbuilt IPOs 
focusing on the Japanese stock market. This choice was dictated by the fact that, before 1997, 
only price discriminatory auctions were used in Japan to price IPOs, while from September 
1997 bookbuilding practices led by underwriters were also allowed. In particular, Japanese 
auctions provide for a competitive price process under which bids are accepted from the highest 
bidders in the rank order until the number of auctioned shares are all sold; investors affiliated 
with the issuing firm  cannot participate to the auction nor receive the allocated shares from the 
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underwriters; furthermore the number of shares that could be subscribed by a single investor is 
very limited, so that this leads to a wide distribution of offered shares across many investors. 
Under the bookbuilding mechanism instead, as for the other countries, the underwriter prices 
the offer and allocates shares discretionally among investors. Japanese stock market offers 
therefore a particularly interesting situation in terms of IPOs price setting mechanisms. 
The analysed sample consists of 950 Japanese IPOs conducted between 1993 and 2001: of 
course, the number of IPOs using auctions is greater than those using bookbuilding, simply 
because bookbuilding was allowed only from 1997. All the analysed auction (481) took place 
on the OTC market – that is the largest stock market for IPOs in Japan – while 357 bookbuilding 
IPOs were conducted on the OTC, 36 bookbuilt IPOs on the Mothers stock exchange (the 
Japanese stock market dedicated to start-up firms) and 76 bookbuilt IPOs on the NASDAQ-
Japan, for a total of 469 bookbuilt IPOs. Dataset’s offering indicators in terms of offer price, 
gross proceeds, initial return and wealth loss by issuer are detailed in Table 18.  
IPOs sample  950 Japanese IPOs 
Analysed period 1993 - 2001 







  number of IPOs 481 469 
  average offer price (yen) 29,756 651,247 
  average gross proceeds (ml yen) 3546 3643 
  average initial return (%) 11.4% 48.0% 
  % of positive initial returns  93.14% 77.4% 
  average wealth loss (ml yen) 257 1253 
Table 18: Descriptive statistic of Kaneko and Pettway analysis (source: own re-elaboration from Kaneko and 
Pettway data, 2003) 
The most significant results refer to underpricing level and wealth loss suffered by single issuer, 
obtained after controlling for ex-ante uncertainty and other issue and firm specific variables. As 
can be already noted from Table 18, the average initial return of auction-price IPOs is about 
four times lower than that of bookbuilt IPOs (11.4% versus 48%, respectively). The wealth lost 
by issuing firm in millions of yen, calculated as the gross proceeds multiplied by the percentage 
initial return, is even much higher for underwriter-priced IPOs than for auctions (1253 million 
of yen for bookbuilding compared to just 257 million of yen for auctions). These first evidences 
show that, under bookbuilding approach, investors receive higher returns while issuing firms 
leave much more money on the table. Table 19, which reports annual data, further confirms 
these findings: OTC auctions present average initial returns of 11.4%, while OTC bookbuilt 
IPOs of 47.6%; bookbuilt issues made on the Mothers have average initial returns of 37.4%, 
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while those listed on NASDAQ-Japan of 54.87%. Comprehensively, bookbuilding IPOs have 
significantly higher underpricing levels in each year than those of auctions, dramatically higher 
in 1999. However, Kaneko and Pettway also precise that their findings are stressed by the fact 
that Japanese underwriters, differently from American underwriters for instance, never set the 
offer price above the upper limit of the initial price range established prior to the sale, resulting 




OTC Mothers NASDAQ-Japan 
    N IR N IR N IR 
1993 auction 54 11.9%         
1994 auction 106 10.84%         
1995 auction 138 12.67%         
1996 auction 109 15.41%         
1997 auction 74 3.58%         
  book-building 28 9.87%         
1998 book-building 62 23.78%         
1999 book-building 73 134.4% 2 227.64%     
2000 book-building 97 21.73% 27 7.59% 33 27.04% 
2001 book-building 97 34.47% 7 98.0% 43 76.23% 
Table 19: Auctions and bookbuilt Japanese IPOs underpricing in the period 1993-2001 (source: own re-
elaboration from Kaneko and Pettway empirical results, 2003) 
 
Lowry, Officer and Schwert 
In their paper entitled “The variability of IPO initial return”, Lowry, Officer and Schwert 
(2010) introduce the issue of IPO price setting mechanism only as a conclusion of their previous 
work. Observing IPOs underpricing great variability both in time and across different types of 
firms, they indeed note that not only IPO prices result usually underpriced, but also that the 
majority of the listed companies presents underpricing very far from the average, attesting 
heavy pricing errors by underwriting firms. In this view, they test a small sample of U.S. 
auctions and conclude that such a mechanism could lead to a more accurate IPO price. 
The starting point of their analysis consists in a large sample of 11,734 U.S. IPOs conducted 
during a wide period of time: 1981-2005. Computing the effects of various market 
characteristics on monthly averages and standard deviation of IPOs initial returns –using the 
RIR formula on the closing price of the 21st day of trading – authors decide to segregate results 
relating to the Internet bubble. As can be noted from Table 20, also when Internet IPO bubble 
period is excluded from the sample, technology and firm’s age variables seem to have a strong 
effect on IPO average and standard deviation initial return. Similar to the general empirical 
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evidence about IPO underpricing and Internet-related firms exposed in the previous section, 
also Lowry, Officer and Schwert find that months in which more listing firms belong to the 
high-technology industries (including biotech, computer equipment, electronics, 
communications, and general technology) and months in which listing firms are younger, 
exhibit a higher average and a higher variability of initial returns: higher percentage of 
technology firms increases average underpricing by 26% and underpricing standard deviation 
by 27%, while a higher percentage of older firms decreases average underpricing by 12% and 
reduces underpricing standard deviation by even 29%.  
IPOs sample 11,734 IPOs 
Analysed period 1981 - 2005 
Underpricing calculation RIR on the 21st trading day closing price 









Std. Dev. of 
Initial 
Return 
underwriter rank 0.14 0.19 -0.04 -0.08 
number of shares 0.22 0.26 0.15 0.16 
percentage technology 0.48 0.52 0.26 0.27 
percentage venture capital 0.30 0.32 0.15 0.11 
NYSE -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 
NASDAQ 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.04 
firm's age -0.29 -0.34 -0.12 -0.29 
price update 0.50 0.61 0.08 0.19 
Table 20: Descriptive statistic of Lowry, Officer and Schwert dataset (source: own re-elaboration from some 
Lowry, Officer and Schwert data, 2010)  
The empirical evidence found by Lowry, Officer and Schwert suggests that the conventional 
pricing mechanism of bookbuilding is not able to incorporate all the information learned during 
the bookbuilding period in the final offer price, thus resulting in strongly and largely altering 
IPOs underpricing; differently, underwriters seem not to be able, in general, to fully capture the 
clearing market price that will equate supply and demand for a given issue. Authors therefore 
decide to test whether IPO price set under the auction mechanism – which provides for that 
information of all market participants will be used to set the offer price – effectively entails 
lower level of initial returns. Hence, they compare a small sample of 16 U.S. auctions 
undertaken between 1999 and 2005, all managed by W.R. Hambrecht & Co and listed on the 
NASDAQ, with a matched sample of 32 bookbuilt comparable IPOs in terms of size and total 
assets (two comparable IPOs per auction). As displayed in Table 21, companies listed through 
the auction mechanism are quite small, except for the giant Google, which in 2004 collected 
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more than $1,6 billion as IPO proceeds25. Results highlight very different initial returns for 
auctions and bookbuilt IPOs: mean first-day initial return for the auctions sample is just 1.5%, 
really modest considering that the majority of auctions were performed during the Internet 
bubble period, when underpricing levels were particularly elevated; mean bookbuilt IPOs first-
day initial return is, on the contrary, much more high, equal to 22%. Standard deviation of first-
day initial return is also lower for the auction sample than for the bookbuilding one (10.1% 
compared to 47.6%, respectively). The same patterns are evident when considering the first-
month initial returns. Despite the moderate size of the analysed sample, Lowry, Officer and 
Schwert findings suggest that auctions of IPO stocks result in considerably more accurate 
pricing than the usual bookbuilding comparable offerings. Authors therefore conclude that 
many issuing firms are willing to accept a less accurate offer price and a higher level of 
underpricing as a way to compensate underwriters for post-IPO services such as market making 
or analyst coverage. However, some issues, such as Google, are likely to find auction 
mechanism as more attractive than bookbuilding, given their ability to obtain substantial analyst 
coverage and marketing, regardless of the issuing mechanism chosen. 





Ravenswood Winery 10.5 3.6% 0.6% 
Salon.com 26.2 -4.8% 8.3% 
Nogatech Inc 72.0 -21.6% -42.4% 
Peet's Coffee $ Tea 26.4 17.2% 6.3% 
Briazz Inc 16.0 0.4% -37.6% 
Overstock.com Inc 39.0 0.2% 3.8% 
RedEnvelope Inc 30.8 3.9% -4.0% 
Genitope Corp 33.3 11.1% 36.1% 
New River Pharmaceuticals 33.6 -6.3% -5.3% 
Google Inc 1,666.4 18.0% 34.1% 
Bofl Holding Inc 35.1 0.0% -4.3% 
Morningstar Inc 140.8 8.4% 18.6% 
CryoCor Inc 40.8 8.4% 18.6% 
Avalon Pharmaceuticals Inc 28.9 -9.6% -46.4% 
Dover Saddlery Inc 27.5 2.5% 0.0% 
Mean    1.5% -3.7% 
Mean of the matched sample   22.0% 37.0% 
Standard deviation   10.1% 25.0% 
Standard deviation of the matched 
sample 
  47.6% 50.7% 
Table 21: U.S. auctions first-day initial return and first-month initial return compared to bookbuilt IPOs mean 
and standard deviation (source: own re-elaboration from Lowry, Officer and Schwert empirical findings, 2010) 
 
25 The reported results already exclude Andover.net auction and the two related matched IPOs, since the company 
registered a first-day initial return of 252%, which created substantial effects on the sample statistics given the 
small size of analysed sample.  
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CHAPTER 4 – THE SPOTIFY DPO CASE 
 
In the previous chapters it has been first described the process of going public with the 
respective benefits and costs, it has then been argued the various numerous theories focusing 
on the main indirect cost of listing, shares underpricing, and it has finally been presented the 
most recent empirical evidences around the issue, necessary to contextualize the following 
section. This last Fourth Chapter will therefore face the underpricing phenomenon from an 
unexplored point of view: that of companies choosing to list their shares using an alternative 
and unorthodox way, the direct public offering. As it has already been anticipated, until 2018 
this particular mechanism was only undertaken by spin-off or bankruptcy firms mainly in OTC 
markets; on April 3, 2018 instead, Spotify Technology, the Swedish global music streaming 
service, decided to give the possibility to its existing shareholders to sell their shares by listing 
them on the NYSE through a DPO. The case has been widely debated by the majority of the 
most important organizations and institutions dealing with stock markets. The element of 
interest was mainly represented by the possibility that Spotify’ DPO, if welcomed by the NYSE 
– which indeed applied to change its own rules so to allow the company to list through this 
innovative way – would have fostered other well established technology companies to do the 
same, hence diminishing investment banks relevance and gains from the IPO process. The focus 
of this chapter is however completely different and much narrower: it aims at assessing the 
company’s fundamental value, at understanding in which extent this was taken into account by 
advisors and institutions involved as well in the DPO process, and finally at debating if also the 
case of Spotify could be deemed underpriced and which could eventually be the advantages of 
undertaking a direct listing in terms of initial first-day return.  
Therefore, the first section of this chapter will present the most relevant aspect of the company’s 
business, the company’s financial results over time and how they translate with respect to 
market positioning. The second part will instead deal with the peculiar listing process followed 
by Spotify, with a particular focus on the mechanism by which reference and opening price 
have been determined. The third section will instead present a research on a small sample of 
Internet-related IPOs conducted between 2016 and 2018, trying to highlight the similarities and 
the differences between the average characteristics of the sample and those of Spotify’s, always 
in light of shares underpricing. Another section will then perform Spotify’s fundamental 
valuation using DCF methodology, then supported by Multiples analysis. The last part will 
finally debate some of the most critical aspects of Spotify’s listing and will report which 
suggestions could be drawn from the case.  
88 
 
4.1 – COMPANY’S HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Spotify Technology SA is a Sweden company, now incorporated in Luxemburg, which offers 
the largest global music streaming subscription service. Its primary business is based on an 
audio streaming platform that provides protected music from record labels and media 
companies. Founded and developed in 2006 by Daniel Ek and Martin Lorentzon, the first 
Spotify application was launched in 2008, a period in which music industry revenues were in 
decline due to piracy and digital distribution growth. Spotify’s mission, as reported on the 
company’s website and in the Registration Statement (2018, p.1), is to “unlock the potential of 
human creativity by giving a million creative artists the opportunity to live off their art and 
billions of fans the opportunity to enjoy and be inspired by these creators”, so “to provide a 
better way for both artists and consumers to benefit from the digital transformation of the music 
industry”.  
Spotify does not produce original contents, but just showcases contents whose rights are 
obtained through licence agreements with important media groups as Universal Music Group, 
Sony Music Entertainment and Warner Music Group. Hence, the company primarily relies on 
two sources of revenues: advertising and subscription fees. Spotify’s customers can in fact 
choose between two different services: a “premium” service which provides users with an 
unlimited online and offline high-quality music streaming experience, free of commercial; and 
an “ad-supported” service, which is characterized by no subscription fees and provides users 
with limited on-demand online access to over 35 million tracks available on the platform. In 
both cases, the platform also gives users the possibility to create and share music playlists, to 
text and recommends tracks to other users so to improve the social component associated with 
the streaming. As can be seen from Figure 3, the company operates worldwide, offering its 
services in most of Europe, the Americas, Australia, some regions of Africa and Asia, and on 
the most modern devices as Windows, macOS and Linus computers, iOS and Androids 
smartphone and tablets. At the end of 2017 the company counted 157 million of monthly active 




Figure 3: Spotify’s monthly active users by region in the period 2015-2017 (source: own elaboration based on 
Spotify’s Registration Statement, March 2018) 
 
Spotify financial results  
As Spotify’s business model relies on showcasing licensed contents to generate revenue, its 
past financial results appear highly affected by typical problems of such a business. As can be 
assessed by looking at Figure 4 indeed, while company’s revenues grew rapidly year on year, 
net losses steadily increased as well.  
 
Figure 4: Spotify’s revenue and net losses on the period 2009-2017. Data in millions of € (source: own 
elaboration based on Spotify’s Registration Statement, March 2018) 
Disregarding start-up phase years, over the period 2009-2017 the company records a CAGR in 
revenue equal to 105.6%: 2017 revenue, amounting to €4,090 million, are 300 times higher 






























last five years (2013-2017) revenue still present a relevant CAGR of 53%, attenuating during 
the last three years (2015-2017) with a CAGR of 45%: year on year revenue growth for 2015, 
2016 and 2017 are respectively 75.5%, 55.0% and 38.5%. As shown by Table 22, in the last 
three years the largest part of revenues stems from subscription fees paid by premium users 
(almost 90% of total revenues in all the considered years is given by premium segment); year 
on year increase in premium revenues of 52% and 38% are primarily due to an increase in the 
number of premium subscribers, probably partly driven by the introduction of two more 
affordable premium plans built ad hoc to target broaden populations of users, students and 
families. On the other hand, ad-supported revenues averagely count for the 10% of total 
revenue, though exhibiting positive rate of growth: revenues attributable to the music-free 
service increase by 51% from 2015 to 2016, and by 41% from 2016 to 2017, confirming 
advertising as a relevant source of inflow.  
 
Data in millions of €  2015 2016 2017 % change 
2015 to 2016 
% change 
2016 to 2017  
 Total Revenue 
1,904 2,952 4,090 52% 39% 
 
 Premium  
1,744 2,657 3,674 
52% 38%  
 % on total revenue 
91.6% 90.0% 89.8% 
 
 Ad-supported 
196 295 416 
51% 41%  
 % on total revenue 10.3% 10.0% 10.2%  
Table 22: Spotify’s revenue in the three years before the DPO by type of users (source: own elaboration based 
on Spotify’s Registration Statement, March 2018) 
Although premium subscribers generate the largest part of revenues, they still represent the 
minority of Spotify’s users. Servicing of “monthly active users” (MAUs) notion, defined as the 
number of people which effectively uses the platform for a certain fraction of time in a period 
of 30 days, Figure 5 shows and compares the evolution of ad-supported MAUs with premium 
subscribers from 2015 to 2017, by quarter. As can be immediately noted, despite growing at 
relevant path, premium users always remain far below the number of free-users: at the end of 
2015 they represent 31% of total MAUs (91 millions), 39% at the end of 2016 (123 million 
MAUs) and 45% at the end of 2017 (157 million MAUs). It is worth to highlight however that, 
as declared by Spotify in the Registration Statement, the increase in the premium subscribers’ 
component is mainly due to the conversion of ad-supported users, through mechanisms such as 
product links and marketing across the leading social media platforms. Therefore, reporting 
declarations of the company, the key factor to ensure the growth of the business relies first in 
the capability of acquiring new users exploiting all the possible marketing techniques and 
synergies with the main social media, and second, in the ability of the company to convert these 
added users into subscription-fees payers. On average, until 2017, Spotify was able to always 
91 
 
rise the number of its monthly active users: +35% of users from the last quarter of 2015 to the 
last quarter of 2016 and +28% from the last quarter of 2016 to the last quarter of 2017.   
 
Figure 5: Spotify’s MAUs divided into premium subscribers and ad-supported MAUs in the period 2015-2017, 
by quarter. Data in millions of € (source: own elaboration based on Spotify’s Registration Statement, March 2018) 
Analysing Spotify profit and loss statement in the last three years before the direct public 
offering (Table 23), it can be noted that a great part of revenue is absorbed by the cost of goods 
sold, which represents the 88%, 86%, and 79% of revenue in 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively. 
COGS primarily consists of royalties and distribution costs related to content streaming; it also 
includes credit card and payment processing fees for subscription revenue, customer service, 
some employee compensation and benefits, cloud computing, facility and equipment costs.  
Data in millions of € Consolidated P&L Statement 
    
  2015 2016 2017 
Revenue 1,940 2,952 4,090 
COGS 1,714 2,551 3,241 
Gross Profit 226 401 849 
Research and Development 136 207 396 
Sales and Marketing  219 368 567 
General and Administrative 106 175 264 
Income (Loss) from Operations (235) (349) (378) 
Net Finance Income (Costs) 10 (186) (855) 
Income (Loss) before Taxes (225) (535) (1,233) 
Income Tax Expense 5 4 2 
Net Income (Loss) (230) (539) (1,235) 
Table 23: Spotify’s reclassified Profit and Loss statement for the years 2015-2017 (source: own elaboration 
based on Spotify’s Registration Statement, March 2018)26 
 

























Premium Subscribers 18 22 24 28 30 36 40 48 52 59 62 71
Ad-supported MAUs 51 56 60 64 67 70 75 77 82 81 89 90






















However, the bulk of the variable costs sustained by the company is given by royalties paid to 
record labels, music publishers, and other rights holders for the right to stream music to the 
company’s users. As shown by Figure 6 indeed, from 2012 to 2015, royalties and distribution 
costs nearly constituted the entirety of the cost of revenue, averaging around 97% of the total 
COGS; since 2016 then, royalties have started to stabilize around 78% of the cost of revenue. 
This initial improvement in the amount of royalties becomes evident also considering their 
absolute growth: while they substantially grew in 2013 and 2015 (+60% and +85%), they only 
increased by 21% and 27% in the last two years, also thanks to the new terms of the licensing 
agreements stipulated with Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music 
Group, and with Merlin, among others. Despite this, Spotify’s royalties payment model is still 
structured in a way through which these costs result directly linked to revenue: monthly 
royalties are in fact calculated on the basis of a wide range of variables, among which the 
amount of revenue generated, the type of content streamed and the country in which such a 
content is streamed. In addition, some licencing agreements establish some targets in terms of 
users to be reached, some advanced payments to be made or some minimum amount to be 
guaranteed27.  
 
Figure 6: Royalties paid and COGS of Spotify in the period 2012-2017. Data in millions of € (source: own 
elaboration from Statista data available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/487332/spotify-royalty-payment-
costs/ and company’s Registration Statement, March 2018) 
Despite royalties still absorb Spotify’s largest part of revenue, in the last years the company 
was able to mitigate their effects on the gross margin, as shown by Figure 7: the gross profit 
 
27 Spotify even has license agreements that include so-called “most favoured nations” provisions, that require that 
the terms of such agreements are the most favourable terms provided to any music licensor, which could cause 
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ratio indeed, increased from less than the 10% of revenue in 2015 to more than the 20% in 2017. 
Expenses related to research and development – mainly incurred for the development of new 
or improved products related to platform and mobile app - and sales and marketing – which 
comprise events and trade shows, public relations, branding, advertising, consulting in order to 
acquire new customers – then show discrete increases year on year (averaging 8% and 12% in 
the three considered years, respectively), which could be deemed to be organic to the expansion 
of the company and to the consequent increased competition within the business. Operating 
results, however, always turn into operating losses, that are further worsened by financial 
interest expenses (approaching the billion of Euros in 2017, due to a conspicuous founding 
started the year before). Since its foundation, Spotify has never become profitable; instead, the 
company continues to register net losses: 2017 net loss, amounting to €1,235 million, is more 
than four times higher the 2015 net loss (€230 million) and 129% higher than 2016 net loss 
(€539 million).  
 
Figure 7: Spotify’s gross margin ratio in the period 2015-2017 (source: own elaboration based on the company’s 
Registration Statement, March 2018) 
Table 24 reports Spotify’s consolidated balance sheet for the last three years before the public 
offering of the company. Total assets of the company quite doubled from 2015 to 2016, passing 
from €1,051 million to €2,100 million, and rapidly grew also from 2016 to 2017, reaching 






























Table 24: Spotify’s reclassified balance sheet in the period 2015-2017 (source: own elaboration based on the 
company’s Registration Statement, March 2018) 
Part of this increment is due to the expansion of company’s intangible items, as can be expected 
from a firm operating in the music streaming business. Intangibles mainly include internal 
development costs, own patents, acquired technology and patents and goodwill. Internal 
development costs, net of accumulated amortization, amount to €5 million in 2015 and 2016, 
and increase to €12 million in 2017. Moreover, Spotify demonstrates to be particularly 
proactive also in the acquisition of other businesses and operations: in 2015, through an 
acquisition, the company increased goodwill by €7 million; during 2016, the company 
performed the acquisition of three separate businesses, after that €7 million were recorded to 
goodwill and €1 million as intangible assets; finally, during 2017, Spotify acquired further five 
separate businesses, paying partly in cash (€52 million) and partly in equity (€33 million): €71 
million were recorded to goodwill and €17 million to acquired intangible assets. Consequently, 
as shown by Table 25, total intangibles and goodwill displayed in consolidated balance sheet 
of the company increased by more than 100%. 
 









 December 31, 2015 5 12 65 82  
 December 31, 2016 5 2 73 80  
 December 31, 2017 12 15 135 162  
       
Table 25: Spotify’s intangible assets in the period 2015-2017 (source: own elaboration based on the company’s 
Registration Statement, March 2018) 
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However, a large part of the last year increase of Spotify’s assets can be explained by analysing 
company’s funding sources. As can be assessed by looking at consolidated balance sheet, 
company’s indebtedness towards credit institutions is null. From 2016 indeed Spotify chose to 
finance its operations through the issuance of €1,160 million of convertible notes. These notes 
bear an interest of 5% which increases by 100 basis points every six months and entail the 
possibility to convert them into Spotify’s ordinary shares with a discount of 20% or more on 
the per share price, depending on the timing of conversion. Noteholders also had the possibility 
to take part of the so called “Tencent Transaction”. Tencent is an operator of social network in 
China which owns a majority stake in Tencent Music Entertainment (TEM), an early mover 
which provides digital music services including streaming, online live broadcasts and karaoke 
services. In December 2017, Spotify and TEM agreed on performing a share exchange 
transaction, after that Spotify holds a minority stake in TEM and TEM holds indirectly, through 
an affiliated company, shares of Spotify. The aim of the transaction for both companies was 
mainly that of establishing long-term investments in the respective music streaming markets. 
Therefore, in December 2017, $301 million of convertible notes were exchanged for 4,800,000 
ordinary shares, then sold to the affiliated of Tencent. In the same period, $110 million of 
convertible notes were converted in 1,754,960 Spotify’s ordinary shares; at the beginning of 
2018 then, $628 million of convertible notes were further exchanged for 9,431,960 ordinary 
shares. In this sense, convertible notes have performed three functions: they first provided the 
company with available financial resources, they then partly served as mean of exchange to 
conclude long-term investments and they also broaden Spotify’s shareholder base.  
Since convertible notes are denominated in dollar, the company also tried to mitigate its 
exposure towards foreign currency creating a strong liquidity position so to use a sort of natural 
hedging: besides cash and cash equivalent, the company also invested in short-term securities 
such as government and agencies securities, corporate notes and collateralized reverse purchase 









Spotify’s market positioning  
As the first application was launched, Spotify’s service distribution rapidly grew and since 
many years the company holds the first position in terms of market share. At the end of June 
2018 indeed, Spotify had a market share of 36%, substantially unvaried with respect to the same 
period of the previous year. Figure 8 reports market shares of all digital music companies 
providing content streaming: as can be seen, among Spotify’s main competitors there are giants 
like Apple, Amazon and Google. 
 
Figure 8: Market share of the main streaming music companies, as at June 2018 (source: MIDiA Research 
website available at https://www.midiaresearch.com/research/) 
Differently from Spotify however, these firms have developed streaming music platforms as 
added services to their core business services and can therefore take advantage of it: Apple, for 
instance, does not need to create and to feed a market of streaming music users, because it 
already incorporates the service in the mobile devices it produces and distributes. Doing this, 
Apple was in fact able to improve its music streaming positioning compared to 2017, reaching 
19% of market share in 2018. Despite this however, as shown in Figure 9, during the last two 
years before the direct listing, Spotify has been able to greatly distance its main competitor, 
Apple, in terms of worldwide premium subscribers. The third player of the market is Amazon, 
which, offering Amazon Music Unlimited and Amazon Prime Music, claims a market share of 
12% at the end of June 2018. Besides them, another important music streaming provider is 
Tencent Music Entertainment in which, as seen in the paragraphs describing Spotify’s 
financials, the company holds a minority stake: if the company, in the future, were be able to 
acquire the control of this business now belonging to the Chinese social network group, it would 
significantly expand its services worldwide (TME 2018 market share amounts to 8%). Moving 
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Deezer, Pandora and Google. Among them, Google is the one having the highest visibility, easy 
offering its music service through Google Play Store28; the remaining two instead, like Spotify, 
are companies whose core business is that of the music streaming. Deezer, firstly launched in 
2007, takes the form of a web application and offers on-demand streaming of more than 43 
million tracks; Pandora is an American service offering customized on-line radio, now available 
only in the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. Finally, the remaining 16% of market share 
includes streaming music services as Joox, SoundCloud, TuneIn, Napster and Tidal, which, 
though not retaining significant stakes, must not be undervalued.  
 
Figure 9: Millions of quarterly subscriber users for Spotify and Apple Music in the period 2016-2018 (source: 
Statista website available on https://www.statista.com/statistics/604959/number-of-apple-music-subscribers/) 
 
Spotify’s opportunities and risks 
Analysing the company from an internal point of view, Spotify’s strengths and weaknesses both 
rely on the extent and nature of its online services. As sustained in the firm’s Registration 
Statement, Spotify has built its global success on the strength of its brand and value proposition: 
one of the pillars of the company is indeed that of providing users with a customized music 
experience, possible thanks to the continuous learning of a wide range of listening behaviours. 
This practice has allowed Spotify to engage even more users and to expand in various music 
streaming markets worldwide. Another key factor is that Spotify has become a key discovery 
tool for users to know new and emerging artists. However, as could appear obvious, Spotify 
expansion has only been possible thanks to the wide spread and easy accessibility of media 
 
28 It is worth to highlight that Google also owns YouTube, that, providing streaming contents, could be considered 




























streaming services provided, that help to retain customers: if its on-demand music streaming 
services were not as easily or widely accessible, users would likely leave the company. All 
these elements enable the company to enlarge its users base and to, potentially, reduce fixed 
costs per account or per user by exploiting economies of scale.  
However, the online nature of the offered contents forces the company to obtain rights, by 
stipulating licencing agreements with the major music labels and media groups, in order to 
distribute intellectual protected contents. By doing this, as seen in the paragraph dedicated to 
the company’s financial statements, the most part of revenue is absorbed by the payment of 
royalties. In this context, Spotify has low bargaining power against content providers since, as 
streaming music market does not present particularly high barriers to entry and faces therefore 
increased concentration, content originators could always supply other streaming platforms able 
to pay higher fees or could even decide to develop their own streaming services. What is sure 
is that the company should renegotiate new contractual agreements based for instance on 
decreasing licensing fees over time, or should even think to vertically integrate: also exploiting 
the millions of data about users’ music preferences and the possibility to have new artists 
growing within it, Spotify could become itself the originator of the contents it streams. 
Moreover, another weakness declared in the company’s prospectus that characterizes all the 
firms of the sector, is the dependence on the Internet: in emerging countries for example, where 
the connectivity is slow and relatively costly, Spotify’s attractiveness is lower.  
One more issue is given by Spotify’s dependence on other technology firms: normally, 
Spotify’s users can access the service by downloading the music app through Apple App Store 
or Google Play which, being also among the principal competitors of the firm, could exercise 
some control on it. Competition and partial dependence on major technology firms is indeed 
the primary external threat for Spotify: these firms have in fact strong global market positions 
that allow them to potentially penetrate more streaming music markets thanks to their already 
consolidated services and products. Another aspect that could negatively affect Spotify’s 
business is the probability to be sued for violation of intellectual property rights.  
Despite these internal and external difficulties, music streaming market has sharply expanded 
in the last years, due partly to the general increase of mobile phone users worldwide, that is 
expected to even grow in the next future, and also to a net change in the way music is listened. 
As shown by Figure 10, that segments the digital music revenue in the U.S. from 2008 to 2018, 
subscription and streaming revenue have greatly overtaken single and album downloads, 
gaining more than $7 billion in revenue during 2018. Besides intensifying its penetration on 
current markets – in the U.S. for instance Spotify already established a market share of 41% as 
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at 2016 and only in the United Kingdom the company had a market share of 59% in 2016 – 
Spotify’s future opportunities could also rely on developing countries: in Brazil, for example, 
the company already had a market share of 42% in 2016; moreover, the long-term equity 
investment made with Tencent Music Entertainment proves the firm’s commitment to expand 
soon in the Asian market. Furthermore, the company could establish additional partnerships 
also with other non-music technology firms. Finally, Spotify could develop new digital contents 
to be distributed across its current music streaming users via its already operative platform.  
 
Figure 10: Digital music revenue in the period 2008-2018. Data in millions of US$ (source: Statista website 
available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/186710/digital-music-revenue-in-the-us-since-2008/)  
 
4.2 – SPOTIFY’S DIRECT LISTING PROCESS 
Once described Spotify’s business model, financial results and market positioning, the 
following paragraphs will analyse the company’s listing process. Spotify’s went public on April 
3, 2018, on the New York Stock Exchange. Before this date, and since the announce of the 
company’s public debut through an unconventional way of listing, the event interested the 
opinion of many institutions, journals and organizations, even not involved in initial public 
offerings issues. Spotify can indeed be considered the first company to list through a direct 
public offering in a traditional stock exchange market like the NYSE. In the past there were in 
fact other cases of disintermediated public offerings, but they were primarily undertaken by 
very small firms or spin-offs in over the counter markets. Spotify’s case instead drew much 
more attention even because, in order to allow a direct offering to take place, the NYSE had to 



















opinion was therefore divided among who wished that Spotify’s approach and NYSE granting 
would have encouraged other companies to do the same, reversing, at least partly, the strict 
IPOs landscape, and who instead feared this potential change.  
The aim of this section however is not that of reporting the various comments and criticisms 
expressed on the advisability of the choices made by Spotify: the goal of this dissertation is 
indeed not that of illustrating the direct listing phenomenon per se, but that, if possible, to 
analyse the existence of a relation between it and the stock underpricing. The section will 
therefore describe in detail firstly the reasons which could have brought the company to the 
choice of a DPO and secondly the overall process; in particular, NYSE ad hoc rules, roles and 
actions of the subjects involved in the listing will be deeply presented; finally the third part will 
be dedicated to the description of pre-listing valuations, to their supposed influence on the 
determination of the reference stock price, and to the prices reached soon after the stock debut.  
 
Reasons behind the choice of a DPO 
As of March 2018, the principal shareholders of Spotify were those reported in Table 26. 
Company’s founders, Daniel Ek and Martin Lorentzon, though having less than 50% of 
ownership, through beneficiary certificates held the majority of total voting rights, 37.0% and 
43.5% respectively. The third relevant shareholder was represented by Tencent, the Chinese 
social media group detaining the 9% of Spotify’s shares. The remaining was owned by two 
investment funds, Technology Crossover Ventures (TVC) and Tiger, and by one of the main 
content providers, Sony Music. Together, as shown in Figure 11, they represented the 67.6% 
of Spotify’s outstanding shares and held the 84% of total voting rights.  
Principal Shareholders N. of ordinary shares % of ownership 
% of total 
voting rights 
Daniel Ek 49,594,360 27.1% 37.0% 
Martin Lorentzon 23,612,720 13.1% 43.5% 
Sony Music Entertainment  10,164,560 5.7% 1.8% 
Entities affiliated to TCV 9,616,720 5.4% 1.7% 
Tencent 16,152,440 9.1% - 
Tiger Global 12,801,280 7.2% - 
Table 26: Spotify’s principal shareholders as at March 2018 (source: own elaboration based on company’s 




Figure 11: Spotify shareholders by ownership as at March 2018 (source: own elaboration based on company’s 
Registration Statement, March 2018) 
Direct public offerings, as already seen in Chapter 1, do not involve the issuing of new capital 
but just provide for the listing of existing shares. In this sense, Spotify made no exception. It 
indeed offered on the NYSE up to 55,731,480 of the total 178,112,840 ordinary shares 
outstanding at the time of the listing, more than the 30% of the outstanding share capital. The 
operation sounds therefore like majority shareholders giving minority shareholders the 
possibility to diversify the investments made, creating a liquidity event. The advantages with 
respect to a traditional IPO are that, first of all, existing shareholders do not suffer any 
ownership dilution, and then that, even though some shareholders decide to divest, shareholders 
base could not become as wide as when fresh capital is issued. Additionally, Spotify could have 
opted for a DPO since it was already able to generate cash flows after having subtracted its 
investing and financing activity (2015 and 2016 increases in cash were respectively equal to 
€371  million and €190 million, while there was a net absorption of cash during 2017). 
However, having carefully analysed Spotify’s Registration Statement and extraordinary 
operations before the public offering, what has been just described seems to be only a secondary 
reason. Considering recent equity exchanges with Tencent Music Entertainment and 
conspicuous business acquisitions aimed at expanding the company’s intangibles portfolio and 
total asset size through the increase of goodwill, Spotify’s first intention of going public could 
have been that of using company’s stock as payment consideration for future acquisitions. In 
this way, company’s inorganic growth prospect could have increased company’s quality. 
Moreover, the use of a DPO could have corroborated potential investors opinion about the 
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was a signal that private debt and equity markets were adequate to fund the company in the near 
future, and on the other hand, the absence of investment banks in the role of underwriters was 
a proof of the company’s confidence about its own disclosures. If these elements were enough 
to obtain investors’ approval, Spotify could choose to issue new capital in the future without 
being too much concerned with it, since in this case it would have already established a pre-
determined value on the market.  
Of course, among Spotify’s considerations when choosing for direct listings, there were also 
reasons like the saving of many fees and indirect costs. First, the fact that there was no 
investment bank determining an offering price29 could have forced the market to strongly rely 
on the positive valuation obtained by the company in recent transactions30, and could therefore 
have eliminated the need for investment banks’ price support. Second, the shorter time and the 
fewer activities assigned to investment bank, should have lowered overall banks’ fees. Third, 
the disintermediated nature of the sale of shares and the assumed reliance on fair previous 
valuations, should have enabled Spotify to leave on the table a lower amount of money. Table 
27 reports expenses related to the DPO process declared by the company in its Registration 
Statement: as can be observed, of the nearly $46 million expenses, the most conspicuous item 
is always represented by fees paid to advisors, in particular financial ones, amounting to $35 
million. However, this amount is not extremely high if compared with the $100 million cashed 
in by investment banks during a traditional IPO like the one of Snap in 201731.  
DPO EXPENSES 
SEC registration fee $55,357 
Listing fee $320,000 
Printing costs $875,000 
Auditors' fees $1,848,900 
Legal fees and expenses $5,544,965 
Transfer agent and registration fees $73,806 
Other advisers' fees  $35,000,000 
Miscellaneous fees and expenses $2,000,972 
Total Expenses $45,719,000 
 




29 A reference price was established as well. See next paragraphs for all the details.  
30 Recent private transaction will be later discussed to the light of reference price determination.  
31 Source: “Spotify, la quotazione diretta spaventa le banche d’affari”, Il Sole 24 Ore (2018). 
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Spotify’s DPO preparation 
Within a listing system designed around repetitive phases of traditional IPOs, Spotify had to 
work closely with the Securities and Exchange Commission, with the NYSE staff, and with 
financial and legal advisors to achieve the goal of direct listing. The unusual way of listing 
required in fact to adapt, delete or update some typical rules and phases of IPOs.  
Starting in 2017, several meetings and confidential submissions were organized first with the 
NYSE and then with the SEC in order to obtain the approval to the direct listing. The outcome 
of them was primarily an amendment to the rule regarding the registration requirements on the 
stock exchange. Usually, indeed, the NYSE has the faculty to list private companies that 
previously have not been registered with the SEC if these companies can demonstrate a $100 
million aggregate market value of publicly held shares; this valuation has to result from both 
an independent third party valuation and from the most recent price reached during a transaction 
on a private placement market. Private companies must in fact present a sustained trading 
activity over several months. Spotify, although having performed some recent private 
transactions, did not fully meet this last requirement. As a consequence, in order to permit the 
direct listing of a company like Spotify, in March 2017 the NYSE began the formal rule filing 
process with the SEC, which was successfully completed in February 2018: it allowed the SEC 
to accept direct listing as long as the resale registration statement is considered effective. The 
new rule provides an exception to the private placement market trading requirement for issuers 
that, first, have a recent valuation from an independent third party indicating at least $250 
million in aggregate market value and that, second, engage a financial advisor to be consulted 
by the NYSE’s designated market maker (DMM) – which in the case of Spotify was Citadel 
Securities – in determining the opening trading price. Pursuant to this, Spotify engaged Morgan 
Stanley & Co. LLC. In addition, the company also hired Goldman Sachs & Co. LCC and Allen 
and Company LCC as financial advisors helping Spotify to define objectives for the listing, to 
advise on the registration statement, and to assist in preparing presentations and other public 
communications. However, unlike in a traditional underwritten IPO, they did not join investors 
meetings and they did not facilitate and coordinate price discovery activities or sale of ordinary 
shares.  
In connection with this change, NYSE also modified some specific rules. For Rule 15, that sets 
the requirements to follow from the DMM in determining the pre-opened indications – the price 
range within which the opening price of a security is anticipated to occur – the definition of 
reference price was changed: while in a traditional IPO it indicates the offering price set by the 
leading investment bank in consultation with main prospective investors and with the issuing 
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company, for direct listing companies it is assumed to be the most recent transaction price if 
the company had recent sustained trading in a private placement market, or, alternatively, a 
price determined by the stock exchange in consultation with a financial advisor of the company 
(NYSE Information Memo, 2018). Therefore, for Spotify the initial reference price, that was 
published to the market pre-trading, was determined by NYSE staff in consultation with 
Morgan Stanley, the company’s “leading” financial advisor; the two arrived at a reference price 
per share equal to $132. Table 28 shows Spotify ordinary shares price history in the most recent 
private transactions before the direct public offering: as can be observed, the reference price of 
$132 strictly reflects the highest price at which shares were previously sold in private 
transactions. In particular, in the month of January 2018, 600,000 ordinary shares were sold: 
the highest registered price in this round was $132,50. During March then, so few days before 
the listing became effective, nearly 5 million of ordinary shares, equal to the 3% of outstanding 
capital at the time, were sold: the highest registered price in this third round of 2018 was 
$131.88.  
   
Per Share Sale Price N. sold Ordinary 
Shares 
N. outstanding 
Ordinary Shares  
   High Low  
 January 2018 $132.50 $90.00 600,000 176,903,360  
 February 2018 $127.50 $95.00 2,174,760 176,976,280  
 March 2018 $131.88 $48.93 4,957,760 178,112,480  
Table 28: Spotify’s share prices in 2018 private transactions before the DPO (source: own elaboration based on 
company’s Registration Statement) 
Therefore, the NYSE and Spotify’s financial advisor seem to have strongly relied on previous 
private market transactions to determine the company’s initial reference price, maybe also 
because they represented a small but still significant percentage of outstanding shares. In a 
traditional IPO, it would have represented the offering price determined by the leading 
underwriter in consultation with the other investment banks and with the company, after having 
tested investors’ feelings and interests about the deal during the bookbuilding phase. Moreover, 
it would have been the price at which the same underwriter would have underwritten offered 
shares and then allocated to institutional (favoured) investors in the primary market, that would 
in turn subsequently have sold the shares in the secondary market at higher prices. As has been 
widely discussed, offering price determination through bookbuilding often involves 
behavioural compromises which do not deal with company’s real valuation. In the case of 
Spotify instead, where there was no investment bank underwriting and allocating shares at the 
reference price of $132 as it will be later discussed, the initial “offering price” was based on 
more robust and substantial elements: prices of recent private sale transactions.  
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Other rules that were modified for the accommodation to direct listing were Rule 104 and Rule 
123D. To Rule 104, that sets forth the responsibilities and duties of the DMM, was added that 
“[…] when facilitating the opening on the first day of trading of a NYSE Direct Listing that has 
not had recent sustained history of trading in a Private Placement Market prior to listing, the 
DMM will consult with a financial advisor to the issuer of such security in order to effect a fair 
and orderly opening of such security” (NYSE Information Memo, p.2). Rule 123D was instead 
revised so to allow the exchange to declare a temporary regulatory halt in some securities.  
Once obtained SEC approval to direct listing, Spotify could prepare and present its resale 
registration statement using, as a foreign private issuer, form F-1. The document allowed 
shareholders whose shares were registered in the Registration Statement to resell them as long 
as the Registration Statement would have been effective: for this purpose, the statement 
remained effective for 90 days since the first day of listing, during which all shareholders, 
except for Tencent that had signed a lockup agreement, had the possibility sell their shares. The 
content of the document tracked that of the registration statements of IPOs, except for the 
presence of a “plan of distribution” section, which mainly describes the role of the NYSE’s 
designated market maker and clarifies that the activities of opening the shares for trading and 
facilitating a market for Spotify’s shares would have not been performed in consultation with 
the company.  
As in a traditional IPO, in order to market the offering, Spotify was engaged in various investors 
education meetings and on March 15, it organized an Investor Day, having contents similar to 
a roadshow presentation. At least fifteen days before the event, Spotify was required to publicly 
file the registration statement including a red herring prospectus, in which the company 
provided a price range indication together with the high and low sales prices per share of recent 
private transactions. During the Investor Day the entire leadership team of Spotify discussed 
some presentations, and what is more, made them publicly available to everyone who wanted 
to join them, without restrictions, through a website. On March 23, the SEC declared Spotify’s 
Registration Statement effective. 
 
Spotify’s effective listing 
 As Spotify chose the novel of direct public offering to list, it wanted the overall process to be 
as fair and transparent as possible. For this reason indeed, not only the reference (offering) price 
of $132 was determined on the basis of the highest last available private sale prices, but also 
the opening price was defined through a different mechanism: it did not tracked previously set 
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offering price like in traditional IPO, but was a simple market trading price. Opening price was 
in fact the single price at which buy and sell orders collected by the NYSE broker-dealers 
matched (following the single price auction rule). The DMM that had to set an opening market 
price, pursuant to NYSE directions, was free to consult with Morgan Stanley, which however 
did not have the same information as in the case of a bookbuilt offering. Morgan Stanley was 
therefore expected to provide input to the DMM regarding its own understanding of the 
ownership of outstanding ordinary shares and of prelisting selling and buying interest on them, 
only relying on investors and shareholders of the time, without coordinating in any way with 
the company. The opening price however has inevitably been partly influenced by pre-opening 
indications published one by one by the DMM about the price range at which ordinary shares 
could open the first day of trading, as indeed happens for an underwritten initial public offering. 
In addition Spotify also specified in the Registration Statement (p.46) that, since the company 
benefits of a broad consumer awareness, “individual investors may have a greater influence in 
setting the opening public price and subsequent public prices of our ordinary shares on the 
NYSE and may have a higher participation in our listing than is typical for an underwritten 
initial public offering. This could result in a public price of our ordinary shares that is higher 
than other investors (such as institutional investors) are willing to pay”. 
On April 3, Spotify therefore opened the trading on the NYSE at a price of $165.90 per share, 
approximately 25.7% higher than the reference price of $132. Company’s and market 
expectation, as declared in the Registration Statement, was a significant initial price volatility. 
According to these expectations indeed, the lack of an investment bank underwriting the shares 
and selling them at the reference-offering price would have impacted the range of buy and sell 
orders submitted to the NYSE. Among the major risks, there was that of a sharp and significant 
decline in the price of the shares. On the contrary, the first day of trading was characterized by 
a high trading volume – 30,526,507 shares were traded of the potential 55,731,480 total shares 
that could be sold – and by a relatively low price volatility, averaging 12.3%. The highest 
reached price was $169.00 while the lowest was $148.26. Spotify stock then closed at $149.01 
per share, obtaining a market valuation higher than $26.5 billion which, according to Dealogic, 
made Spotify the eight-biggest technology initial public offering after the first day of trading. 
The closing price was therefore approximately 10.2% below the opening price but 12.9% above 
the reference price: if Spotify had listed using a traditional underwritten IPO, but the offering 
price had not been determined through the bookbuilding approach but simply using more 
unbiased parameters like recent private transactions, the company would then have suffered an 
underpricing level approaching 13%. Overall, the listing day accomplished Spotify’s main 
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goals in this process by providing liquidity to the company’s shareholders, equal access to all 
buyers and sellers, a transparent process, and a trading price that was determined by market-
driven supply and demand forces.  
 
4.3 – CONTEMPORARY INTERNET-RELATED IPOs 
The previous section described the DPO process which took Spotify public. As explained, the 
company did not lose any money tied to a real stock underpricing, since there was no 
underwriter initially selling the shares at the reference price. The first trading on the public 
stocks indeed realized at the market clearing price. However, merely on theoretical terms, also 
the case of Spotify direct listing could be deemed underpriced at a level of 13% with respect to 
the reference price. This section wants therefore to understand how fair this potential degree of 
underpricing could be in comparison with other Internet-related IPOs which took place in the 
same period of time and in the same stock market. Next paragraphs will present the sample data 
used in the research, the data sources and the most important variables analysed. Then a sort of 
descriptive analysis of the IPOs is performed, that will highlight which are the main principal 
characteristics of the reported Internet-related IPOs and their eventual relationships with shares 
underpricing. Finally, the last part will discuss the most important differences between the 
Spotify’s DPO and other Internet IPOs. 
 
Data and data sources 
The sample collected is composed by 26 IPOs completed on the NYSE and on the NASDAQ 
in the period between April 2016 and December 2018. The selection of the period was dictated 
by Spotify’s offering date: since the company listed in 2018, it is reasonable to compare it with 
other Internet IPOs that took place in the same year or just few years before; taking older 
Internet IPOs would have biased analysis results, including particular phenomena such as the 
Dot-com bubble or the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The choice of NYSE was then made both 
because Spotify listed on that market and because it is considered the largest stock market in 
the world by market capitalization32; NASDAQ represents instead the preferred market by the 
most important high-tech companies and Internet firms in the world. Table 29 reports collected 
data about IPO offerings and companies together with the relative sources.  
 




Table 29: IPO data and data sources used in the research (source: own illustration) 
The list of Internet-related IPOs, firms’ SIC (“Standard Industrial Classification”) code, offer 
date and final offering price, have mainly been obtained from Jay R. Ritter’s website33. 
According to Ritter’s, there have been 28 Internet-related IPOs in the period 2016-2018. The 
sample used in this research is instead reduced to 26 Internet IPOs, after having excluded two 
IPOs for which data were not complete and fully available. Data about the first day closing 
price have been taken from IPO Scoop website34. Data about the stock market in which 
companies listed, the number of offered shares in the IPO and the ordinary shares outstanding 
at the time of the IPO, needed to calculate the total money left on the table and firms’ market 
capitalization, have been collected from each company registration statement; number of 
offered shares and consequently the number of  ordinary shares outstanding after the offering 
do not include eventual additional shares in the case of exercise of the overallotment option. 
Companies incorporation dates, needed to calculate the age of the company at the time of the 
IPO, products or services offered by the company, and revenue of the company of the last 
available yearly financial statements before the IPO have been found in companies’ websites.  
 
Variables description 
In order to analyse the sample, variables described in Table 30 were used. First of all, IPO first-
day return, alternatively referred to as “initial return” or “IPO underpricing” in the following 
paragraphs, has been calculated using the Raw Initial Return formula seen in Chapter 3: as the 
 
33 “A list of internet IPOs (1990-2018)” available on Jay R. Ritter website. See 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ [access date: 20 May 2019].  
34 “Scoop Track Record from 2000 to the present” available at: https://www.iposcoop.com/scoop-track-record-
from-2000-to-present/ [access date: 20 May 2019].  
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percentage difference between the offering price and the first day closing price. Since IPOs 
dates just differ at most by two years, there was no need to calculate IPO underpricing using 
the Market Adjusted Initial Return formula. Moreover, the majority of the empirical studies 
reported in Chapter 3 uses the Raw Initial Return formula in order to calculate first-day initial 
return. IPOs are defined as underpriced when initial return assumes a positive value, that is 
when the first-day closing price is higher than the offering price, overpriced when the initial 
return is negative and correctly priced when the first-day closing price is equal to the offering 
price. Another variable used in the analysis and strictly connected with the one just described 
is the amount of money left on the table, which gives an insight of the degree of IPO 
underpricing in monetary terms: it is indeed calculated as the difference between the first-day 
closing price and the offering price multiplied by the shares issued.  
   
VARIABLE EXPLANATION 
 
IPO first-day return 
The IPO raw initial return (underpricing): the percentage difference 
between the offering price and the first-day closing price  
Money left on the table 
The difference between the first-day closing price and the offering 
price multiplied by the number of offered shares  
Age of the company 
The difference (in years) between the IPO date and the incorporation 
date  
Market capitalization 
The product between the final offering price and the number of 
shares outstanding at the time of the IPO  
Ratio of shares offered 
Number of shares offered in the IPO divided by total outstanding 
shares  
Table 30: List of variables used in the research (source: own elaboration) 
Other variables elaborated in order to segment the sample are: the age of the issuing company 
at the time of the IPO, calculated as the difference (expressed in years) between the date of the 
IPO and the date of incorporation of the company; the company’s market capitalization (taken 
as a proxy of the company’s size), computed as the product between the final offering price and 
the number of shares outstanding at the time of the IPO; finally the ratio of offered shares, 
calculated as number of shares offered in the IPO divided by total outstanding shares.  
 
Descriptive analysis and results 
Once described the various sources and the variables constructed, the following analysis first 
presents the main characteristics of the sample and tries to link them with the theoretical and 




As can be firstly noted from Table 31, the analysed 26 Internet-related companies of the sample 
show an average initial return of 30.77%. In particular, the 81% of them (21 IPOs) are 
underpriced, presenting an average first-day return which approaches the 40%; 12% of them (3 
IPOs) do instead experience a 13.20% of overpricing and only 8% of analysed companies (2 
IPOs) are correctly priced. The most overpriced company was Carvana, an online retailer of 
automobiles, whose initial offering price was $15 but closed at $11; symmetrically, the most 
underpriced IPO was that of Elastic NV, an enterprise search software company, which 
experienced a first-day return of 94.4%, with an offering price equal to $36 and a closing price 
equal to $70. However, even excluding these two outliers, the average underpricing still remains 






   Number of IPOs 21 3 2 26 
% on total 81% 12% 8% 100% 
Mean initial return 39.99% -13.20% 0.00% 30.77% 
Max/Min value 94.40% -26.00% - - 
Table 31: Descriptive statistic of the sample (source: own elaboration based on sample data) 
Figure 12 reports the frequency distribution of the IPO initial return which, as could be 
expected, is less concentrated towards very high values. Regarding underpriced IPOs, 33% of 
them present a quite elevated initial return between 40% and 60%; 28% of them have an 
underpricing between 20% and 40% and only 19% of them suffered an underpricing lower than 
the 20%.  
 
Figure 12: Frequency distribution of IPO initial returns (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
Table 32 summarizes the most relevant characteristics of the sample directly linked with the 
offering. As can be observed, at a first sight the underpriced subsample highlights different 
values in terms of average market capitalization with respect to overpriced and correctly priced 
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subsamples. However this is mainly due to few large technology companies biasing the mean: 
Snap, the camera company which launched Snapchat application, with a market capitalization 
higher than $19 billion; the storage software Dropbox, having a market capitalization higher 
than $8 billion; finally Stoneco (which offers cloud base online payment) and Farfetch (a luxury 
fashion platform) approaching the $7 billion and the $6 billion, respectively. The majority of 
the underpriced companies presents indeed a market capitalization between $1 and 2$ billion. 
Regarding the offering price, although calculating an average of it will always be imprecise, 
underpriced IPOs seem also to receive a higher valuation ($19.57) with respect to overpriced 
($16.33) and correctly priced IPOs ($12.00). Considering the ratio of offered shares on the total 
market capitalization instead, underpriced and overpriced subsamples both present a ratio of 
18%. Internet IPOs of this sample then left a total amount of money on the table of 
approximately $181 million.  
  Underpriced Overpriced Correctly Priced 
Mean offering price $19.57 $16.33 $12.00 
Mean market capitalization (US$ millions) 2,978 1,057 1,024 
Mean ratio (offered shares/mkt cap) 18% 18% 44% 
Mean money left (US$ millions) $181  - - 
Table 32: Descriptive statistic of the sample (source: own elaboration based on sample data) 
Figure 13 further highlights how the level of initial return varies with firms’ market 
capitalization. Seven ranges of market capitalization are compared with the corresponding 
mean initial return for the IPOs included in the sample. It is possible to figurately distinguish 
two paths: firms having a market capitalization smaller than $1 billion show a moderate first-
day return ranging from 10% to 17%; the rest of the companies instead does not present great 
variance in the mean initial return: the means are all concentrated between the 30% and the 
40%. In particular, Snap, the company of the sample presenting the highest market 
capitalization supported an IPO underpricing of 44.0%, while Dropbox, the second largest 
company by market capitalization, registered a 35.6% first-day return. Regarding this sample 
therefore, underpricing seems to be positively correlated with market capitalization, but only 





Figure 13: Mean initial return for different ranges of market capitalization (source: own illustration based on 
sample data) 
Another frequently firm specific factor taken into consideration when discussing IPO 
underpricing is companies’ age at the time of listing. Among others, Laughran and Ritter (2004) 
and Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) empirically proved that underpricing is generally more 
severe for young firms, being their valuation more uncertain. Observing Figure 14 however, 
which reports mean initial returns by companies age, it seems to be no relation at all. This 
outcome could be due both to the small size of the sample that does not allow to find absolute 
results and probably also to the fact that the “Internet” feature pools IPOs of different ages in 
terms of underpricing.  
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Although, as explained before, the analysed period is selected so to avoid external distortions, 
some differences in underpricing level could be underlined also distinguishing for the three 
analysed years. As displayed in Table 33, 10 companies of the sample went public in 2017 and 
11 during 2018; only 5 companies listed instead during 2016. For this reason, it seems more 
appropriate to compare 2017 and 2018 results. 2018 average level of underpricing is decisively 
higher than 2017’s, attesting at 46.5% versus 16.2%. During 2018 moreover, no firm was 
overpriced, as report data regarding the maximum and minimum level of initial return reached 
in each year. When comparing yearly mean initial returns of the IPOs in the sample with those 
of all IPOs conducted in the analysed period (Ritter, 2018), the result is a higher degree of 
underpricing for Internet-related firms: Loughran and Ritter (2004), DuCharme, Rajgopal and 
Sefcik (2001) and Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000) findings, demonstrating that Internet-
related IPOs are generally characterized by more severe underpricing than other IPOs, seem to 
be validated also by this small sample. In particular, the greatest difference in mean 
underpricing of only Internet firms and that of all IPOs, is much prominent during 2018 (46.5% 
versus 18.6%, respectively).  
Year N. of IPOs 
Mean Initial Return 
of Internet IPOs  
Men Initial Return 
for all IPOs 
Max – Min Initial 
Return 
2016 5 24.5% 14.6% 67.2% - (3.1%) 
2017 10 16.2% 13.0% 67.9% - (26.0%) 
2018 11 46.5% 18.6% 94.4% - 1.6% 
Table 33: Descriptive statistic of the sample compared with general data (Source: own elaboration based on 
sample data and on Ritter’s data available on 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2019/03/IPOs2018_Underpricing.pdf) 
Spotify’s direct public offering therefore took place in a year characterized by a particularly 
high level of underpricing: 2018 first-day return, averaging around 46% is indeed more than 
three times the potential level of underpricing that Spotify would have suffered in the case of a 
traditional underwritten process, 12.9%. In terms of offering terms, no IPO would be 
appropriate to be compared with Spotify. The global leader of the music streaming did in fact 
obtain a valuation in terms of reference price of $132, while the highest offering price of the 
IPOs in the sample is that of Elastic NV, equal to $36. The company also distances the other 
IPOs by considering its market capitalization: $23.5 billion against a mean of $2.8 of the 
sample. Despite this, in order to better evaluate Spotify direct listing and reference price, the 
sample can be reduced to few companies, nearer to Spotify also in terms of revenue and services 









before the IPO) 
millions of US$ 
Age  
(at the time of 
the IPO) 
Dropbox 35.6% 2018  $8,240,489,544   $1,106.800  11 
Roku 67.9% 2017 $1,326,478,930  $398.649  15 
Snap 44.0% 2017 $19,673,592,890  $404.482  6 
Spotify 12.9% 2018 $23,510,894,880 $4,840.92435 12 
Table 34: Descriptive statistics for more comparable companies (source: own illustration based on sample data) 
The three companies included in the table have been chosen by combining different parameters: 
first, although being all Internet-related companies, businesses which have more affinity with 
the streaming market were considered; second, revenues in the last year before the IPO year; 
third, companies’ age at the time of the IPO. Market capitalization has also been taken as a 
relevant criterion. The reduced sample is therefore composed by:  
− Dropbox, a software working on the storage of different types of data on the Internet, which 
may be an important future partner for Spotify in the management of data about users’ 
preferences; as Spotify, it went public in 2018, 11 years after its incorporation, but it 
differently chose the NASDAQ as stock exchange; it presented about $1,107 million in 
revenue in 2017, obtaining a capitalization higher than $8 billion; it registered an 
underpricing equal to 35.6%.  
− Roku, an American company offering a series of online media players, among which 
movies and music, through its own mobile device; hence, it can be considered among 
Spotify’s smaller competitors; Roku listed in 2017 on the NASDAQ, 15 years after its 
incorporation date; during 2016 it recorded revenues for nearly $399 million; with a market 
capitalization higher than $1 billion, its shares experienced a significant initial return, equal 
to 67.9%.  
− Snap, the company based on the technology of the camera, went public on the NYSE during 
2017, quite young, only 6 years after its foundation; it both could be a partner, a competitor, 
or even a future business acquisition for Spotify; 2016 revenues amounted to $404 million; 
market capitalization, as already said, is particularly high ($19 billion) and initial return is 
consistent as well (44.0%).  
Therefore, also taking into account only the most comparable IPOs of the sample, artificial 
initial return of Spotify still remains largely lower with respect to the three IPOs presented 
 
35 This number was calculated as the product of 2017 Spotify Euro revenues (4,090) times the exchange rate 
USD/EUR at 31/12/2017, equal to 1.1836 (source: “Tassi di cambio storici mensili” on Banca d’Italia website). 
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above. Several are the common elements between them and Spotify: firms’ age at the time of 
the IPO (Dropbox is the nearest one), business sector (Roku) and market capitalization (Snap). 
Although these similarities, the three identified IPOs present an average underpricing 36 
percentage points higher than Spotify’s one (49% versus 13%). The reason of such a result must 
therefore be found in other elements, as the mechanism used to determine the reference-offering 
prices.  
 
4.4 – THE VALUATION OF SPOTIFY 
As many other large technology firms, the value of Spotify was difficult to be evaluated at the 
time of the DPO. The only certain available references were the sale prices at which company’s 
shares had been sold few months before the DPO. As already discussed, the company’s initial 
reference price ($132) – published by the DMM on the NYSE that could have partially 
influenced buy and sell orders prices – was determined on the basis of those transactions. The 
resulting artificial initial return (12.9%) was extremely low in comparison with other 
technology Internet-related IPOs which went public in the same year (46.5%). Hence, the 
question is whether Spotify has been overvalued or not during the pre-listing phase; that is, 
whether the reference-offering price of the company was set too high, so to result in a reduced 
underpricing with respect with other IPOs, or whether it was instead correctly priced or even 
set below the real value of Spotify’s shares.  
To estimate if the reference price of Spotify was correctly set, this section will first provide an 
evaluation of the company using Discounted Cash Flow (DFC) methodology, which will be 
then corroborated by a sensitivity analysis on the main critical variables of the model; finally, 
the DCF results will be compared with a Multiples analysis.  
 
Discounted Cash Flow analysis  
The starting point of the DCF analysis has of course been a deep and careful study of the 
economic variables affecting Spotify financial performance since its incorporation date. The 
most important ones have already been largely discussed in the first section of this chapter 
regarding Spotify’s historical financials and for this reason this paragraph will not fully 
replicate them. Nevertheless, references at Spotify’s historical data will be made whenever 
necessary to better understand financial projections.  
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In the DCF analysis it has been used an explicit forecast period of 10 years. Spotify’s value 
beyond the explicit forecast period is estimated through the terminal value formula. 
Unfortunately, Spotify’s Registration Statement did not report any specific forecasts value, so 
all the assumptions made to perform the company’s analysis were arbitrary determined as 
follows36.  
Revenue growth is assumed to be quite sustained during the first five years of forecasts (2018-
2022) and more moderate in the last five years (2023-2027). In particular, the used annual 
revenue growth for 2018 is 39%, decreasing by 1 percentage point each year until 2022; the 
revenue growth assumed for 2023 is instead 33%, steadily declining year by year until reaching 
a level of 20% in 2027. Three methodologies were evaluated when trying to assess revenue 
forecasts. One possibility was that of taking comparable companies in terms of business, age 
and growth which went public some years before Spotify and simply replicate the growth they 
experienced in revenues after their IPOs. However, only two listed companies could be eligible, 
Pandora and Netflix. Nevertheless, Netflix listed on the NASDAQ during 2002: taking Netflix 
2003 revenue growth could be highly misleading since, from that time, macroeconomic 
conditions changed significantly; Pandora listed on the NYSE during 2011, at an age of 11 
years, the same of Spotify; however, because Pandora only operated in some specific countries 
and did not have the same global presence as Spotify had at the time of the IPO, neither this 
last company’s revenue growth seemed appropriate to reflect Spotify’s prospects. Another 
methodology which could have been used was that of relying on macro studies performed at 
industry level, as Damodaran does for instance; nevertheless, as the average datum also includes 
small and medium technology firms, it would have implied too much generalization that would 
not have properly reflected the company’s history. For these reasons, the used method was the 
historical approach. As already analysed in the first section of this chapter, Spotify experienced 
a rapidly and extraordinary growth in its start-up phase; from 2013 revenues were still 
increasing at sustained paths, as confirmed by the CAGR of 53% during the period 2013-2017. 
The three years before the DPO were still good, although presenting a decline in the revenue 
growth rate: 75.48% in 2015, 55.04% in 2016 and 38.55% in 2017. In the first section of this 
chapter it was highlighted how the company was able to increase quarter by quarter the number 
of its monthly active users, especially premium ones which represent the most conspicuous 
source of income: only from the first quarter of 2015 to the last quarter of 2017, Spotify’s 
premium subscribers increased from 18 million to 71 million. However, with an average of total 
 
36 All the tables regarding the forecasts described in this paragraph can be found in the Appendix B.  
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monthly active users of 157 million, the company has still the possibility to convert a large part 
of them into paying users, at a level high enough to sustain the revenue growth reached in 2017.  
COGS growth has been tied to revenues by forecasting the ratio between cost of goods sold and 
revenue level year by year. COGS over revenue is assumed to be 75% in 2018, slightly 
decreasing during the first five years of projections until stabilizing at a level of 68% in 2023. 
As already discussed, COGS mainly includes royalties and distribution costs paid by Spotify in 
order to acquire rights to stream protected contents. Although being always really high, in the 
last couple of years before Spotify’s DPO these costs stabilize around 78% of total revenue. 
2018 assumption of 75% could hence seem a little too optimistic, but it takes into account future 
benefits from Spotify’s recent agreements with main media companies aimed at changing, at 
least partly, the way in which these costs are computed: as analysed in the section dealing with 
risks and opportunities of the company, this is a necessary action for Spotify in order to keep 
grow.  
R&D, sales and marketing, general and administrative expenses: these expenses have all been 
forecasted on the basis of revenues, following a declining path, both by considering their 
percentage on revenue from 2015 to 2017 and by taking into account Spotify’s declarations in 
the Registration Statement. Research and development over sales is assumed at 10% in the first 
years of forecasts, then decreasing towards 7% in the last explicit year; since Spotify affirms it 
is keeping investing in order to better connect its users and to enlarge its offering beyond music 
streaming, these expenses remain at 10% at least until 2020. Sales and marketing expenses over 
sales are instead assumed to be more conspicuous, at 14%, from 2018 to 2020, since the 
company is expected to increase these costs as competition becomes more tightened. Finally, 
general and administrative expenses over sales are taken at an average level of 5.50% over the 
10 years.  
Operating tax rate could not have been inferred from Spotify’s previous financial statements, 
since the company has always been in loss. Therefore, as it is also disclosed in the company’s 
Registration Statement, the considered tax rate is the corporate tax rate applied by Luxemburg, 
equal to 27% for each of the explicit forecast years.  
Working capital change has been computed as the sum of trade receivables and other current 
assets with trade payables and other current liabilities (Spotify business nature implies indeed 
zero inventory). Trade receivables have been forecasted using DSO (days sales outstanding), 
which during 2017 have been equal to 32 days; therefore, they have been rounded to 30 days 
for the entire forecast period, as also disclosed by the company in the Registration Statement. 
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Trade payables have instead been forecasted as percentage of COGS: as in 2017, they have 
been kept at 11% of COGS until 2019, while they then slightly improve as the firm starts to 
make profits. Other current assets and liabilities are instead maintained quite stable at the levels 
of 2017.  
CAPEX (capital expenditures) has been calculated as the sum of net investment in property, 
plant and equipment and acquisitions in intangible assets, excluding goodwill. Usually the DCF 
analysis does not consider, for the sake of operating free cash flows, the acquired intangible 
assets; however, since the success of the company is partly linked to its capability of acquiring 
developed technology and patents, also this type of investment is considered as operating. 
CAPEX in property, plant and equipment is forecasted on the base of sales with a decreasing 
tendency: PPE percentage on revenue is assumed at 3% in 2018 till 1.20% in 2027; it is a very 
low rate considering a company that could still grow, but it is realistic if considering that 
Spotify’s operations mainly require only data centres and that the same company declared in 
the Registration Statement (p.127) that “our current facilities are adequate to meet our needs 
for the near future and that suitable additional or alternative space will be available on 
commercially reasonable terms to accommodate our foreseeable future operations”. CAPEX in 
intangible assets are also taken as percentage on sales: it is assumed at 3% of revenues for the 
first five forecast years and 2.5% for the remaining five.  
Amortization and depreciation have been instead forecasted as percentage of related fixed 
assets. Depreciation has been computed as the 60% and 50% of PPE during 2018 and 2019, 
respectively, and has then been taken constant at 40% for the remaining years. Amortization of 
intangible assets cannot be precisely forecasted: however, it is assumed to be at 30% of 
intangibles, net of goodwill, for the whole forecast period.  
Cost of capital has been taken from Damodaran WACC reports. The industries considered in 
computing Spotify’s weighted average cost of capital were software-entertainment, software-
Internet and software-systems and applications: the resulting average is a weighted cost of 
capital of 10.8%37.  
Final growth rate, needed to determine DCF terminal value, has been considered at 2%, that, 
also according to Damodaran (2017), is the most used final growth rate for the DCF analysis.  
As it is reported in Figure 15, the DCF analysis brought to a value per share of $147.74, 12% 
greater than the initial reference price set at $132. Estimated value per share is instead really 
 
37 Data available on Damodaran website at 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.htm> [access date: 09/09/2019]. 
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close – only 0.9% lower – to the price at which Spotify closed its first day of trading, $149.01. 
This first result suggests two main primary conclusions about the company’s valuation: first 
that the market is efficient in determining informative and fair prices of stock; and second, that, 
although having not sustained real indirect costs related to shares underpricing, also Spotify has 
been, at least at the first instance, arbitrary undervalued – and therefore underpriced – by the 
stock exchange (the NYSE) and the lead financial advisor (Morgan Stanley). However, in order 
to draw some solid conclusions, this first analysis will now be tested by a sensitivity analysis 
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The first varibales on which a sensitivy analysis was conducted are, as it is very common in the 
valuation framework, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the final growth rate 
(g). As shown by Table 35 indeed, estimated value per share results highly influenced by 
changes in these two variables: maintaining all other assumptions unchanged and decresing the 
cost of capital just to 10.0% while increasing the final growth rate to 2.5% for instance, would 
bring to a value per share of $149.5, very close to the first-day closing price of Spotify. 
However, since DCF analysis and in praticular terminal value are highly influenced by these 
measures, it is appropriate to maintain a more conservative approach. 
  WACC 













1,0% 184,0 168,2 154,3 135,4 131,2 121,5 112,9 
1,5% 194,3 176,9 161,7 141,2 136,7 126,3 117,0 
2,0% 206,0 186,7 170,1 147,7 142,8 131,6 121,6 
2,5% 219,5 198,0 179,5 155,0 149,7 137,5 126,7 
3,0% 235,3 211,0 190,3 163,2 157,4 144,0 132,3 
Table 35: DCF results sensitivity analysis by WACC and final growth rate (source: own elaboration) 
Beyond cost of capital and final growth rate, which are always highly debated in the framework 
of the DCF, as also seen in the explanation of the assumptions, the two main items which largely 
determine Spotify’s final price per share are revenue growth and COGS. Initially, a sensitivity 
analysis for the each of the first three years of projections has been performed on the basis of 
revenue growth rate and COGS percentage over sales, as reported in Tables 45, 46 and 47 in 
Appendix B. Nevertheless, in order to underline the effect of contemporary changing these two 
variables in multiple years, two other complete scenarios have been developed with respect to 
the base scenario analysed in the previous paragraph.  
In the more optimistic scenario, as can be seen by Table 48 contained in Appendix B, 2018 
revenue growth is assumed at 40%, decreasing by one percentage point year by year until 2020, 
and then restabilising at revenue growth rates considered in the base model. Simultaneously, 
COGS over revenue is taken at 74% in 2018, 73% in 2019 and 72% in 2020; the rest of the 
assumptions are unchanged with respect to the base model. As can be seen from Table 36, this 
version brings to an estimated value per share of $152.01, 3% higher than the $147.74 value 






Final Growth Rate 2.00% 
Terminal Value     45.769  
PV of TV    16.413  
Sum of NPV    20.274  
Non operating assets      2.141  
EV    22.415  
NFP          467  
Market value of equity    21.948  
N. Outstanding Shares (ml)          178  
Value per Share (€)    123,23  
Value per Share ($)    152,01  
USD/EUR=1,2336 at 31/03/2018 
Table 36: DCF valuation results based on the optimistic scenario (source: own elaboration) 
In the more pessimistic scenario instead, as can be seen by Table 49 contained in Appendix B, 
2018 revenue growth is assumed at 37%, decreasing by one percentage point year by year until 
2023. COGS over sales is instead increased to 76% in 2018, 75% in 2019 and to 74% in 2020. 
The remaining forecast assumptions are kept at the base model level. As can be observed by 
Table 37, this scenario results in an estimated value per share of $138.37, 20% lower than the 
$147.74 value per share estimated through the base model.  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Final Growth Rate 2.00% 
Terminal Value             42.221  
PV of TV            15.140  
Sum of NPV            18.305  
Non operating assets              2.141  
EV            20.446  
NFP                  467  
Market value of equity            19.979  
N. Outstanding Shares (ml)                  178  
Value per Share (€)            112,17  
Value per Share ($)            138,37  
USD/EUR=1,2336 at 31/03/2018  
Table 37: DCF valuation results based on the pessimistic scenario (source: own elaboration) 
Therefore, assumptions made in the base model appear much more skewed towards the 
optimistic scenario. With the following Multiples analysis, it would be possible to assess if the 
estimated value per share of $147.74 has been built on too much optimistic assumptions or if it 








In order to perform Multiples analysis, 10 firms have been considered: among them six are 
direct competitors of Spotify, while the others are large technology companies which could 
become Spotify’s competitors in the near future38. Useful data in order to calculate EV/sales, 
EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA multiples are all disclosed in Table 3839. 
 
Table 38: Dataset for Spotify’s multiple analysis (source: own elaboration from Macrotrends data) 
To understand which of the three reported multiples could be the most appropriate to assess 
Spotify’s enterprise value, three linear regressions were performed with respect to the EBITDA 
margin (last column of the Table) over the three multiples. As can be observed by looking at 
the regression charts (Figure 19 and 20) in the Appendix C and at the Figure 16 below, the only 
relation, although imperfect, seems to exist between EBITDA margin and revenue multiples.  
 
Figure 16: Regression chart of EBITDA margin over revenue multiples (source: own illustration based on 
sample data) 
 
38 Snap was not included in this sample, since although having all the characteristics to be considered a future 
competitor of Spotify, its outlier financials regarding EBIT and EBITDA would have created misleading results 
given the small size of the sample.  
39 All the data in Table reflect available value at 31/12/2017 (source: Macrotrends website).  
 Data in 
millions of US$ 
P/BV MKT CAP NFP EV SALES EV/ SALES EBITDA EV/ EBITDA EBIT EV/EBIT
 EBITDA 
margin 
Apple 6,02 879.350  23.026    902.376  229.234  3,9 71.501    12,6 61.344    14,7 31%
Amazon 20,43 594.900  6.243-      588.657  177.866  3,3 15.584    37,8 4.106      143,4 9%
Bilibili n.a. 760         193-         567         379         1,5 12          47,3 34-          -16,7 3%
Dropbox 24,19 6.230      29          6.259      1.107      5,7 75          83,5 114-         -54,9 7%
Google 4,8 771.380  97.902-    673.478  110.855  6,1 33.061    20,4 26.146    25,8 30%
Netflix 23,23 91.170    3.676      94.846    11.693    8,1 7.169      13,2 839         113,0 61%
Pandora 7,92 1.310      228-         1.082      1.467      0,7 278-         -3,9 493-         -2,2 -19%
Roku 33,72 4.600      177-         4.423      513         8,6 14-          -315,9 20-          -221,2 -3%
Tencent 14,14 489.460  4.820-      484.640  35.188    13,8 13.365    36,3 13.365    36,3 38%
Twitter 3,55 18.180    2.694-      15.486    2.443      6,3 515         30,1 39          397,1 21%

















Once decided for which multiple to use in this analysis, the calculated average EV/sales of the 
whole sample is 5.8x, resulting in a total enterprise value of Spotify equal to €23,744 million 
(2017 Spotify’s revenue are indeed €4,090 million), €1,954 million higher than Spotify’s EV 
resulting from the base scenario (€21,798 million). However, as also discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, Spotify’s main competitors are Apple (with the offering of Apple 
Music), Amazon (which provides Amazon Music Unlimited and Amazon Prime), Google 
(since it owns both Google Play and YouTube) and Netflix (the giant of the streaming). The 
Chinese group Tencent, though holding Tencent Music Entertainment which could be 
considered among the most direct competitors of Spotify, has not been included in this list since, 
being participated by Spotify through a minority equity stake, it would have implied additional 
calculations in order to neutralize this effect. As can be observed from Table 39, restricting the 
sample to these firms brings the mean EV/sales to 5.4x, resulting in an enterprise value of 
Spotify of €21,922 million, only 1% higher than the enterprise value computed through the 
DCF analysis. For this reason, the value per share obtained through the base version of the 
discounted cash flow analysis of $147.74 could be deemed much more reliable than the other 
two scenarios.  
  Apple Amazon Google Netflix Mean 
EV/Sales 3.9x 3.3x 6.1x 8.1x 5.4x 
Spotify 2017 Revenue €4,090 
Spotify EV (multiples) €21,922 
Spotify EV (DCF analysis) €21,790 
Table 39: Spotify’s enterprise value through multiples valuation (source: own elaboration from the sample data) 
 
4.5 – SPOTIFY’S DPO SUGGESTIONS 
In the previous paragraphs it has been described the Spotify’s direct listing process, the 
company’s performance and situation before the DPO, and the stock market debut; additionally, 
it has been reported the valuation of Spotify (at the time of the DPO) performed using DCF 
methodology and multiples analysis. In this last section of the chapter it will instead be debated 
which could be the lesson, in terms of shares valuation, from the first real DPO undertaken as 
an alternative to traditional IPOs.  
All this dissertation has been focused on the phenomenon that characterizes the majority of 
initial public offerings and that is often referred to as the most conspicuous indirect cost of 
listing: shares underpricing. However, can a DPO, and hence Spotify, really be deemed 
underpriced? Is it correct to speak about underpricing for direct listings like the one of Spotify? 
For what concerns the limited knowledge of this work, the argument has never been directly 
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faced and the existing literature only provides few and unclear answers about it. In the study of 
Spotify’s case, the overall DPO process followed by the company has been deeply described: 
it has been seen that, although three prestigious investment banks (Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
Sachs, Allen and Co.) have been indeed involved in the issue, they have only played a marginal 
role compared to what is usually done in a traditional IPO. In specific, they did not underwrite 
any of the shares offered by Spotify’s selling investors. They just limited – Morgan Stanley in 
particular being the leading financial advisor – to determine with the NYSE and with the 
designated market maker first an initial reference price (set at the level of $132.00 also looking 
at Spotify’s previous private shares transactions), and then a clearing market price (set at 
$165.90 on the base of buy and sell orders received by the DMM), both without getting an 
opinion from the company or prospective investors. Therefore, since in the case of Spotify the 
first price at which shares began to be exchanged was the market clearing price, shares 
underpricing could not be found: company’s shares were indeed not underwritten and sold by 
investment banks to institutional investors at the offering price, to be then resold by such 
investors in the secondary market at a higher price than the offering one. In other words, the 
company did not leave any money on the table, since no share was indeed sold at the offering-
reference price and therefore no share did initially trade at discount.  
From another point of view, however, all the elements necessary to ideally compute shares first-
day return exist also in Spotify’s direct listing. As it has been broadly observed in Chapter 3, 
which summarizes the most important empirical evidences of IPOs underpricing related to 
investment banks’ role and bookbuilding process, underpricing is usually calculated as the 
percentage difference between the first-day trading closing price and the offering price. Since 
also in the case of Spotify’s DPO a reference price has been determined – as required by NYSE 
ad hoc Rule 15 which substitutes the term “offering price” with that of “reference price” for 
direct public offerings – stocks initial return can be calculated, as usual, as the percentage 
change from the reference price ($132.00) to the closing price ($149.01) of the first day of 
trading, resulting in an underpricing of 12.9%. In this sense, it could be right to debate about 
shares underpricing also in the framework of this specific case, if the phenomenon is simply 
intended as a measure of the trading price jump over previously set value indications 
incorporated and reflected in a reference-offering price, that only expresses how much the 
offered shares have been undervalued during the pre-listing phase. Of course, it is sure that this 
point could weaken the results of this dissertation and for this reason the following conclusions 
should be validated by further future analyses on the issue, as more companies will chose to list 
through this innovative mechanism.  
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Having clarified that, as it has been assessed in the section dedicated to the valuation of the 
company, also Spotify shares seem to have been undervalued before their effective listing. As 
found through the DCF analysis indeed – then corroborated by sensitivity and multiples 
analyses – the assumed fair value of Spotify’s shares is $147.74, really close to the first day 
closing price of the stock, $149.01, but 11.9% higher than the reference price of $132.00. This 
outcome has therefore suggested that also Spotify’s shares, as the majority of IPO shares, have 
indeed been undervalued by Morgan Stanley when setting the reference price in consultation 
with the NYSE. The only difference was that Spotify’s shares did not initially trade at that price 
since they were not underwritten by the investment bank. Therefore, also the in the case of this 
DPO, at least theoretically, it is possible to sustain that company’s shares have been underpriced 
by 12.9% (since the DCF has resulted in a value per share really similar to the closing price, 
this last is considered as the real value of Spotify’s shares, as market mechanisms are supposed 
to be more efficient than the valuation analysis performed in this dissertation is).  
During this chapter it has also been studied IPO underpricing of a sample of 26 Internet-related 
firms which went public through the traditional underwritten process from 2016 to 2018. It has 
been highlighted that the majority of them was indeed underpriced, and that the degree of that 
underpricing was decisively higher, in particular for companies that went public during 2018, 
than the average level reached considering also non-Internet IPOs. As shown in Figure 17, the 
11 Internet IPOs conducted during 2018 and considered in the sample exhibited in fact a mean 
initial return of 46.5%, more than twice the mean underpricing level calculated on the basis of 
all the IPOs undertaken in 2018 (18.6%). In this context, Spotify’s underpricing (12.88%) 
appears as an exception: not only the company’s shares were less underpriced than the other 
Internet-related IPOs of the same year, but they were also significantly less underpriced than 
the average underpricing of all the 2018 IPOs. Moreover, also taking into account only the 
largest technology companies of the sample like those displayed in Figure 18, Spotify remained 
among the firms presenting the lowest level of underpricing (only Presidio exhibited a smaller 
initial return, equal to 1.8%). The final paragraph of the section dedicated to the contemporary 
Internet-related IPOs analysis then compared Spotify’s initial return with underpricing levels 
of the most comparable firms within the sample: Dropbox, Roku and Snap; although presenting 
similar features to Spotify’s ones – in terms of market capitalization, offered services and age 
at the time of listing – their underpricing (35.6%, 67.9% and 44.0%, respectively) was 




Figure 17: Yearly Mean Initial Return of the sample, of all IPOs and of Spotify in the period 2016-2018 (source: 




Figure 18: Initial Return of some of the most important Internet-related IPOs of the period 2016-2018, compared 
with Spotify’s (source: own illustration based on sample data) 
Therefore, the whole analysis performed in this chapter suggests two primary conclusions: the 
first is that also Spotify’s shares have been somehow underpriced in the pre-listing phase, and 
the second is that this positive first-day initial return is however much lower than the average 
underpricing of contemporary technology IPOs. At this point, the question could therefore be: 
which could be the reasons behind the lower underpricing level of the company? A first 
explanation could rely in the grater size of Spotify with respect to the other firms of the sample 
in terms of revenue; this characteristic, associated with the fact that a firm with higher revenue 
is also supposed to have a well-established market share, could make the company more 




























trustworthy than smaller and younger companies. However also looking at the largest 
technology IPOs undertaken after 2000, initial returns remain elevated40: just to cite the most 
relevant, LinkedIn IPO (2011) initial return was 109.4%, Twitter IPO one (2013) was 72.7%, 
Groupon IPO one (2011) was 30.6% and Google auction one (2004) was 18.04%. The cause of 
Spotify’s lower level of underpricing must therefore be found in the way the company’s shares 
offering took place and, especially, in the procedure according to which the reference-offering 
price has been determined. Chapter 3 reported some of the main empirical studies about IPO 
underpricing linked to the role of investment banks. In particular, one section was dedicated to 
the evidences related to principal-agent asymmetries, in which Chen, Fok and Kang (2009) 
demonstrated that self-marketed IPOs – that is, investment banks’ IPOs underwritten by the 
same investment banks – were less underpriced than non-self-marketed IPOs. In another 
section, dedicated to the test of Benveniste and Spindt theory (1989), Jenkinson and Jones 
(2004), Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) partly concluded 
that positive first-day return is largely discretionary used by underwriters more in order to 
favour their own main relevant clients than to effectively gain information about the real value 
of issued shares. Finally in the section dealing with the relation between shares underpricing 
and price-setting mechanisms all the considered authors – Derrien and Womack (2003), Kaneko 
and Pettway (2003), Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) – highlighted that shares offered 
through auction IPOs were systematically less underpriced than shares offered through the 
bookbuilding mechanism. Following these evidences, Spotify’s lower degree of underpricing 
could be due first, to the absence of investment banks in the role of underwriters – thus 
neutralizing information asymmetry problems between bank and listing firm and deleting 
investment bank’s interests in favouring its own clients – and then to the fairer mechanism 
through which the reference price has been determined. Spotify’s experience could therefore 
be assumed as one more proof about bookbuilding approach inadequacy in determining IPOs 
offering prices. While Derrien and Womack (2003), Kaneko and Pettway (2003), and Lowry, 
Officer and Schwert (2010) studies underlined that listing companies could save more money 
if opting for an offering price determined on the basis of an auction mechanism rather than of 
an orders’ book collected by underwriters, Spotify’s direct public offering suggests an 
alternative way in which offering price could be set also in traditional underwritten IPOs: by 
referring, if existing, to recent private market equity transactions.  
 




However, another allowed question would be the following one: why did Spotify’s financial 
advisor, Morgan Stanley, and stock market, the NYSE’s staff, decide to underprice Spotify’s 
shares as well? They could have simply set the reference price equal to the estimated 
fundamental per share value of the company’s equity (for example, taking that deriving from 
this DCF analysis, at $147.7) and the resulting first-day initial return would have been very 
close to zero. In traditional underwritten IPOs it rarely happens since, at least part of the 
underpricing level, benefits investment bankers and its clients; but in a DPO, where investment 
banks have no possibility to favour their own interests’ and institutional investors ones, there 
would be no rational to, even if ideally, underprice offered shares. One explanation to this issue 
could be found in Anand’s theory (2003): as described in Chapter 2, Anand sustained that a 
certain degree of underpricing is required also in direct offerings, in order to be able to compete 
with traditional underpriced IPOs. Spotify’s offering could in a first instance be set at discount 
so to make it desirable to prospect investors: even though investors who bought Spotify’s shares 
did not record any tangible capital gain with respect to the reference price, they could have been 
persuaded by the idea of investing in a stock whose fundamental value ranged from $138 to 
$152 (expanding the DCF analysis at the results obtained through the “optimistic” and the 
“pessimistic” scenarios) but that was initially “offered” only at $13241.  
After having tried to carefully interpret the various reasons behind some crucial aspects of 
Spotify’s direct public offering, two main general suggestions dictated by the first real direct 
listing case can be summarized as follows. First, provided that the concept of underpricing could 
be somehow applied also to DPOs, also direct listings will likely be interested by first-day 
closing price appreciation with respect to reference-offering price: an ideal shares underpricing 
could indeed realize since investment banks and stock markets, only marginally involved in the 
process, are interested, for some unclear reasons, in underpricing the offering as well. Second, 
the eventual positive first-day return of offered shares will probably be lower than that of other 
IPOs: reference price determination under DPO process will indeed appeal to fairer and more 
reliable criteria, such as previous price transactions, which better approximate the fundamental 
value of the stock. 
  
 
41 In some sense, this reasoning could be considered as an alternative application of Loughran and Ritter (2002) 





The starting point of this dissertation, investigating the relation between underpricing and direct 
listings, has naturally been a thorough study of the theoretical literature about IPO underpricing. 
This initial research has highlighted that, while the numerous empirical studies conducted in 
different period of times and in various financial markets have all confirmed the presence, 
though in different measures, of this phenomenon, theoretical literature has never been, and 
probably, will never be able to provide a single and exhaustive explanation to IPO underpricing. 
Completely aware of this, author’s interest has however been captured by recent studies 
focusing on the connection between underpricing and the way in which the listing process is 
structured in terms of price setting and shares allocation. One particular statement by Ritter and 
Welch (2002, p.11), reporting that “[…] the solution to the underpricing puzzle has to lie in 
focusing on the setting of the offer price, where the normal interplay of supply and demand is 
suppressed by the underwriter”, has led to the decision of deepening this aspect of underpricing.  
For this reason, part of this dissertation has been dedicated to the review of the most relevant 
evidences about the topic. Stemming from the perception of a large amount of money left on 
the table from the Internet bubble forward, these studies have concentrated their attention on 
the role of underwriters within the listing process. Among others, Chen, Fok and Kang (2009) 
analysed the issue by examining self-marketed IPOs, that is initial public offerings of banks 
who participate in the distribution of their own shares, finding that, when investment banks are 
involved in their own IPO, the expected level of underpricing is lower. Various authors have 
then faced the point by focusing on investment banks’ activities performed along the 
bookbuilding procedure: Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002), Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002), 
and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) have demonstrated that investment banks’ discretion in 
allocating shares among investors is often aimed more at favouring regular important clients 
than at setting more informative offering prices. Finally, Derrien and Womack (2003), Kaneko 
and Pettway (2003) and Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) have empirically compared 
underpricing resulting from bookbuilt IPOs with that of auctions, highlighting that, when 
underwriters are little involved in the price-setting mechanism, as indeed happens for auctions, 
underpricing is greatly reduced.  
Following these findings, the case of Spotify’s direct listing wants to contribute and corroborate 
these previous empirical evidences by adopting a unique perspective, that of a completely 
disintermediated listing process indeed. By analysing an initial public offering in which no 
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investment bank has assumed the role of underwriter and by comparing it with contemporary 
traditional IPOs, similar to Spotify under many aspects except for the type of offering, the 
influence of investment banks on underpricing should been easily recognised. Therefore, the 
aim of this work was first to understand if underpricing could be somehow identified also in 
this type of listing, and then to compare it with underpricing level reached by traditional IPOs.  
The study of the Spotify’s direct public offering has shown that the company, materially, did 
not leave any money on the table in going public. It has been seen that, although three 
prestigious investment banks (Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Allen and Co.) have been 
indeed involved in the issue, they did not underwrite any of the shares offered by Spotify’s 
selling investors. They just limited to determine with the NYSE and with the designated market 
maker first an initial reference price – set at the level of $132.00 by looking at Spotify’s previous 
private shares transactions – and then a clearing market price – set at $165.90 on the base of 
buy and sell orders received by the DMM – that represents the price at which Spotify’s shares 
began to trade for the first time. Therefore, the decision to list through a direct offering, thus 
providing for no institutional investors buying company’s shares from underwriters at the 
offering price and reselling them soon after at higher prices, has allowed Spotify to save 
millions of dollars in terms of indirect costs of listing. However, from a pure theoretical point 
of view, all the elements necessary to ideally compute shares first-day return exist also in 
Spotify’s direct listing. Since also in this case a sort of offering price has been determined, as 
required by NYSE ad hoc Rule 15 which substitutes the term “offering price” with that of 
“reference price” for direct public offerings, stocks initial return can be calculated, as usual, as 
the percentage change from the reference price ($132.00) to the closing price ($149.01) of the 
first day of trading, resulting in an underpricing of 12.9%.  
It has been explained that this artificial initial return can assume a double meaning. First, it 
could be simply intended as a measure of how much the trading price jumps over previous value 
indications incorporated and reflected in the reference price; in such case, Spotify’s ideal 
underpricing would only express the extent of shares’ undervaluation during the pre-listing 
phase. Alternatively, it could represent the real loss suffered by the company, if it had chosen 
to list undertaking a traditional underwritten IPO, in which, however, offering price had been 
determined using more tangible parameters as private shares transactions prices, than the 
bookbuilding approach. By adopting this last interpretation, it has become interesting to 
examine the magnitude of the underpricing phenomenon for contemporary traditional IPOs, 
whose offering prices were indeed established by taking into account banks’ and investors’ 
private interests.  
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For this purpose, a sample of 26 Internet IPOs listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ between April 
2016 and December 2018 has been analysed. It has been first observed that most of the 
companies (81%) are indeed underpriced and that the mean initial return over the three analysed 
years is 30.8%. It has also been highlighted that only companies presenting a market 
capitalization lower than $1 billion show a mean initial return under the 20%, while all the 
others are characterized by mean underpricing averaging from 30% to more than 40%. In 
particular, firms with the greater market capitalization, Snap and Dropbox, have been 
underpriced by 44.0% and 35.6%, respectively. Finally, distinguishing underpricing for each of 
the three years, 2018 IPOs exhibit the highest average level of underpricing (46.5%) with 
respect to 2017 IPOs (16.2%) and 2016 IPOs (24.5%). Moreover, Internet IPOs undertaken in 
2018 have been much more underpriced than all other IPOs operated in the same year (the mean 
initial return for all the 2018 IPOs is indeed 18.6%). 
Therefore, the empirical evidences deriving from the analysed sample showed that, at least 
theoretically, Spotify’s underpricing has been more contained than that of contemporary and 
comparable IPOs. However, in order to assess if the company has indeed been undervalued in 
the pre-listing phase – that is, if the reference price has been set under the real shares’ value – 
company evaluation using discounted cash flow methodology and multiples analysis has been 
performed. The fundamental analysis, corroborated by various sensitivity scenarios, has 
evidenced that the company’s value per share at the time of the DPO is $147.7. As the reference 
price was set almost 11.9% lower than Spotify’s fundamental value, this outcome confirms that 
the firm has indeed been underpriced in phase of pre-listing valuation. Then, company’s initial 
return of 12.9% results much lower than the level of underpricing of both the comparable 
Internet IPOs considered in the sample and the whole population of IPOs conducted during 
2018, thus proving its exceptional nature. 
It has then been hypothesized that, following Anand’s theory (2003), Spotify’s direct public 
offering could have been underpriced in order to make it as appealing as other contemporary 
IPOs for prospective investors: though not gaining any evident direct benefits from Spotify’s 
shares underpricing, Morgan Stanley and the NYSE could have decided to underprice Spotify’s 
shares on purpose so to let them compete with traditional underpriced IPOs. Moreover, it has 
been assumed that the lower degree of shares underpricing could be attributed to the mechanism 
by which the reference price was determined. While Derrien and Womack (2003), Kaneko and 
Pettway (2003), and Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) studies underlined that listing 
companies could save a large amount of money if opting for an offering price determined on 
the basis of an auction mechanism rather than of an orders’ book collected by underwriters, 
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Spotify’s direct public offering suggests another alternative by which offering price could be 
set also in traditional underwritten IPOs. Indeed, if traditional IPOs provided for a more limited 
negotiation between investment banks and institutional investors about the offering price and 
relied instead more on tangible and objective criteria such as private sales prices, as done in the 
case of Spotify’s reference price, underpricing degree would be largely reduced. 
Nevertheless, these hypotheses must be carefully weighted, since the analysis does present 
some limitations. First, the comparable sample has a small size, only including technology and 
Internet IPOs undertaken on the two main American stock markets in the period 2016-2018; 
Spotify underpricing could be further compared with large technology IPOs conducted in 
previous years or with contemporary non-technology IPOs. Second, the whole work questions 
the conceptual meaning of underpricing, inquiring if such phenomenon can only be defined 
when investment banks underwrite offered shares, entailing that issuing companies actually 
leave money on the table, or if it can be defined also in the context of DPOs, whenever the first-
day of trading closing price jumps above the offer price, thus conveying market shares 
appreciation with respect to pre-opening valuations. Since, for what concerns the limited 
knowledge of this work, the existing literature only provides few and unclear answers about the 
argument, this concrete case has hopefully underlined an aspect of underpricing before 
unexplored. As other companies will decide to go public through direct listing, further studies 













Table 40: Consolidated Spotify Profit and Loss Statement from 2015 to 2017. Data in millions of € (source: 




Table 41: Consolidated Spotify Balance Sheet Statement from 2015 to 2017. Data in millions of € (source: 



















Table 45: DCF sensitivity analysis on revenue and COGS growth for 2018 (source: own elaboration) 
 
 
Table 46: DCF sensitivity analysis on revenue and COGS growth for 2019 (source: own elaboration) 
 
     
Table 47: DCF sensitivity analysis on revenue and COGS growth for 2020 (source: own elaboration) 
 
 
33,0% 34,0% 35,0% 36,0% 37,0% 38,0% 39,0% 40,0% 41,0%
72,0% 142,8     143,8     144,8     145,8     146,8     147,8     148,8     149,8     150,8     
73,0% 142,5     143,5     144,5     145,5     146,5     147,4     148,4     149,4     150,4     
74,0% 142,2     143,2     144,1     145,1     146,1     147,1     148,1     149,1     150,1     
75,0% 141,8     142,8     143,8     144,8     145,8     146,8     147,7     148,7     149,7     
76,0% 141,5     142,5     143,5     144,4     145,4     146,4     147,4     148,4     149,3     
77,0% 141,2     142,1     143,1     144,1     145,1     146,1     147,0     148,0     149,0     
78,0% 140,8     141,8     142,8     143,7     144,7     145,7     146,7     147,7     148,6     
79,0% 140,5     141,5     142,4     143,4     144,4     145,4     146,3     147,3     148,3     












32,0% 33,0% 34,0% 35,0% 36,0% 37,0% 38,0% 39,0% 40,0%
71,0% 142,9     144,0     145,0     146,0     147,0     148,0     149,0     150,1     151,1     
72,0% 142,5     143,5     144,6     145,6     146,6     147,6     148,6     149,6     150,6     
73,0% 142,1     143,1     144,1     145,1     146,2     147,2     148,2     149,2     150,2     
74,0% 141,7     142,7     143,7     144,7     145,7     146,7     147,7     148,7     149,8     
75,0% 141,3     142,3     143,3     144,3     145,3     146,3     147,3     148,3     149,3     
76,0% 140,9     141,9     142,9     143,9     144,9     145,9     146,9     147,9     148,9     
77,0% 140,4     141,4     142,4     143,4     144,4     145,4     146,4     147,4     148,4     
78,0% 140,0     141,0     142,0     143,0     144,0     145,0     146,0     147,0     148,0     











31,0% 32,0% 33,0% 34,0% 35,0% 36,0% 37,0% 38,0% 39,0%
70,0% 143,0     144,1     145,1     146,2     147,2     148,2     149,3     150,3     151,4     
71,0% 142,6     143,6     144,7     145,7     146,7     147,8     148,8     149,9     150,9     
72,0% 142,1     143,1     144,1     145,2     146,2     147,2     148,3     149,3     150,3     
73,0% 141,6     142,6     143,6     144,6     145,7     146,7     147,7     148,8     149,8     
74,0% 141,0     142,1     143,1     144,1     145,1     146,2     147,2     148,2     149,2     
75,0% 140,5     141,5     142,6     143,6     144,6     145,6     146,7     147,7     148,7     
76,0% 140,0     141,0     142,0     143,1     144,1     145,1     146,1     147,1     148,1     
77,0% 139,5     140,5     141,5     142,5     143,5     144,6     145,6     146,6     147,6     
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Figure 20: regression chart of EBITDA margin over EBIT multiples (source: own illustration based on sample 
data) 
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